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1. Introduction
The objective of this document is to summarize the research context of the work
I have done in the last three years as research associate and PhD student at the
University of Bremen. The document presents main ideas and methodologies that
have guided and accompanied me along the way. The central question of the thesis
is whether firm distress risk explains stock returns. This question is important
because it has been suspected that distress risk might reconcile a growing evidence
on patterns in returns, which are otherwise hard to explain, with conventional
economic theory.
The main motivation for the thesis is that research on the cross-section of stocks
seems to be in a state of “chaos” (Cochrane 2011, p. 1058). Harvey et al. (2015)
survey the literature and document hundreds of variables that have been proposed
to explain average stock returns. Most of these variables are firm characteristics.
The main concerns of this empirical literature are to either propose new proxies
for risk or to even challenge the conventional risk-return relation in general. But
the abundance of papers and variables leaves us in a state of confusion. First,
how many independent firm characteristics determine expected returns? Firm
characteristics are correlated with each other and the countless attempts to as-
sociate different characteristics with returns amount to an unprecedented data
mining. There is a need to condense the set of explanatory variables. Second,
why do common firm characteristics explain expected returns? This is the deeper
economic question. Firm characteristics are a particularly nasty type of variable
because they rarely give rise to straightforward interpretations. Explaining why
common characteristics are related to returns will often amount to mere specu-
lation because many characteristics are highly ambiguous. The goal of my thesis
is to unambiguously define firm distress risk as a characteristic in order to assess
whether it can explain patterns in returns with regard to other common charac-
teristics. Distress risk is a popular explanation for several characteristics (Fama &
French 1995, 1996). The thesis assesses whether distress risk can answer the two
questions posed above by investigating its ability to explain patterns in returns.
This task is important because it could help to reconcile empirical evidence on
asset pricing “anomalies” with conventional risk-based explanations.
The theory is straightforward. The Consumption-Based Capital Asset Pricing
Model (CCAPM), the most general absolute asset pricing model, states that in-
vestors worry about consumption risk. The Merton (1973) Intertemporal Capital
Asset Pricing Model (ICAPM) is nested in this framework and it is the workhorse
for modern empirical research. The theory is based on the premise that investors
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dislike assets which do badly when they are otherwise desperate. Assets that co-
vary positively with their “hunger” must compensate them with higher returns.
For instance, a stock which does badly in a recession, when investors are likely
to be simultaneously adversely affected by other shocks, is regarded as unattrac-
tive and should only be considered by investors if it offers higher average returns.
Hence, the empirical literature, which is now charged with data-mining, should
indeed be looking at state variable risk (Cochrane 2007). Fama & French (1995,
1996) argue that distress risk is an ICAPM state variable and suggest that firm
distress risk proxies for the risk associated with this state variable. Investors who
have outside labor income should dislike owning the stock of high distress risk
firms because the stock of these firms is expected to do badly just when the odds
of loosing jobs increase. Distress risk is a plausbile ICAPM state variable because
this description should characterize the average investor.
The actual empirical work is presented in four papers in the annex of this document
and the main empirical findings are briefly summarized in section 4. Specifically,
the research has produced three results: First, evidence from event studies suggests
that the above sketched relation between distress risk and stock returns exists.
Investors discount the value of distressed firms and are especially reluctant to
finance distressed firms in times of aggregate contraction. Stock market reactions
to rating events are more pronounced in times of aggregate contraction, there
is a flight to safety in the stock market. This phenomenon appears to be highly
persistent. The European Central Bank (ECB) has recently tried to counter it with
a battery of unconventional monetary policy measures, but my evidence shows that
these programs are rather unsuccessful in stimulating the propensity of investors
to finance distressed firms. Second, models to measure default risk at the firm level
are evaluated in a new and unique database on corporate defaults in the German
stock market. This is a rather technical issue that bears clear recommendations
for practical implementations in risk management. Third, the high accuracy risk
scores of these models are used to assess the relation between distress risk and
long-run average stock returns. The results remain inconclusive in this case, but
they suggest a few general insights for future research. In spite of all efforts to
reduce the ambiguity of distress risk as a firm characteristic (by defining it as a
powerful forecaster of defaults), viewing distress risk as a firm characteristic, which
is common in the empirical literature (Campbell et al. 2008, Dichev 1998, Griffin
& Lemmon 2002), is potentially misleading. Pure default risk affects only a small
proportion of firms to a significant extent. Stock investors should therefore be able
to diversify it away.
The theoretical context presented in this document is very powerful and com-
prehensive. Some of the world’s most renowned researchers have looked into the
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questions I ask in this thesis. To that end, I do regard my empirical work as small
steps towards a better understanding of the relationship between equity returns
and distress risk. Specifically, I believe they contribute in two significant ways to
the existing literature. First, they are to a considerable extent to be regarded as
out-of-sample tests. The vast majority of empirical research in finance is based
on US data and models, which are commonly used in research and practice, have
rarely been put to a test in other samples. This is troublesome because there are
important differences between the US financial system and, say, the German mar-
ket. The latter is clearly defined as a bank-based system where equity ownership
is low, attitudes toward financial risk are different and so on. By looking specifi-
cally at markets other than the US, I try to account for these factors in assessing
how well the findings and models from the US can be transferred to other mar-
kets. As a consequence, a big challenge of my work has been to collect relevant
data. Data on US financial markets are now so easily accessible through modern
research databases, it does not take programming skills at all to generate highly
sophisticated samples. By contrast, all of the data I have worked with required
combining several sources and a lot of very cumbersome manual work has been
done to generate informative samples. I regard this as the second contribution of
my thesis. In the light of an intense research activity and competition between
researchers in our field, the uniqueness of data is a distinguishing feature of my
work.
The structure of this document is as follows: Section 2 discusses the main theoreti-
cal ideas behind the research. Section 3 is devoted to explaining the methodological
framework. It contains a review of several popular models to forecast corporate
defaults and an up-to-date discussion of methods in empirical asset pricing. The
four research papers I have written are presented in section 4. Section 5 concludes.
The appendix contains information on collaboration with peers, the four papers,
a declaration of authorship and my curriculum vitae.
2. Theory and Motivation
Any analysis should start off with some intuition. Over the last years, I have
repeatedly discussed my research with people from diverse backgrounds. The
typical intuitive answer reads: “Distressed equity should yield higher returns. You
would demand a premium as a debt investor in a distressed firm, equity investors
should be compensated similarly!”. Behind this statement is the idea that debt
and equity are priced in a similar fashion.
3

large number of (risk) factors affecting the prospects of firms. Sometimes there
are good news, sometimes things look rather bleak. On average, things appear to
be just fine and equity investors receive slightly positive excess returns. Equity
investors have to endure much and this is their reward. Credit spreads are strictly
larger than zero. Hence, debt investors receive a compensation for something that
is always there. The risk is not a constant, but there is no pronounced tendency for
things to cancel out. This is the nature of credit risk and this thesis investigates
whether such risk can be found in equity returns.
In the following, I turn to some theoretical foundations by summarizing models
that are now frequently used to price stocks. The goal is to discuss why distress
risk might play a role in these models.
2.1. Asset Pricing Theory: From the Consumption Model to
the ICAPM
Conventional asset pricing models are based on solid theoretical foundations. For
instance, Markowitz (1952) portfolio theory and a neoclassical equilibrium frame-
work gave rise to the Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965) Capital Asset Pricing
Model (CAPM) - a model taught in undergraduate finance courses. Therefore, it
is not introduced here. The empirical failures of the CAPM are legendary and too
numerous to summarize here. After all, the one factor CAPM has frequently been
criticized for not being able to explain why different stocks earn vastly different
returns on average. Consequently, subsequent empirical work, pretty much under
the aegis of Fama & French (1992), has found many other unexplained patterns
in the cross-section of equities. Subrahmanyam (2010) offers a literature review.
In general, this body of research can be regarded as an extensive explorative data
analysis without clear theoretical foundations. Explaining the empirical findings,
i.e. linking them back to a theory, is mighty difficult. The crux of the asset pricing
research of the last decades appears to be that going from the theory to the data
has not yielded fully convincing empirical results, whereas the road from the data
to the theory is equally long and thorny.
2.1.1. The Consumption Capital Asset Pricing Model
In light of this experience, it is very helpful to evaluate what the most general asset
pricing models, which are far more generic than the single factor CAPM, suggest we
should find in the data. The Rubinstein (1976), Breeden & Litzenberger (1978)
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and Breeden (1979) CCAPM is the most general absolute asset pricing model,
which nests all other common models as special cases (Cochrane 2005, Chp. 1-
4). Absolute asset pricing models price assets given fundamental sources of risk,
whereas relative asset pricing models price one security given others. The goal of
this thesis is to assess whether distress risk is a fundamental source of risk in equity
returns. Thus, it is important to understand what the ancestor of all absolute
pricing models, the CCAPM, postulates. This model is much more parsimonious
with regard to assumptions than the textbook CAPM. All it takes to derive this
model is to assume investors maximize lifetime utility, can trade securities at no
transaction costs and are not credit-constrained. According to the CCAPM, asset
prices p depend on the choice between saving and consumption c and are through
a stochastic discount factor m linked to consumption growth. The fundamental
CCAPM asset pricing function is stated in (1):
pt = Et[mt+1 × xt+1]
with mt+1 = ψ × u
′(ct+1)
u′(ct)
xt+1 = pt+1 + dt+1.
(1)
The stochastic discount factor m depends on subjective impatience ψ and the
marginal utility of today’s and tomorrow’s consumption u′(c). xt+1 is the absolute
profit consisting of tomorrow’s price and dividends. Conventionally, such a func-
tional form is simply called a p = E[m×x] model. Often, it is convenient to think
about this model in terms of returns instead of prices. Because the asset return is
given as Rt+1 =
xt+1
pt
, (1) is also frequently stated as
1 = E[m×R]. (2)
The elegance of this simple structure lies in the way it enables us to straight-
forwardly derive many very general insights from it. In the following, time sub-
scripts have been dropped for notational simplicity if they are not necessary. Let
R = (1+ r) denote the rate of return. The pricing kernel (1) can be rearranged to
represent the risk-free rate rf . Because there is no uncertainty about Rf = (1+rf ),
it can be represented as Rf = 1
E[m]
.2 Furthermore, multiplying out inside the ex-
pectation parameter in (1) yields:
2Proof: Consider the return on an individual security i:
1 = E[m×Ri]
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p = E[m]× E[x] + Cov[m,x]. (3)
Substituting E[m] with 1
Rf
establishes a direct relation between prices and con-
sumption risk:
p =
E[x]
Rf
+ Cov[m,x]. (4)
The first term on the right-hand side of (4) is the present value of the payoffs. The
second term is a risk surcharge. The most important implication of the CCAPM
is that investors dislike assets that are expected to loose value when consumption
growth is low. To see this more clearly, we can write out the stochastic discount
factor using (1) in (4) to obtain
p =
E[x]
Rf
+
Cov[ψ × u′(ct+1), x]
u′(ct)
. (5)
Investors discount prices of assets which are negatively correlated with marginal
utility of consumption. Conventional economic theory suggests u′(c) is decreasing
in c. Therefore, marginal utility of consumption is especially high when consump-
tion is low, for instance during a recession. Prices of assets whose payoff x is low
in such states are discounted according to (5) to incentivize risk averse investors
to buy these assets in spite of the negative correlation. In other words, investors
require premiums for holding assets that are expected to generate negative payoffs
when they are hit by negative consumption shocks. Being an absolute asset pricing
model, the CCAPM establishes a positive relation between returns and the most
fundamental risk among all risks in economics: consumption risk.
This model is comprehensive and concise, there are hardly good economic argu-
ments against the way it establishes a relation between fundamental macroeco-
nomic risk and asset prices. However, the empirical evidence is not very support-
ive. To test it, one needs data on aggregate consumption, which comes with many
1 = E[m]× E[(1 + ri)]× Cov[m× (1 + ri)].
Provided that asset i is risk-free, Cov[m× (1 + ri)] = 0. Hence:
Rf =
1
E[m]
.
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measurement issues and is, at best, available in monthly frequency (Breeden et al.
1989). 3 Empirically, the seminal test of the CCAPM by Mehra & Prescott (1985)
has given rise to the equity premium puzzle. A few further rearrangements es-
tablish a direct testable relation between asset price risk and consumption risk.
Multiplying out inside the expectations parameter in (2) for a given asset i yields
1 = E[m]× E[Ri] + ρm,Ri × σRi × σm. (6)
This expressions delivers the so-called Hansen & Jagannathan (1991) bound, which
establishes bounds on the levels of returns given levels of risk:
E[Ri] =
1
E[m]
− ρm,Ri × σRi ×
σm
E[m]
⇔ E[Ri] = Rf − ρm,Ri × σRi ×
σm
E[m]
.
(7)
According to (7), risk-free securities earn the risk-free rate, securities with a posi-
tive correlation coefficient ρm,Ri are positively correlated with the discount factor
and thus, due to the conventional assumptions regarding marginal utility (see (5)),
negatively correlated with consumption. Such assets are a hedge for consumption
risk, they have high payoffs when consumption is low, and yield lower returns
than the risk-free rate. Typically, such assets are just as hard to find as negative
correlations in real financial markets. Finally, securities that are negatively corre-
lated with the discount factor are the most risky assets from the perspective of a
consumer. Consequently, they must reward investors with higher returns. Corre-
lation coefficients like ρm,Ri cannot exceed 1 in absolute terms. Hence, (7) can be
rearranged to
|E[Ri]−R
f
σR
| ≤ σm
E[m]
. (8)
The left-hand side of (8) is the well-known Sharpe (1964) ratio. It cannot exceed
the right-hand side due to the constraint on the correlation coefficient. The expres-
sions (7) and (8) relate the excess return on any security i to the volatility of the
3A huge body of literature is devoted to measuring and explaining consumption growth. Work
by some of the most renowned finance researchers on this topic underlines how important
this matter is for asset pricing (Campbell 1991, Cochrane 1991, Thaler 1990).
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discount factor and the correlation of the asset with the discount factor. Moreover,
assuming a constant relative risk aversion utility function u(c) = c
1−θ
1−θ in (1) with
u′(c) = c−θ and risk aversion θ allows for a representation of the right-hand side
of (8) as4
|E[Ri]−R
f
σRi
| ≤ σm
E[m]
≈ θ × σ(∆ln(c)). (9)
As stated before, investors require a larger compensation for asset price risk when
consumption risk σ(∆ln(c)) or risk aversion is large. The infamous equity premium
puzzle is buried in these expressions. Mehra & Prescott (1985) report the long-run
historical average return on US equities as r = 0.0698 with a standard deviation of
σR = 0.1654 and the risk-free rate over the same time period (1889-1976) is given as
rf = 0.0080. These values yield a Sharpe ratio of 0.3736. According to (9), this is
to be put in the context of risk aversion and consumption growth volatility. Mehra
& Prescott (1985) find that the volatility of consumption growth is only 0.0357
and this would require a risk aversion coefficient of θ ≈ 10.5.5 But such a level
of risk aversion is completely at odds with the data. A large strand of literature
summarized by Mehra & Prescott (1985) suggests the coefficient should be well
below 1. Hence, observed equity premiums are too large to be consistent with the
CCAPM (equity premium puzzle).6 The equity premium puzzle has inspired a
vast body of research that has been summarized by Kocherlakota (1996). In spite
of these efforts, it continues to be regarded as a puzzle.
This thesis aims to contribute to explaining the cross-section of equity returns.
Expression (7) suggests the CCAPM could do this in principle. Several authors
have examined the ability of the model to explain cross-sectional return differ-
ences.7 Empirical work on the CCAPM proceeds as follows. As a first step, the
1 = E[m,R] structure is explicitly written down assuming a specific utility func-
tion and then linearized to obtain an empirically tractable specification. Assuming
a constant relative risk aversion utility function, Mankiw & Shapiro (1986) derive
4See Cochrane (2005, p.21).
5Cochrane (2005, p. 456) reports slightly different long-run averages and comes to a value for
risk aversion which is even higher, θ ≈ 50.
6Moreover, a second puzzle emerges from the CCAPM with regard to the risk-free rate, whose
empirical observations are much too low to be consistent with the model (see Cochrane (2005,
p. 457)).
7See, among others, Breeden et al. (1989), Lettau & Ludvigson (2001), Tedongap (2014).
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ri = r
f + (E[rm]− rf )× Cov(ri,
ct+1
ct
)
σc
, (10)
which gives rise to straightforward estimation techniques. In analogy to the famil-
iar CAPM, the normalized covariance on the right-hand side of (10) is the asset’s
consumption beta. The results presented by Mankiw & Shapiro (1986) suggest
consumption betas contain much less information on stock returns than the con-
ventional CAPM. Similar results have been obtained by Cochrane (1996) and
Lettau & Ludvigson (2001). Even though there is little to criticize in the way the
CCAPM establishes a relation between consumption risk and asset prices from a
theoretical perspective, the empirical results are not (yet) fully supportive of this
model.
2.1.2. The Intertemporal Capital Asset Pricing Model
For these reasons, the empirical literature has turned to alternative models relating
expected returns to generic state variables. A special case of the CCAPM is the
Merton (1973) ICAPM, which is more suitable for empirical work. In deriving
the ICAPM, it is assumed that consumers do not only optimize with respect
to current and future consumption but also with respect to certain time variant
state variables that characterize future investment opportunities. If investment
opportunities depending on state variables vary over time, an asset’s exposure to
the state variable will determine its average return.
What might these state variables be? Following the CAPM and CCAPM logic
an obvious state variable is wealth.8 In the CAPM and the ICAPM wealth as a
state variable is typically approximated by the market portfolio, i.e. the return
on a portfolio of all risky assets in the economy. Apart from this rather intuitive
insight, there might be a plethora of further state variables z, so linearization of
the ICAPM including these state variables as part of the consumer optimization
problem yields specifications like
E[ri]− rf = βmi × (rm − rf ) +
∑
βzi × µz, (11)
where rm is the return on the market portfolio, µz are the prices of state variable
8The consumer optimization problem underlying all asset pricing models can be formulated in
terms of wealth instead of consumption because wealth, savings and consumption are related
to each other through budget constraints.
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risk and β coefficients represent the sensitivities to these risk factors. Expressions
like (11) are nested in the CCAPM framework. All it takes in addition to (10)
is to assume that consumption wealth risk can be reasonably approximated by
the return on the market portfolio. Moreover, the simple CAPM is nested in the
CCAPM because it contains the assumption that no additional state variable and
just consumption wealth risk approximated by the market portfolio is relevant
for the consumer optimization problem. The ICAPM and the CAPM are just
approaches to substitute consumption out of the discount factor (Cochrane 2005,
Chp. 9).
It is evident that (11) alone has the potential to spark the enthusiasm of empirical
researchers. On the surface, it might appear to provide the empirical researcher
with a “fishing license” (Fama 1991), according to which relating arbitrary exoge-
nous variables to asset returns would be justified on the grounds of the ICAPM.
However, the standards for an ICAPM state variable are higher. It is important to
recall that we are dealing with state variables which are of special hedging concern
to investors (Merton 1973). For instance, a recession might be a state of concern
for investors. When investors care about their wealth in recessionary states and
dislike assets which worsen their situation in such times, they drive up current
prices for assets which are expected to provide a safe haven in recessions and drive
down prices of assets which are expected to collapse in such times. Consequently,
the former asset (the recession hedge) should yield a lower average return, whereas
the latter asset (the risky asset) should yield a higher average return. This example
illustrates that a variable can only be a state variable in (11) if it forecasts ag-
gregate macroeconomic activity (Cochrane 2005, Maio & Santa-Clara 2012, Boons
2016). This restriction is the ultimate safeguard against an interpretation of the
ICAPM as a fishing license for new factors.9
The discussion about ICAPM state variables is the origin of the debate about the
relation between distress risk and equity returns. Fama & French (1996) conjecture
distress risk is a state variable because, for most investors, human capital (labor
income) is an important asset, too. Investors, who are employed in industries
with high distress risk should avoid holding the stocks of these firms because a
negative shock to these firms would reduce both the value of their human capital
and the value of their financial assets. Fama & French (1996), who have suggested
this explanation for the value factor, directly connect to the CCAPM and ICAPM
theory with this line of argumentation.
9This restriction is very often ignored in the literature. Strictly speaking, it is even ignored by
Fama & French themselves.
11
2.2. Empirical Asset Pricing: Factor Models and their Failures
The Fama-French distress proposition is an important motivation for the empirical
work in this thesis. However, it is helpful to look at what empirical asset pric-
ing models based on the theory presented above have accomplished so far before
elaborating on the empirical relationship between distress risk and equity returns
further. As will become apparent later, assessing the relation between distress risk
and equity returns can be regarded as a key battleground in modern finance.
Fama & French (1992, 1993) proposed the Fama & French-3-factor-model (FFM)
in a time when the inability of the single factor CAPM to explain returns and
patterns of returns with respect to size and book-to-market ratios became widely
accepted empirical facts. The factors Small-Minus-Big (SMB) and High-Minus-
Low (HML) are supposed to summarize these common pattern in stock returns.
The empirical FFM is defined as
E[ri − f f ] = αi + βmi × (rm − rf ) + βSMBi × SMB + βHMLi ×HML, (12)
where zero pricing errors imply α = 0. Overall, the work of Fama & French
manifested in the FFM and a wide variety of articles, can be associated with two
goals. The first goal, the main concern brought forward in Fama & French (1992,
1993, 2012), is to show how well empirical asset pricing models, especially the
FFM, explain the cross-section of stock returns. The first goal is, for the most
part, a statistical exercise. The second goal, which is most clearly formulated in
Fama & French (1996) and Fama (1996) but visible in all other papers, too, is to
link the size (SMB) and value (HML) factors to state variables of special hedging
concern. Without this claim, there is not much that seems to connect (12) with
the CCAPM and ICAPM theory discussed above and the FFM may even appear
ad-hoc. Therefore, the second goal is about the economic content of the FFM.
The empirical strengths and weaknesses of the FFM are now very well known. The
model has made its way into the textbooks and is now standardly used in practical
applications like corporate valuation or the evaluation of portfolio managers. Nev-
ertheless, there is a vast body of literature on the empirical failures of the model.
Apart from size and value effects, researchers have detected many other patterns
in stock returns. The “anomalies-literature” is too extensive to summarize here,
selective summaries are provided by Richardson et al. (2010) and Schwert (2003).
The most popular “anomaly” in this regard is the Jegadeesh & Titman (1993) mo-
mentum effect. Momentum cannot be explained by the FFM and has given rise
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to the momentum factor Winner-Minus-Loser (WML) (Carhart 1997). Moreover,
an astonishingly large number of further “anomalies” has caused researchers to
propose new factors. In a thorough review of the literature, Harvey et al. (2015)
find 313 articles published in top academic journals or presented at top confer-
ences that propose 316 different factors for multifactor models.10 Cochrane (2005,
2011) calls this phenomenon a “factor zoo”. Obviously, the empirical methodol-
ogy of Fama & French has sparked a debate, which has made some things much
less clear. A growing strand of the methodological literature expresses skepticism
with regard to the enormous number of patterns that have been detected in stock
returns. Concerns about data-snooping, correctly sized test statistics and publica-
tion bias are obvious. Accounting for these issues is expected to reduce the number
of “anomalies” and factors in the future (Harvey et al. 2015, Lewellen et al. 2010,
McLean & Pontiff 2016).
An important motivation for this thesis is the controversial debate about the eco-
nomics behind the FFM. This debate is centered on the question whether the FFM
risk factors SMB and HML are compensation for systematic risk in the economy.
As explained above, Fama & French are the main proponents of the risk hypothesis.
However, they acknowledge their work remains somewhat incomplete as they con-
clude that their results “do not cleanly identify the two consumption-investment
state variables of special hedging concern to investors that would provide a neat
interpretation of our results in terms of Merton’s (1973) ICAPM” (Fama & French
1996, p.82). Roughly a decade later, the risk camp in finance has presented some
interesting new evidence in favor of risk-based explanations for the FFM factors.
Hahn & Lee (2006) show changes in the default and term spreads explain size and
value premiums in the US stock market. Petkova (2006) proposes a factor model
based on shocks to the dividend yield, term and default spreads as well as the short
rate. She shows that these variables are correlated with SMB and HML. More-
over, her model based on macroeconomic shocks has superior explanatory ability
than the FFM. These results support the notion of the FFM as an ICAPM. More
recently, the literature has acknowledged the restriction on empirical work related
to the ICAPM explained in section 2.1.2: state variable candidates must forecast
macroeconomic activity. Maio & Santa-Clara (2012) and Boons (2016) demon-
strate the ability of several macroeconomic variables to do so is consistently priced
in the cross-section of stocks. According to these results, which are based on the
condition that the ICAPM is no “fishing license”, there is no “factor zoo” but
ample evidence for risk-based explanations.
On the other side of the fence is behavioral finance. Advocates for behavioral
10According to Harvey et al. (2015), there are thousands of additional working papers and articles
published in other academic journals.
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explanations oppose the assumption of rational agents, which is essential for the
CCAPM and its nested models. Instead, they claim the patterns in stock re-
turns reflect investor over- and underreaction or mispricing in short. De Bondt &
Thaler (1987) argue seasonal patterns in stock returns can be explained by under-
and overreaction. Lakonishok et al. (1994) find that investors tend to na¨ıvely
extrapolate past earnings growth into the future and thereby underestimate the
true value of firms with high book-to-market ratios. According to this argumenta-
tion, incompetent investors drive up prices of growth firms and drive down prices
of value firms creating a value effect in stock returns. In a seminal paper, Daniel
& Titman (1997) demonstrate stock returns covary simply because they share
certain characteristics and not because they load on risk factors as stated in the
models summarized above. From the perspective of the risk camp, this evidence
is disturbing as anything beyond behavioral explanations for these results in hard
to conceive. The results brought forward by behavorial finance, Shiller (2003)
provides a literature summary, put the use of multifactor models like (12) into
question.
Where do we stand now? Capital market theory, most notably the CCAPM,
establishes a distinct relation between risk and returns. Ultimately, there should
be only one risk that explains returns: consumption risk. Empirical models, like
the FFM, are supposed to be clever tricks to replace consumption risk with easy
to measure firm characteristics. However, the empirical procedures have opened
the floodgates for many different characteristics that are associated with failures
of the models. These errors are manifested in a vast “anomalies” literature. After
all, such errors must not be lethal, as all models are wrong, but some are useful
(Box & Draper 1987). However, effectively, we are now dealing with a highly
multidimensional problem. There is a plethora of characteristics and we still know
relatively little about the economics behind them. The big problem is, the relation
between risk and returns, which was established by theory, seems to be evaporating
in the data. Are common characteristics proxies for risk? If so, what kind of risk
do they measure? Answering these questions is necessary in order to find out
whether models like the FFM are variants of the ICAPM/CCAPM.
2.3. Distress Risk - A Missing Link?
Fama & French (1993, 1995, 1996) conjecture distress risk is a state variable in the
ICAPM and the SMB and HML factors are proxies for this state variable. Distress
risk has four properties that render it an appealing state variable candidate:
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1. Distress risk fluctuates over the business cycle. Figure 2 illustrates this
statement using data on corporate defaults in the German stock market,
which are used in two of the empirical research papers of this thesis. Defaults
peak during the two recessions in 2003 and 2009.11 Hence, default risk might
very well be regarded as a recession state variable (Cochrane 2007).
2. The average investor should be exposed to distress risk regardless of her
asset market exposure. Fama & French (1996) make exactly this point.
When investors have labor income in the private sector, their wealth will be
adversely affected by default risk in low states, for example due to layoffs.
This could create correlation between consumption risk and asset price risk
that CCAPM/ICAPM investors dislike.
3. Estimating distress risk is less error prone than measuring consumption
growth. Admittedly, the former is not exactly trivial. One of the research
papers of this thesis deals with bankruptcy forecasting models and section
3 explains several default risk indicators in detail. However, distress risk
measures rely on audited accounting and stock market data, not on surveys,
which researchers need to conduct in order to gauge consumption volatil-
ity (Breeden et al. 1989, Campbell 1991, Cochrane 1991). The quality of
data in modern financial databases, like Thomson Reuters Datastream, is
by no means perfect, but it should be much better than the quality of data
which can be reached when questioning a representative sample of house-
holds. Moreover, distress risk estimates are available in higher frequency,
whereas consumption volatility data is typically low-frequency data.
4. Distress risk can be stated as a firm characteristic. In fact, it is most intuitive
to specify distress risk as a firm attribute, perhaps as a probability of default
(PD) (see section 3 for further details). This gives rise to straightforward
interpretations and well-known methods in finance. Furthermore, it allows
us to connect to a large body of research. Several characteristics that are
known to be correlated with stock returns are associated with distress risk.
For instance, small firms are much more likely to default on debt payments.
Various default risk models use firm size as a predictor and underline that
it is negatively related to risk (Campbell et al. 2008, Ohlson 1980, Shumway
2001). Book-to-market ratios have likewise been found to be associated with
default risk. Campbell et al. (2008) and Ding et al. (2012) show value firms
are more likely to default than growth firms.
Distress risk is a conceivable state variable candidate, Fama & French (1993, 1995,
11The third spike in 2013 is due to a large wave of defaults in the solar cells industry.
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Figure 2: Corporate Defaults in the German Stock Market
1996) suggest it as a risk-based explanation for the FFM factors. The big question
is whether distress risk is a missing link reconciling multifactor models with a
CCAPM/ICAPM interpretation. Obviously, the question at hand is important
enough to determine the future of empirical asset pricing and therefore too big
and controversial to answer in a PhD thesis. This is why I have chosen to present
this thesis as a collection of four research papers which provide empirical evidence
on several important aspects of this question.
The first paper assesses how equity markets respond to news about distress risk
over the business cycle in the short-run. Credit ratings are used as a measure
of distress risk and business cycle identification algorithms are applied to classify
recessions in a large international sample. The remaining three papers look into
the long-run relationship between distress risk and equity returns. A growing
strand of the US literature is devoted to this topic.12 The research presented
in this thesis aims at providing out-of-sample evidence by looking at German
and European data. This undertaking has made it necessary to evaluate several
alternative measures of distress risk. Credit ratings are not available for large
cross-sections of firms, except for the Compustat US-file. Therefore, the second
paper is concerned with performance tests of several distress risk models. Together
with two co-authors, I assess how well the models forecast defaults in the German
12See among others Dichev (1998), Griffin & Lemmon (2002), Vassalou & Xing (2004) and
Campbell et al. (2008). A detailed summary is provided in the third article (see appendix
B).
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capital market. This is a crucial part of the methodology for the subsequent papers
because it addresses the measurement error problem discussed above. Further
details on distress risk measures are also explained in the next section. The distress
risk know-how developed in this work has been used in the third paper to conduct
a series of asset pricing tests. Together with two co-authors, I assess the relation
between distress risk and equity returns and examine whether distress risk can
explain size, value and momentum effects in the German stock market. The fourth
and final paper deals with recent developments in monetary policy. Unconventional
monetary policy aims at reducing funding costs for distressed firms. To be effective,
the monetary policy must pass through a transmission mechanism in equity and
credit markets. I check whether the transmission mechanism of monetary policy
in the EMU works as expected. I show how stocks and CDS of firms in the EMU
respond to monetary policy shocks and assess how this response depends on distress
risk. Basically, this paper presents another perspective on the cyclical relationship
between distress risk and equity returns and points out some difference between
equity and credit markets.
3. Methodology
This section discusses how firm distress risk should be estimated. Various measures
have been proposed, I present the most common ones. Reducing measurement
errors and obtaining a precise estimate for distress risk is crucial in order to isolate
distress risk from other effects in asset returns. This issue is discussed in detail in
the second research paper, which contains a quantitative analysis of the forecasting
performance of models discussed in this section. The material below is based on an
extensive review of the literature that I have conducted when I began the work on
the thesis. It is supposed to clarify how distress risk is measured in the literature
and also in risk management practice.
3.1. Measuring Distress Risk
We are looking for a distress risk firm characteristic in order to use this informa-
tion in asset pricing tests. What is the meaning of “distress”? Distress is not
equivalent to default. However, both are closely related to each other; defaults are
typically preceded by a phase of distress. As such, distress is typically defined as a
period where cash flow is not sufficient to cover the current obligations of the firm
(Andrade & Kaplan 1998, Asquith et al. 1994, Whitaker 1999, Wruck 1990). Yet,
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the following section will show that low profitability and insufficient debt coverage
are typical predictors of corporate defaults. In a similar vein, Pindado et al. (2008)
find that default- and distress risk are not entirely different since models forecast-
ing distress apply largely the same predictors as their default risk counterparts.
After all, the work in this thesis needs to identify firms which are in distress and
these are firms with elevated default risk. In accordance with the existing strand
of the literature on distress risk and equity returns, I use the terms distress risk
and default risk interchangeably in the following.13
In this manner, the thesis can build on a large strand of the forecasting literature
that is summarized in the following. Default risk models can be classified in two
categories: structural and reduced form models. The former are derived from asset
pricing theories and the latter are data-driven approaches. In practice, estimating
distress risk is often outsourced to rating agencies providing opinions on credit
risk. In principle, credit ratings are offered to investors free of charge. From an
investor’s perspective, they may appear as a parsimonious and efficient solution to
the problem. Therefore, the review of the literature below begins with a discussion
of credit ratings.
3.1.1. Credit Ratings
Ratings are supposed to deliver information and alleviate the agency problem in
financial markets. Furthermore, they serve as a device to transmit regulatory stan-
dards into the practice of portfolio management. John Moody invented the credit
rating in 1909 in order to facilitate lending in the emerging railroad bond mar-
ket. Prior to the ascent of ratings, information on creditworthiness was flowing
through informal channels with heavy dependence on insiders, such as journal-
ists and bankers (Sylla 2002). Ratings were primarily meant to provide publicly
accessible information on credit risk. Ratings became an institutional feature of
the capital market when the US regulators incorporated ratings into their policies
in the 1930s. In 1986, ratings became even more important in regulation as the
Investment Company Act limited the possibility of portfolio managers to invest in
securities with ratings below certain thresholds. These developments have created
the so-called “investment grade threshold”: ratings BBB- and higher are called
investment grade ratings.
Ratings are opinions of the rating agency on the credit risk associated with an
13See, among others, Dichev (1998), Griffin & Lemmon (2002), Campbell et al. (2008) and
Vassalou & Xing (2004).
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issuer or an issue. Rating agencies are usually anxious to clarify that ratings,
which are published on an ordinal scale, offer no direct link to a PD (Standard &
Poor’s 2011). Moreover, rating agencies claim they apply a “through-the-cycle”
methodology in order to identify a long-run trend in credit risk. This approach is
unfavorable in risk management because it lowers the accuracy of PDs (Altman &
Rijken 2006). Agencies argue investors, who use ratings as basis for transaction
decisions in portfolio management, require some degree of rating stability (Moody‘s
2006, Standard & Poor’s 2008).14
In spite of these limitations, information on the likelihood of an issuer to default
is arguably the most sought-after information contained in a rating. One method
to uncover the link is given by the rating transition matrix. The transition matrix
published by Moody‘s (2008) tells us that an issuer with an Aaa rating, on average,
experiences a downgrade to Aa within one year with a probability of 7.74% and
goes into default with a probability of virtually zero. The PD increases as the
rating decreases, so that, on average, an issuer with a rating of Caa, well below
the investment-grade cut-off, shows a likelihood of 12% to default within a year.
The transition matrix is merely a descriptive statistic of the rating history and
thus inherently backward-looking. Nickell et al. (2000) analyze the stability of the
transition matrix through time. They find that the above stated probabilities vary
considerably in time, especially through the business cycle. To sum up, extracting
PDs from credit ratings is laden with some conceptual difficulties and feasible only
based on a very large and reliable rating history database.
With regard to the ability of credit ratings to differentiate defaulters from sur-
vivors, recent work by Hilscher & Wilson (2016) shows ratings are easily outper-
formed by reduced form default risk models. However, they still appear to contain
important information on the long-run component of default risk. In accordance
with these results, Lo¨ffler (2013) finds ratings predict the long run trend in default
risk. In addition, there is an ever-growing literature on the information content of
rating changes for capital markets. These studies generally find that rating changes
contain little information for equity and fixed-income markets (Hand et al. 1992,
Holthausen & Leftwich 1986, Norden & Weber 2004). Typically, asset prices show
strong reactions weeks before downgrades, no reactions in the aftermath of down-
grades and no reactions to upgrades in general. The first research paper of this
thesis assesses how markets react to news about distress risk conveyed by rating
changes. This article adds to the literature by suggesting that the market reaction
to rating changes should depend on the business cycle. In accordance with the
14In addition to this conceptual issue, the issuer-pay model and the competition in the ratings
market may impair the ability of credit ratings to provide reliable information on default risk
(Bolton et al. 2012).
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idea of distress risk as an ICAPM state variable, the reactions are shown to be
significantly stronger (weaker) during recessions (expansions). Further details are
provided in section 4.
3.1.2. Structural and Reduced Form Default Risk Models
The findings in the literature summarized above cast some doubts on the use of
credit ratings as indicators for distress. Furthermore, a large history of credit
ratings for the cross-section of German and European firms, which is used to
provide out-of-sample evidence on the relation between distress risk and equity
returns, is not available. Economies in the EMU are commonly regarded as bank-
based economies. Many firms in these economies are simply not rated because
their creditors are banks which handle credit risk with proprietary models. This
is why I spent considerable time with the development and testing of default risk
models. The results of this work are presented in the second research paper.
The quantitative analysis in this article was preceded by a thorough review of
the related literature. Forecasting corporate defaults has been an active field of
research since the 1960s, so there was no need to start from scratch.
There are two classes of default risk models. Structural models are based on
valuation theories and infer PDs from security prices. The most well-known model
in this class is the Merton (1974) Distance-to-Default (DD), which can be used to
estimate PDs based on stock prices. Moreover, there are approaches to infer PDs
from CDS and bond spreads (Bharath & Shumway 2008, Giesecke et al. 2010).
Reduced form accounting models are atheoretical and data-driven approaches.
Work in this areas has been pioneered by Beaver (1966) and Altman (1968), who
tried to identify the most relevant accounting information for the prediction of
bankruptcies.
I have reviewed all accessible articles devoted to forecasting default with structural
and reduced form accounting models. The literature has predominantly applied
two different methodological frameworks to estimate distress risk with reduced
form accounting models: linear discriminant analysis and several forms of binary
response regressions (logit and probit regressions), including survival models.15
Therefore, the review is restricted to articles applying these methods.16 Table 1
15The Cox (1955) model, the most popular model in survival analysis, is computationally equiv-
alent to multiperiod logit models (Shumway 2001). The label survival analysis is more well
known in medical research or engineering and has made its way into economics from these
areas.
16Furthermore, neural networks have been used to forecast defaults. The bulk of this research
20
lists all articles which have been reviewed.
has been published in the 1990s. By and large, the methodology could not demonstrate
superior power in this field (see Poddig (1994), Boritz et al. (1995)). The interested reader
is referred to Kumar & Ravi (2007) for a summary.
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The oldest article listed in table 1, Beaver (1966), dates back to the 1960s and
the latest one, Hilscher & Wilson (2016), has only been published recently. There
has been a continuous research interest in the field, yet the overall number of
articles (53) is not nearly as large as the “anomalies” literature summarized by
Harvey et al. (2015). One explanation for this finding is that default data are
not as standardly available as stock prices and balance sheet items in commercial
databases. In fact, the articles surveyed usually combine information gathered
from several databases and compiling the data frequently involves cumbersome
manual work. Defaults are rare events and several older studies listed in table
1 rely on very few defaults which makes their results less reliable. In spite of
these difficulties, a general finding emerging from this literature is that defaults
are predictable with high accuracy up to one year ahead. There is not a single
study that concludes otherwise. Hence, measuring distress risk as an unambiguous
firm characteristic seems to be possible.17
3.1.3. Reduced form accounting models
Pioneered by the work of Altman (1968), early reduced form accounting models
were developed using linear discriminant analysis. Ohlson (1980) showed this
technique unrealistically assumes equal covariance matrices of predictors across
defaulters and survivors. He recommended logit regressions as a superior method
and the literature has largely sticked with it since then. Furthermore, the literature
summary shows there are only few studies which develop or test default risk models
in markets other than the US. Table 1 contains no article recommending a certain
procedure with regard to the German or other EMU member stock markets. In
light of the significant institutional differences between the US and the EMU, it
is not appropriate to adapt a model proposed by the US literature without prior
out-of-sample tests. I found such a test was in order before work on the pricing of
default risk in the German equity market could be undertaken.
Screening the literature for the most promising techniques is the first step. With
regard to reduced form accounting models this boils down to a variable selection
problem. There is no significant methodological debate in this field, most articles
apply some form of binary response regression. The papers listed in table 1 differ
with respect to what they feed into the models rather than with regard to how
17Comparing the forecasting performance of specific models discussed in the articles listed in
table 1 is difficult because the procedures and metrics used to assess model performance differ.
A detailed discussion of modern performance metrics is provided in the second research paper
(see appendix B).
27
parameters are estimated. Table 2 shows the most powerful combination of exoge-
nous variables applied by several important articles that are explicitly devoted to
forecasting defaults. Only articles published in top academic journals or presented
at important conferences are included.
There are five categories of variables which are in various ways considered to be
relevant in reduced form accounting models. Information on profitability, leverage
and liquidity are part of almost any model. Following Ohlson (1980), most studies
use net income to total assets as a proxy for profitability. Leverage is commonly
modeled as the total liabilities to total assets ratio. Confirming the conjecture
about a relation between size and distress discussed in section 2, size also en-
ters many models. Another common category is liquidity, whereas debt coverage
is completely missing in modern models. Since Shumway (2001), market based
variables reflecting valuation play an important role in reduced form accounting
models. However, the book-to-market ratio, the characteristic associated with the
value effect, is only by a few studies found to be a significant predictor.
Table 2 illustrates that the most common models in the literature do not differ
dramatically from each other. Out-of-sample tests of all models are therefore not
likely to yield very interesting results. The second research paper presented in this
thesis has evaluated the out-of-sample performance of two models whose exogenous
variables are not overlapping substantially. Specifically, it considers the Altman
(1968) Z-Score, which can be regarded as ancestor of reduced from accounting
models. Nevertheless it is still frequently applied in different areas of empirical
research, including empirical asset pricing (Dichev 1998, Griffin & Lemmon 2002).
Moreover, the paper tests the failure score (F-Score) proposed by Campbell et al.
(2008). This model is now regarded as state-of-the-art in reduced form accounting
models (Bauer & Agarwal 2014, Ding et al. 2012, Hilscher & Wilson 2016). The
structure of these two models is explained in detail in the second research paper.
3.1.4. Distance to Default
In addition, the second research paper assesses how the structural Merton (1974)
DD fares as a predictor of corporate defaults. Merton assumes the Modigliani &
Miller (1958) theorem holds. Consequently, a firm’s equity is a residual claim and
can be regarded as a European call option on the firm’s assets VA with a strike
price equal to the book value of the firm’s liabilities D. Intuitively speaking, equity
holders can pay out creditors and then keep the rest of the firm value when the call
matures after T years. Firms default when their asset value hits the debt value.
This renders the call option worthless. Solving for the probability that equity has
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Profitability
Sales to assets X
Net income to assets X X X X X X
EBIT to assets X X
Operating income to assets
Recent change in income to past
level of income
X X
Retained earnings to assets X
Negative income for two periods
(dummy)
X
Leverage
Liabilities to assets X X X X X X X
Liabilities to equity X
Current liabilities to assets X
Current liabilities to current as-
sets
X X
Liabilities > assets (dummy) X
Liquidity
Working capital to assets X X X
Current assets to assets X X X
Debt coverage
Operating cash-flow to liabilities X X
Valuation
Share price (rescaled) X X X X
Stock excess return X X X X X
Stock return volatility X X X X X
Book to market ratio X X
Size
Assets X
Relative market capitalization X X X
Number of business segments X
This table presents the variable selection of important forecasting studies in the
literature. Only important studies which are explicitly devoted to forecasting
defaults of public firms are included. The variables of the model showing the
strongest out-of-sample performance have been selected.
Table 2: Independent variables in reduced form accounting models
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no value yields
Merton-PD = N(− ln(
VA,t
Dt
) + (µ− 0.5× σ2A)
σA ×
√
T
), (13)
where σA and µ denote asset volatility and growth, respectively and N(. . . ) is the
cumulative normal distribution. The fraction inside the brackets is the distance-
to-default, a leverage ratio scaled by asset volatility indicating how far away the
firm is from the default point. A lower value indicates higher risk. Inserting the
negative of this fraction into the normal distribution yields a PD.18
Obviously, this is a methodologically clean and elegant way to obtain information
on default risk. Moreover, it has the advantage that no information on corporate
defaults are needed to compute the statistic. The DD has been frequently applied
in empirical asset pricing research (Vassalou & Xing 2004, Garlappi & Yan 2011,
Ferreira Filipe et al. 2014). However, the forecasting literature summarized in table
1 has voiced some concern as to whether the DD contains reliable information on
future defaults. Several studies, for instance Agarwal & Taffler (2008), Bharath
& Shumway (2008), Campbell et al. (2008), Wu et al. (2010) and Xu (2013),
demonstrate reduced form accounting models outperform the DD with regard to
the ability to discriminate between defaulters and survivors. Moreover, several
papers show the assumption of the normal distribution leads to severely downward-
biased PDs in (13) (Hillegeist et al. 2004, Eom et al. 2004). Still, the performance
of the Merton (1974) DD as a forecaster of defaults against common reduced form
accounting models has never been comprehensively evaluated in the German stock
market. The second empirical paper of this thesis closes this research gap.
3.1.5. Bond and CDS Spreads
For the sake of completeness, it should be further mentioned that another strand
of the literature deals with extracting default risk information from credit-related
securities instead of equities. A discussion of bond and CDS pricing is obviously
beyond the scope of this thesis, but using default risk information in the prices of
such securities deserves a few comments, especially since regulators have actively
advocated the use of this kind of information in risk management (EBA 2014, p.
23).
18Futher details on the estimation of (13) are provided in the second research paper.
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Compared with the CDS market, the corporate bond market has a much longer
history. Chan-Lau (2006) provides a brief introduction on default risk implied by
bond prices. The expected payoff B of a zero-bond with a face value of one unit
maturing in one period is given as
B =
(1− PD) + PD ×RR
1 + r
, (14)
where RR is the recovery rate in case of default and r is the risk-free rate. Under
the assumption that bonds are priced by risk-neutral agents, the implied PD can
be easily solved from (14). Along the lines of Fons (1987), this framework can be
extended in a straightforward way to coupon bonds with any maturity.
How informative are bond spreads about defaults? The evidence is extremely
sparse. The findings of Giesecke et al. (2010) suggest bond spreads are not infor-
mative about defaults. A large proportion of bond spreads is driven by factors that
are unrelated to credit quality, such as interest rate, tax and liquidity risk (Driessen
2004, Huang & Huang 2012). From an empirical perspective, an important fac-
tor hampering the use of bond spreads in PD models is the vast heterogeneity of
issue-specific clauses in the bond market. Bharath & Shumway (2008) state their
database is seriously reduced after the elimination of bonds with special features.
After all, they are left with 58 defaults. Hence, their finding that bond spreads
contain useful information in predicting defaults comes with a caveat. Further-
more, it is noteworthy that Giesecke et al. (2010) who search for defaults in the
U.S. bond market from 1866-2008 in a cumbersome manual cross-database anal-
ysis are able to identify only 143 defaults. In practice, it seems impossible to use
bond spreads as a basis for PD forecasts for these reasons.
Compared with the corporate bond market, the CDS market is smaller but more
standardized and thus easier to handle in empirical work. There is a clear theo-
retical link between bond yields and CDS spreads that is best illustrated by an
arbitrage argument. On the one hand, consider a fixed-rate corporate bond with
maturity N and a yield-to-maturity y. Furthermore, assume that the N year CDS
spread for the same reference entity is defined as s. As above, r is the N year
risk-free rate. Ignoring restrictions on short selling, counterparty risk, tax and
liquidity premia, no arbitrage implies that the pay-off from a portfolio of the cor-
porate bond and a long position in the CDS, should be equal to a long position in
the risk-free bond. This intuition is formalized in (15):
(y − s)− r = 0. (15)
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If the left-hand side of the parity (15) is larger (smaller) than zero, it will be
profitable to assume a long (short) position in the corporate bond and the CDS
while assuming a short (long) position in the risk-free bond. Even though the
hypothetical CDS used in this no-arbitrage argument also ignore some real world
contractual features of CDS, such as the so-called “cheapest-to-deliver” option,
Hull et al. (2012) find the relationship postulated in (15) holds well empirically.19
The CDS spread s is an insurance premium and it implies a PD. Following Chan-
Lau (2006), I assume the perspective of a protection seller in the CDS market.
Given the same hypothetical zero-bond assumed in (14), her expected loss L is
just the mirror image of the bondholder’s expected pay-off:
L = PD × (1−RR), (16)
where the PD and the recovery rate are deemed to be independent. Under the
assumptions underlying the relationship (15), the CDS spread s for the zero-bond
is given as the discounted expected loss (16):
s =
PD × (1−RR)
1 + r
. (17)
Thus, the PD can be recovered from (17) if the recovery rate, the risk-free rate and
the spread are given. The CDS pricing theory pioneered by Hull & White (2000)
paves the way to obtain a more sophisticated framework with multiple coupon
periods that enables us to solve for the PD if we observe the CDS spread. In
essence, the spread s, which is the market price of default risk, will equalize the
expected discounted pay-offs from protection sellers and buyers. It is quite difficult
to implement this model for empirical purposes. Berndt & Obreja (2010) show the
approximation (18)
PD = 4× log(1 + s
4×RR) (18)
suffices, if the arbitrage argument made explicit in (15) holds and CDS coupons
are paid on a quarterly basis, as it is now standard in the market.20 Like PDs
19This options leaves some freedom with regard to the specific issues that are to be delivered by
the protection buyer in the event of default.
20Berndt & Obreja (2010) find a common factor in European CDS spreads is highly correlated
with catastrophe risk, i.e. the risk of an economic event which will lead to a simultaneous
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extracted from bond spreads, (18) yields a risk neutral probability. To illustrate
the implications of using such risk neutral measures for default forecasts, consider
the following case study of four European industrial firms. On the left axis, figure
3 depicts the physical Merton-PD, which has been computed using (13) at the
beginning of every month between 2008-2015. Furthermore, the right axis in figure
3 shows the risk neutral probabilities implied by the 1-year senior unsecured CDS
spread given by (18).
These figures shows time series plots of PDs implied by the Merton (1974) model and CDS. The
Merton model has been computed at the beginning of every month from 03/2008 to 05/2105
using one year of historically observable daily equity returns and balance sheet data. The latter
has been lagged by six months to account for the publication bias. A PD has been extraced from
CDS spreads using the approximation (18). All data has been downloaded from Datastream.
Figure 3: Case Study - Physical vs. Risk Neutral Probabilities
CDS implied PDs are at many times a multiple of physical PDs. Hence, mar-
ket participants in the CDS market are not risk neutral but risk averse. In fact,
CDS implied PDs can exceed one in extreme situations, for instance when there
default of several blue chip companies.
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are rumours about bankruptcy, which was the case at the end of 2009 for Heidel-
bergCement. Moreover, such situations seem to cause large disturbance in CDS
spreads even after the physical PDs have returned to uncritical levels. These re-
sults underline that CDS should not be used for default forecasts (Jarrow 2012).
Strictly speaking, (18) does not yield a probability but a pricing measure. The
same applies to bond spreads. A conclusive study of the forecasting power of CDS
implied PDs does not exist. Another practical reason for this is that the CDS
market is very small and defaults are very rare.21 The fourth research paper pre-
sented in section 4 analyzes the entire cross-section of French, German, Italian and
Spanish CDS. The number of firms with existing contracts is only 108. Moreover,
the efficiency of the CDS market remains a debated issue. Recent research sug-
gests the CDS market is characterized by imperfect competition, market frictions
(Gu¨ndu¨z et al. 2012) and illiquidity (Junge & Trolle 2013). Up until now, CDS
appear to be useless for default forecasts, as well.
So far, the section has been a wrap-up of the main ideas behind distress risk models.
The goal was to discuss the reliability of several approaches to measure distress
risk. On the one hand, there is a variety of reduced form accounting models and,
on the other hand, there is the Merton (1974) model. A final conclusion as to
how well these approaches measure default risk is the main concern of the second
research paper and deferred to the summary of the empirical results in section 4.
Moreover, it has been explained that approaches based on bond and CDS spreads
are no viable alternative for the problem at hand. In theory and practice, there
is a much stronger and well-known consensus about methods to cope with market
risk than with credit risk. Dealing with market risk is now a standard subject
in undergraduate and postgraduate finance courses, credit risk is typically barely
touched in university courses. Bohn (2011), who provides one of the few textbooks
on credit risk, suggests the lack of data as a main explanation for this phenomenon.
Estimating and testing models requires data that are generally unavailable to the
public and require a lot of manual work. Rating agencies have a clear advantage in
this regard because they have been building large proprietary databases for a long
time. Storing the data in a safe and secret place keeps them in business, but it
basically prevents external reviews of the performance of ratings as risk measures.
What credit ratings really achieve as forecasters remains largely unclear in the
literature. This opens up the debate about the use of structural and reduced form
accounting models in empirical research. There is only one way to make sure these
models provide precise estimates of distress risk, namely a quantitative evaluation
of their forecasting performance. The results for such an analysis are summarized
21A history of credit events dealt with in the CDS market is available on the website http:
//www.creditfixings.com. There were 10 worldwide corporate credit events in 2008 and 6
in 2016.
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in section 4.
3.2. Empirical Asset Pricing Methods
Armed with knowledge about distress risk models, the remainder of this section
turns to asset pricing methods. It explains how the distress risk characteristic
can be used to assess the relationship between distress risk and equity returns.
In general, there are two perspectives of interest in this regard: a) how do equity
markets react when information about distress risk is disclosed in the short-run
and b) what are the implications of distress risk for equity returns in the long-
run. There is an established methodology for both perspectives that has been
summarized by major textbooks.22 Hence, the methodological discussion in this
document is relatively brief.
3.2.1. Assessing Market Reactions with Event Studies
Assessing the reactions of stock prices to news about firm distress risk can be
regarded as a test of the short-run ICAPM mechanics: Do investors discount
the prices of distressed firms or is distress irrelevant for equity investors? The
first research paper is directly devoted to answering this question. Moreover, the
fourth paper deals with a similar topic as it addresses the equity and CDS market
reactions of credit-constrained firms to monetary policy shocks.
Early tests of the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) focused on the ability of
the stock market to filter and process information. Fama et al. (1969) proposed
the traditional event study methodology as a framework to test the EMH. Since
then, the research focus has shifted to more subtle questions and the event study
framework has been applied to address various other issues, including the impact
of regulatory changes or assessing damages in legal proceedings. In short, the event
study framework can be used to gauge the effects of economic events on the value
of firms (MacKinlay 1997). In the context of this thesis, the events of interest
are related to distress. Credit ratings are interesting in this regard because their
publications mark distinct events. The large body of research on the stock market
reaction to rating changes has already been mentioned above. The basic structure
of an event study is depicted in figure 4.
22See, for example, Cochrane (2005).
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estimation window calculation window
t− j − k t− j − l t− j t
event day
t+ j
Figure 4: The structure of an event study
The estimation window spans a time period before the event of interest in which
the parameters of asset pricing models are estimated. The models are supposed to
capture expected returns. For instance, one might assume the FFM is an adequate
description of expected returns and use the estimation window to estimate a stock’s
loadings on the market, size and value factors, respectively. The estimation window
is separated from the calculation window because parameter estimation is based
on the assumption that the stock price of interest evolves normally throughout
the estimation window and is not affected by the event of interest. In figure 4,
the demarcation of the event window from the calculation window is indicated by
the time subscripts l and k. There is no rule as to how many days the estimation
window should span, but the number must be sufficient to guarantee the feasibility
of regression procedures. As a next step, the required parameters are used to
compute fitted values as a proxy for expected returns in the calculation window,
which may contain 2 × j + 1 ticks centered around the event day denoted as t
in figure 4. The variable of interest in the calculation window are the residuals
of the asset pricing models which are obtained by subtracting the fitted values
from the actually observed returns. These residuals are called abnormal returns
(AR). Moreover, cumulating AR yields an abnormal holding period return called
cumulative abnormal return (CAR). The conventional null hypothesis is CAR = 0.
A battery of hypothesis tests has been proposed. The power of these event-studies
tests suffers from a few methodological problems. Return variances increase around
the event day, CAR tend to be highly autocorrelated and the whole procedure is
very sensitive to outliers (Brown & Warner 1985). Recently, the methodology has
been enhanced by new powerful nonparametric tests (Kolari & Pynnonen 2011).
If firm distress risk is indeed a state variable in the ICAPM, tests should reject
the null when markets learn about distress risk. Specifically, they should discount
the value of a firm when default risk increases and respond with increasing prices
to news about decreasing distress risk. These are the mechanics required to gen-
erate a premium for distressed firms. Furthermore, since state variables reflect
macroeconomic activity, there should be a significant dependence of the reaction
on the business cycle. We would expect the discount to distressed firms to be es-
pecially large when the economy is in a recession because recessions are typically
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accompanied by high agency costs of lending and tight credit markets. A firm
suffering from a downgrade in such a setting should be more affected than a firm
downgraded in a booming economy. This is precisely what the first research paper
summarized in section 4 tests.
3.2.2. Approaches to Assess Long-Run Relationships
The short-run event-study is limited to analyze reactions, the calculation window
depicted in figure 4 spans a few weeks at the most. Obviously, a look at the long-
run relationship is necessary to gauge whether distress risk explains patterns in
equity returns. From a methodological point of view, this requires something like a
multivariate panel regression of several characteristics C for each firm i, including
distress risk, on long-run returns r (Cochrane 2011):
ri,t+1 = a+ b
′Ci,t + ϵi,t+1. (19)
Almost any research sample in finance consists of repeated observations of a cross-
section, i.e. empirical research in finance is mainly based on panel data. Still,
real panel regressions like (19) are relatively uncommon in empirical asset pricing
(Cochrane 2011, Freyberger et al. 2016). One can only speculate about the reasons,
perhaps one reason is that tests of the EMH became important in the 1960s, when
panel data analysis was still in its infancy. A whole subbranch of econometrics
devoted to the problem stated in (19) has evolved in asset pricing. Below I discuss
portfolio sorts and Fama & MacBeth (1973) regressions, two methods which have
been applied in the thesis as ways to test long-run relationships. These are still the
most commonly used methods. Obviously, there is not really anything new about
them, but the vast body of literature on “anomalies” summarized by Harvey et al.
(2015) (see section 2) has given rise to a new debate about inference in finance,
which I add to the short methodological discussion here.
Portfolio sorts appeared in the late 1970s. Basu (1977) was a very early adopter.
The technique is appealing to intuition because it mirrors the actual experience of
an investor ranking firms according to some firm characteristic and then forming
portfolios based on this ranking. The long run performance of such investment
strategies are used to infer the relationship between the characteristic and returns.
Usually, the final tests are based on long-short portfolios which assume a long
(short) position in the top- (bottom-) ranked firms. Apart from its intuition, this
method has two compelling advantages. First, the sorts itself are nonparametric
37
(though, admittedly, standard regression tests of the long-short portfolios are typ-
ically parametric). Second, sorts can be used to detect non-linear relationships.
Many theories suggest a non-linear relation between characteristics and returns
(Garlappi et al. 2006, Garlappi & Yan 2011), a linear regression will fail in these
instances. On the other hand, portfolio sorts have several downsides. Cochrane
(2011) emphasizes they are simply not able to deal with the multidimensionality
characterizing modern asset pricing. Double-sorts are still feasible, in some in-
stances maybe even triple-sorts, but sorting can get us nowhere near to controlling
for the plethora of characteristics that has been proposed in the literature. Fur-
thermore, Lo & MacKinlay (1999) point out that sorting on a variable showing
in-sample correlation with returns gives rise to a data-snooping bias. Following
in the same vein, Berk (2000) shows sorts affect the variance structure in the
panel: sorting a cross-section on a characteristic that is known to be correlated
with returns yields portfolio returns with high variance between the portfolios but,
compared to the full-sample, lower within variance. Reducing the within variance
of portfolios or test assets can artificially swamp the explanatory power of asset
pricing models. Lastly, a researcher applying portfolio sorts has to question the
assumptions underlying the technique: Are the assets in a portfolio really liquid
and are short-sales feasible? Are the extreme portfolios, which are used to compute
long-short strategy returns, especially affected by these limitations? These issues
are to a lesser degree a problem when using US data since data quality generally
is, in this case, less of an issue and control variables for liquidity are available.
However, my personal research experience prompts me to express more doubts
when the sample consists of European stocks and the variable of interest (distress)
is per se associated with extreme return behavior.
Portfolio sorts treat the cross-section and time series dimensions separately, sorts
address the cross-section and regressions address the time series. Cochrane (2011)
argues this is effectively equivalent to nonparametric cross-sectional regressions
with histogram weights. After all, sorts might be not that different from true
panel data models like (19). The connection between panel data analysis and
the two-pass Fama & MacBeth (1973) regressions is even more straightforward.
This approach can be used to assess whether a certain factor or characteristic is
priced in the cross-section. When the variable of interest is a factor, the procedure
begins with an estimation of factor loadings, for instance an estimation of CAPM
betas for each asset. Thereafter, the factor loadings or characteristics, which do
not need to be estimated beforehand, are regressed in the cross-section at each
point in time on returns. That is, Fama & MacBeth (1973) regressions are a series
of t cross-sectional regressions similar to (19), just without the time dimension,
resulting in t estimates of cross-sectional coefficients and standard errors or t-
values. The most obvious thing to do next in order to obtain an estimate for
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the long-run relation between the exogenous variable and expected returns is to
average the coefficient estimates and t-values.23 After all, Fama & MacBeth (1973)
regressions are also related to panel data methods like (19). Cochrane (2005)
discusses circumstances under which the two-pass procedure outlined above is
equivalent to a pooled Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression.
A common assumption underlying regression frameworks like (19) and the Fama
& MacBeth (1973) cross-sectional regressions is that the error terms ϵ are inde-
pendent and identically distributed. More recently, two important concerns about
the standard errors in finance have been voiced by Cameron et al. (2006), Petersen
(2008) and Gow et al. (2010). The first concern refers to cross-sectionally corre-
lated error terms. Whenever some unobservable factor affects returns contempora-
neously, the assumption Cov[ϵi,t, ϵj,t] is violated in each cross-sectional regression
and standard errors are subject to a time effect. Second, returns might be auto-
correlated in time, i.e. Cov[ϵi,t, ϵi,t+s] for s ̸= 0 does not hold, which is called a firm
effect. These effects may cause standard errors to be severely downward-biased.
According to the literature survey of Petersen (2008), 42% of research papers in
finance did not adjust standard errors for these problems which is likely to render
their results incorrect. Cameron et al. (2006) have proposed to compute errors
clustered on firm and time in order to deal with these issues. Petersen (2008)
as well as Gow et al. (2010) present simulation evidence underlining the impor-
tance of these adjustments in finance. The former recommend to compute several
standard errors in procedures like Fama & MacBeth (1973) regressions or the gen-
eral framework (19). Conventional errors should be shown alongside of firm-level,
time-level and two-way clustered errors.24
To recap, methods in empirical asset pricing have been living a life of their own
until the end of the last decade. Portfolio sorts and Fama & MacBeth (1973)
regressions are both in some way related to a generic panel regression framework
like (19), but they tend to deal with variation in the cross-section and in the time
series in separate steps. Portfolio sorts are nonparametric and able to deal with
nonlinearity, but Fama & MacBeth (1973) regressions are better suited to deal
with multidimensional problems. Important recent methodological contributions
23When the exogenous variable in the cross-sectional regressions are estimated factor loadings, a
correction of the standard problems for the errors-in-variables problem according to Shanken
(1992) is recommendable.
24The conventional OLS variance estimator is V = s2 × (X ′X)−1, where s2 = 1N−K ×
∑N
i=1 ei
and N,K denote the numbers of observations and parameters, respectively. With one-way
clustering the variance estimator is Vclustered = (X
′X)−1 ×∑Ncj=1 u′j × uj × (X ′X)−1, where
Nc denotes the number of clusters (e.g. firms/years) and u is
∑
ei × xi in each cluster. See
Cameron et al. (2006) for further details and the variance estimator in the case of two-way
clustering.
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are beginning to acknowledge the panel structure of finance data more directly and
Cochrane (2011) recommends uniting time series and cross-sections in true panel
data models for future research. Empirical research in this thesis follows this
recommendation and applies portfolio sorts, Fama & MacBeth (1973) regressions
as well as panel data models in a more narrow definition.
4. Empirical Results
The research papers, which have been written over the course of the last three
years, speak for themselves. They represent the actual work I have done. This
section offers a short summary of their main results and tries to contextualize
them. Summaries are necessarily a reduction and rarely as good as the originals.
Instead of just condensing and rephrasing material from the papers, I try to provide
some additional material that has not made it into the final versions of the papers
(mainly to save space) and discuss the significance of the results for the research
context outlined in this document.
4.1. The Relevance of Credit Ratings over the Business Cycle
If distress risk is priced in the equity market, the value of stocks should decline
when investors learn about increasing risk. But when and how do they get this
information? Section 3 explains that credit ratings are probably not the best
forecasters of default, but their use is widespread and in some cases mandatory
from a regulatory perspective. By and large, they are to be regarded as facilitators
and distributors of distress risk news.
As such, we expect that equity investors react in some way to credit rating changes.
Specifically, we expect that downgrades, indicating an increase in distress risk,
tend to reduce the value of equity. Following a substantial downgrade, equity
investors should stand a lower chance of extracting rents from the firm due to the
higher risk of bankruptcy and the absolute priority rule. The flipside of this, an
upgrade, should give rise to increasing equity returns. The first objective of the
first research paper is to test these relations in an event study of rating changes.
The paper adds to the literature as it is based on a very large international database
including rating events from all three major rating agencies. Moreover, it does not
only investigate rating changes but also other more nuanced information released
by rating agencies (rating outlooks and watchlist events). Figure 5 illustrates the
40
empirical findings.
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This figure shows the evolution of CAR associated with rating events at time zero. CAR have
been computed based on the CAPM and averaged in a 91 day calculation window to obtain the
series shown in the plot. “Out.” denotes rating outlooks and “Watch.” denotes inclusions of
firms in an agency watchlist in order to review the current rating.
Figure 5: Reaction of stock prices to rating changes
As expected, the paper finds that all events which are associated with increasing
distress risk give rise to negative equity returns. The strongest reaction occurs after
downgrades. Positive news about a firm’s creditworthiness give rise to comparably
low stock market reactions. The different reactions to positive and negative events
are likely to mirror risk aversion. All in all, these results confirm that investors
discount the value of distressed firms. So far, these results are straightforward and
not overly exciting. In fact, they seem merely mechanical and have already been
documented in the empirical literature (Hand et al. 1992, Holthausen & Leftwich
1986, Norden & Weber 2004).
The papers extends the conventional rating event study analysis by investigating
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the dependence of market reactions on different phases of the business cycle. Sev-
eral theoretical considerations suggest market reactions to rating events are more
pronounced in recessions and lower during expansions. The paper discusses the
theory of the agency costs of lending (Bernanke et al. 1996, Tirole 2006) on the one
hand and the dynamics of competition in the ratings market on the other hand
(Bolton et al. 2012). The former postulates that the adverse selection problem
and moral hazard, distinguishing a good from a bad firm, becomes much more
severe in recessions when the overall success rate of investment projects is lower.
According to this theory, investors find it less attractive to finance distressed firms
during economic downturns. This is exactly the same argumentation as the Fama
& French (1995, 1996) case for distress risk as an ICAPM state variable. There-
fore, the second contribution of the paper can also be regarded as an attempt to
assess whether the short-run reaction of stocks to news about distress is consistent
with the Fama & French distress risk story.
The evidence does indeed support this view. Bernanke et al. (1996) document a
flight to quality in several debt markets during recessions. The first research pa-
per finds equity investors behave similarly. During economic downturns, investors
sell-off stocks of downgraded firms to a stronger degree than during expansions or
neutral business cycle phases. This effect is especially pronounced in the specula-
tive grade segment. Furthermore, the paper shows there are hardly any reactions
to rating changes in the investment grade segment, which is characterized by very
low PDs. The investment grade definition seems to indicate a threshold below
which there is significant distress risk. Stocks of firms rated below the threshold
display strong cyclical reactions that are fully consistent with the notion of a dis-
tress risk state variable. Stocks of firms with investment grade rating, firms whose
PDs are de-facto null, are not affected by news about distress risk. Of course, this
evidence tells us nothing about long-run distress risk premia but only that the
short-term reactions are fully consistent with such premia. Without the evidence,
there would be no need to look into the long-run. Moreover, the evidence also tells
us where to look, namely at firms with significant PDs.
4.2. The Performance of Default Risk Models in the German
Stock Market
A long-term analysis requires a reliable model to measure PDs. An important
aim of the thesis is to provide out-of-sample evidence on the relation between
distress risk and stock returns by looking at the German stock market. While the
literature review in section 3 underlines several models might be able to deliver this
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information, the performance of such models has never been tested in the German
stock market. Therefore, the second article aims at evaluating the performance of
these models in the German stock market. In particular, the paper considers the
Altman (1968) Z-Score, Campbell et al. (2008) F-Score and Merton (1974) DD.
The goal is to obtain a firm characteristic which provides reliable information on
default risk and can be used in empirical asset pricing research. As argued in
section 2, testing the ability of models to forecast defaults is a crucial preliminary
step in order to reduce measurement errors and arbitrariness in firm characteristics.
In contrast to the other research papers presented in this thesis, developing and
testing default risk models is more of a technical issue. In particular, such un-
dertakings involve three challenges. First, the procedures require reliable data on
corporate defaults. Considerable time was spent on attempts to automatically re-
trieve such information from commercial databases. In the end, these sources were
found to be highly unreliable. They appear to list several incorrect dates, some-
times pre- or backdating defaults by more than a year, and miss a large number
of defaults. Therefore, very cumbersome manual searches have been conducted
to retrieve information on the final state of all firms which have left the German
stock market since 1990. In this fashion, 181 default events could be unambigu-
ously defined as dates of firms filing for default with German courts. The search
procedure has yielded a binary variable, which is equal to one at this instant and
zero otherwise.
The second challenge is estimating model parameters using this data.25 The ex-
plained data structure suggests binary response models for this task. All three
common models, logit, probit and complementary-log-log links, have been con-
sidered in the article. Moreover, for both the research question at hand and the
practical use of default risk models, it is critical to obtain forward-looking out-of-
sample risk measures. Specifically, parameter estimates should only be based on
information which investors could use in real time. The paper adapts a “walk-
forward” estimation strategy with repeated estimation periods explained by Sobe-
hart et al. (2000) to ensure investors could have used the models considered in
reality. This results in true out-of-sample risk scores and PDs which are in the
third and final step tested with regard to their ability to forecast defaults.
A powerful model should have two different traits: First, it should reliably classify
25As explained in section 3, not all models require this step. Specifically, the Altman (1968)
Z-Score and the Merton (1974) DD do not require a re-estimation of parameters, but their
forecasting performance may improve when this is done (Grice & Ingram 2001, Bharath &
Shumway 2008). The paper compares the original specifications of the Z-Score and DD with
new recalibrated version which are called Z-Score (recal.) and DD (recal.), respectively.
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Both discriminatory ability (ranking) and calibration (PDs) are visualized in the
plots. For each model, PD observations have been sorted into deciles. The first
decile contains the 10% of observations with the lowest PDs and so on. Discrimi-
natory ability is visible when a model shows monotonously increasing true default
rates, the diamonds in the figure, from decile 1 to 10. Only few (if any) defaults
should occur in low risk deciles and most defaults, ideally all of them, should occur
in decile 10. Though not all models show the desired monotonous increase, the fig-
ure underlines default rates are elevated in the higher risk deciles. In other words,
all four models display some discriminatory ability. The Campbell et al. (2008) F-
Score shown in the bottom right panel of figure 6 displays the best discriminatory
power according to the ROC analysis conduced in the paper. A well-calibrated
model has mean decile PDs, the circles in the figure, which are close to the true
empirical decile PDs (the diamonds). We can see models differ tremendously in
this regard. The Merton (1974) model produces severely downward-biased PDs,
all of them are close to zero.26 The top left panel shows the recalibrated version of
the DD. Recalibrating DD with binary response regressions reduces the downward
bias, but it does not completely eliminate it. The recalibrated Z-Score does also
show a tendency to produce downward-biased PDs. F-Score is once more the best
performing model.
What are the lessons learned from all this? Figure 6 underlines that F-Score wins
the model horse race. Additional results in the paper confirm defaults in the
German stock market are well predictable. It is reasonable to assume investors
are well aware of this fact. Comparable results have been presented by the related
literature on default risk models summarized in section 3 and similar models are
applied in corporate banking. Consequently, the long-run analysis on the relation
between distress risk and stock returns applies the F-Score to measure market
expectations of default risk. The paper on market reactions to rating changes
has found that PDs in the investment grade segment are close to zero. The PD
patterns in figure 6 confirm that a large share of firms is virtually not at risk. This
is consistent with the notion that distress risk is probably irrelevant for investors
in these firms.
26Deciles 2-7 in the top left panel of figure 6 are empty because the Merton (1974) model produces
many zero PDs. Further details are provided in the second paper.
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4.3. The Relation between Distress Risk and Returns in the
German Stock Market
Does distress risk measured by the F-Score explain average stock returns? The
third article asks two different questions: Are investors rewarded a premium for
holding the equity of distressed firms? Are common characteristics-effects, like
value and momentum effects, in fact distress effects?27 Answering these questions
sheds light on whether distress risk is an ICAPM state variable that explains com-
mon patterns in returns. Being able to show this is true would be an important
step towards reconciling the conflicting empirical evidence on the explanatory abil-
ity of a plethora of characteristics (the “factor zoo”) with conventional risk based
ICAPM/CCAPM explanations.
The previous findings have pointed to nonlinearities in the relationship between
distress risk and returns. Therefore, it is natural to start the analysis with portfolio
sorts. Semi-annual excess returns on F-Score sorted portfolios are presented in
panel A of table 3.28
27Brueckner (2013) and Artmann et al. (2012) show these effects are present in the German
stock market, whereas there is no evidence for a size effect.
28This is table 4 in the third research paper.
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Unfortunately, the results remain inconclusive. Excess returns on portfolios 5-
9 are negative, but only portfolio 9 shows large negative returns which are, on
average, statistically different from zero. Average excess returns on the high risk
portfolio are positive but statistically not different from zero. The alpha coefficients
of common risk factor models are economically insignificant. Interpreting firms in
portfolio 1 as safe and firms in portfolio 10 as distressed is in line with the previous
findings. The first paper has shown the equity market reacts to news about distress
when PDs are significantly different from zero (in the speculative grade segment).
The second paper illustrates firms in portfolio 10 are at risk, whereas firms in
other portfolio are rather not distressed (see figure 6). The 10-1 portfolio, which
is long (short) distressed (safe) firms, yields an average return that is statistically
not different from zero. According to this test, there is no distress risk effect.
Can any further conclusions be drawn from the data? In particular, does the
roughly V-shaped pattern of portfolio returns tell us anything? One might ar-
gue the decay in returns after portfolio 4 indicates firms are gradually becoming
distressed, whereas firms in portfolio 10 are already dead. This argumentation is
based on the differences between distress and default (Wruck 1990). It suggests a
negative relation between distress (risk) and returns but no relation between de-
fault (risk) and returns. However, not all firms in portfolio 10 default, the average
portfolio F-Score, which is shown in panel C of table 3, translates into an annual
PD of roughly 3.2%.29 We know the F-Score produces PDs which are close to the
true default rates. Hence, the most plausible interpretation for firms in portfolio
10 is that they are truly distressed; some default but most survive. Moreover, the
portfolio 9 -5.2 mean F-Score translates into a mean annual PD of only 1%. Is this
already a concern for investors? Lastly, the implied mean annual PDs on all other
portfolios are only a few basis points. Can we really say firms in portfolio 7 are
more distressed than firms in portfolio 6 or do other factors explain the differences
in excess returns? There is hardly anything that supports the former.
More persuasive is the idea that the excess returns in table 3 are explained by
other, unobserved variables. Panel C points to strong patterns with regard to
size, book-to-market equity and momentum, three good old friends. Apparently,
distress risk alone is not able to provide convincing explanations for returns. The
rest of the paper is devoted to assessing whether it can still at least partially explain
patterns in returns with regard to these well-known characteristics. It cannot. Like
Artmann et al. (2012), I find evidence for significant value and momentum effects in
returns. Empirically, F-Scores are correlated with these characteristics, they enter
F-Score as exogenous variables (see table 2). In spite of the correlation, there is
29Applying the logit transformation to the F-Scores in panel C of table 3 yields a semi-annual
PD.
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no evidence for a causal link between distress risk and size, value and momentum
effects. After all, distress risk appears to contribute nothing to explaining stock
returns. The excess returns in table 3 are probably explained by correlation of
F-Scores with other characteristics, but the idea of a distress risk characteristic
bringing order into the mess of characteristics-effects seems wrong.
Will there never be order in the cross-section of stocks? Should we perhaps even
abandon the Fama & French (1995, 1996) distress story? A final verdict is deferred
to section 5. At this point, it is worth recalling that common characteristics like
size, book-to-market equity and momentum have a “catch all” nature. They are
most likely collections of several different economic effects, which may very well
amplify or cancel each other out. In spite of all efforts to reduce measurement error
and arbitrariness, a distress characteristic like the F-Score may ultimately suffer
from similar drawbacks. After all, default risk models are also only combinations
of accounting and market information. In the end, it comes down to the question
of what investors consider to be important. Is a slightly elevated F-Score (or any
other default risk score) a considerable signal for distress risk or is the negative
momentum (small size / high book-to-market ratio) that enters its computation
a more important signal for something else? In most cases, it is unclear to what
extent characteristics capture the macroeconomic processes which are decisive for
the CCAPM/ICAPM mechanics. Firm characteristics have only in rare cases
straightforward interpretations. We should probably not use them so extensively
as explanatory variables for returns. Cochrane (2007) suggests to focus on the
actual macroeconomic process instead. Following in this vein, instead of defining
an elevated book-to-market ratio (or about any other characteristic) as an indicator
for distress, we should perhaps ask which firms are especially exposed to tightening
lending standards or try to identify industries in decline. Approaches like these
are more straightforward because they acknowledge the concept of systematic risk
more directly than conventional firm characteristics. Further recommendations for
future research based on this thought are provided in section 5.
4.4. The Reaction of European Stocks to Unconventional
Monetary Policy
At first sight, the fourth research paper may seem to be only remotely connected to
the research context outlined in this document. The paper assesses the response
of stocks and CDS to unconventional monetary policy shocks. The link to the
overall context of the thesis is buried in the transmission mechanism of monetary
policy. The related empirical literature has found that the credit channel is the
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most important one among several of such transmission channels (Mishkin 1996,
Bernanke & Gertler 1995, Ciccarelli et al. 2015).
Credit channels suggest expansionary monetary policy can reduce the agency prob-
lem in financial markets. The theory of cyclical agency costs and its effect on the
propensity of investors to finance risky firms has already been discussed above.
Bernanke et al. (1996) document a flight to safety in several credit markets and the
first research paper suggests a similar effect takes place in the equity market. Mon-
etary policy might counter these effects with expansionary actions. Specifically,
central banks could be able to improve the balance sheets of credit-constrained
firms as they commit to purchasing assets in several credit (and equity) markets.
Increasing bond (equity) prices will lower risk premia and ease funding conditions
for these firms. Asset purchase programs are commonly called unconventional
monetary policy. Recently, they have gained popularity among several major cen-
tral banks. The fourth research paper asks whether credit channels are operative
and central banks can indeed counter the flight to safety, which has been docu-
mented in the first research paper. Specifically, the paper investigates the reactions
of stocks and CDS in the entire cross-section of French, German, Italian and Span-
ish firms in order to provide another perspective on the relation between distress
risk and stock returns. It shifts the focus from the long-run back to the short-run.
The previous results suggest that, given the methodological framework at hand,
more interesting economic conclusions can be drawn from this perspective. This
has been the main motivation for the paper in the overall research context.
Like the first article, this paper makes use of the event study methodology. In
contrast to firm specific rating events, the events of interest in this case are market-
wide monetary shocks. Since all firms are at the same time affected by them, it is
not sensible to apply the Fama et al. (1969) event study methodology outlined in
section 3. Instead, the article applies several different methods to extract monetary
policy shocks from interest rates (Kuttner 2001, Rogers et al. 2014) and uses these
shocks as exogenous variables in time-series and panel regressions. The main
research hypotheses test the effectiveness of the credit channel. In detail, they
state that unconventional monetary policy shocks give rise to stronger increases
(decreases) in stock prices (CDS spreads) when firms are distressed. According to
the data, the opposite is true. It appears that firms with low distress risk show
the strongest increases (decreases) in stock prices (CDS spreads) suggesting that
unconventional monetary policy cannot counter the flight to safety. Investors do
not regard these programs as beneficial for distressed firms.
Once more, the evidence underlines that the flight to safety is a powerful concept
in financial markets. Not even central banks seem to be able to dissolve it. It is
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worth recalling that this phenomenon is fully consistent with the idea of distress
risk as an ICAPM state variable. Hence, in line with the findings of the first paper,
the fourth paper shows the economic distress risk story is visible in the short-run.
Moreover, the paper points to a surprising short-run relation between interest rates
and stock returns. Since the beginnings of the EMU, the response of the stock
market to conventional interest rate shocks induced by ECB actions has had the
same sign as the shock. A main rate decrease of the ECB has, on average, given
rise to negative and not positive stock market reactions. These additional results,
which stand in harsh contrast to economic intuition, cast doubts on the overall
effectiveness of monetary policy in the EMU. Furthermore, this finding shows the
potential of the current era of zero-interest rates to twist things up. Who thought
a prolonged period of below zero interest rates would be possible ten years ago?
How do common empirical models fare with negative interest rates? We should
routinely control for these unparalleled developments in empirical research.
5. Conclusion
The overriding goal of the thesis has been to assess whether firm distress risk can
reconcile the empirical literature with conventional risk-based CCAPM/ICAPM
explanations for stocks returns. The theory says risk averse investors should dis-
count the value of firms because they dislike asset price risk that is correlated
with consumption risk. Distress risk does plausibly create this correlation, for in-
stance, when investors depend on labor income. Consequently, the average equity
investor should be more reluctant to finance distressed firms than safe firms and
she should be especially reluctant to do so when the economy is in a recession. The
evidence points to strong cyclical relations between distress risk and stock returns
in the short-run. Specifically, investors have a higher propensity to sell off stocks
from issuers in the speculative grade rating segment after downgrades when the
economy is in a recession. The motives behind this flight to safety appear to be
strong. The ECB has recently found it necessary to counter these tendencies with
a battery of unconventional monetary policy measures which are supposed to ease
funding conditions for distressed firms. However, all this does not seem to affect
the behavior of investors. All in all, the CCAPM/ICAPM mechanics are clearly
visible in the short-run.
Does the discount on distressed firms give rise to a premium? Can distress risk
also explain long-run average returns? Sadly, the results remain inconclusive in
this regard. I have spent a lot of time and effort on developing and testing models
to measure default risk in order to associate the information provided by these
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models with long-run average stock returns. Default risk models are powerful
in forecasting corporate defaults. They are an exciting topic on their own and of
tremendous importance in practice. However, they seem to bear little consequences
for the stock market. Conventional asset pricing tests suggest the relation between
default risk scores and excess stock returns is insignificant in the German stock
market. Moreover, distress risk cannot provide convincing explanations for other
patterns in returns (value and momentum effects).
Why do we see strong reactions of stocks to news about distress in the short-run
but no relation between distress risk and long-run average returns? There are two
explanations for this. First of all, detecting short run reactions is, by nature, easier
than establishing long-run relationships. Numerous factors influence stock returns
over the course of a few months, whereas isolating effects in windows spanning
a few days is less difficult. Second, conventional theory tells us systematic risk
matters in the long-run. Default risk can be measured with very high accuracy,
but it is likely that investors can diversify it away. Though corporate defaults
follow a procyclical trend, the overall default rate does rarely exceed 4%. Even
in such a worst case scenario, an investor who holds the market portfolio will not
incur extreme losses from defaults. Losses will only be substantial if the value of
all other surviving firms deteriorates, as well.
This brings us to the question whether the definition of distress that has been used
in this thesis, the default event, nests this kind of distress risk. Defaults are perhaps
too extreme and rare to pose a risk for the average firm. A different way to look at
distress risk would be to identify situations when firms are not profitable enough
to cover their obligations. Such definitions have already been used to investigate
other issues (Andrade & Kaplan 1998, Whitaker 1999). I have experimented with
models forecasting early distress instead of defaults, as well. By and large, the
results were inconclusive, too. Altering the definition of distress in this fashion
reduces the skew in the distribution of risk scores. More firms will be at risk.
However, to what extent is the resulting risk a distress risk and to what extent is
it a common profitability risk? The relation between stock returns and the latter
is, of course, trivial. The crux is that an informative risk characteristic (one that
forecasts default) will always follow a skewed distribution with few firms at risk
and many that remain totally unaffected. Defining a distress risk characteristic
based on a less extreme definition runs into the danger of being ambiguous, which
leads us back to where the empirical literature currently stands.
I conclude that measuring distress risk as a firm characteristic is inappropriate in
asset pricing. Interesting alternatives for future research can be found in macroe-
conomics. For example, the results presented by Hahn & Lee (2006) and Petkova
52
(2006) suggest that the default spread, the difference between risk-free and corpo-
rate bonds, is correlated with the Fama & French risk factors in the US. Similarly,
Boons (2016) finds the default spread forecasts credit crunches and exposure to
this variable is priced in the cross-section of US stocks. In general, macroeco-
nomics opens up natural ways to look at what we call systematic risk in finance.
We should recall the main reason for separating empirical finance from macroe-
conomics was that macroeconomic data are typically low-frequency data and less
convenient than return data in research. Alas, high availability of (stock) return
data has lead to an unprecedented data-mining which is making it harder than ever
to understand what explains average stock returns. Firm characteristics do not
seem to take us anywhere. Macroeconomic time series are now much longer than
they were when research on the cross-section of stocks began and a larger variety
of data has become available. Cochrane (2007) says understanding the macroeco-
nomic risk that drives asset prices is the trunk of the tree. I agree and suggest that
future research should reinforce efforts to explain patterns in the cross-section of
stock returns with macroeconomic distress risk.
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A. Collaboration with Peers
Three of the four research papers presented in the following annex have been
written together with two co-authors. The fourth paper is authored solely by
myself. This annex provides detailed information on the collaboration with peers
in order to acknowledge the contributions of two persons, my supervisor Prof.
Dr. Thorsten Poddig and former colleague Dr. Christian Fieberg, to the work
presented in this thesis. I am grateful for their help.
The first paper, “The Relevance of Credit Ratings over the Business Cycle”, is
based on data that have been collected by Dr. Fieberg. He has also provided some
codes for the computation of AR. I have developed the story and hypotheses based
on the macroeconomic theory. Moreover, I have written all code for hypothesis
tests, regressions, plots and tables. The paper has been rewritten a number of
times. All drafts have been written by myself. Prof. Poddig has gone through the
text several times and has made valuable recommendations. He has made detailed
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December 2015.
The second paper, “Forecasting Corporate Defaults in the German Stock Mar-
ket”, is based on data that have been hand-collected by myself. The theory and
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gone to great lengths to improve the readability of the paper. Dr. Fieberg has
contributed several suggestions and comments. I have presented the paper at the
conference ”Reporting, Investor Relations, Capital Markets – Challenges and Op-
portunities in Financial Communication” at HHL Leipzig in November 2016. The
paper has been submitted to the Journal of Risk and is currently under review.
The third paper, “Another Look at the Relation between Distress Risk and Equity
Returns - Evidence From Germany” has been written in close collaboration with
Prof. Poddig. He has made extensive contributions to the methodology of the
paper. I have collected all data. Code and text have been written by myself. Prof.
Poddig and I have discussed the results, which remain to some degree inconclusive,
for a long time. The interpretations in the paper are a result from these discussions.
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Dr. Fieberg has contributed several comments during the early phase of research.
I have presented the paper at the 2016 HVB PhD student seminar in Mu¨nster.
The paper shall soon be submitted to a suitable journal.
B. Research Papers
B.1. Paper I: The Relevance of Credit Ratings over the
Business Cycle
The article “The Relevance of Credit Ratings over the Business Cycle” has been
published in The Journal of Risk Finance and is not included in this version of the
dissertation to avoid any copyright infringement.
B.2. Paper II: Forecasting Corporate Defaults in the German
Stock Market
The article “Forecasting Corporate Defaults in the German Stock Markets” will
be published in The Journal of Risk and is not included in this version of the
dissertation to avoid any copyright infringement.
B.3. Paper III: Another Look at the Relation between Distress
Risk and Equity Returns - Evidence From Germany
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Another Look at the Relation
between Distress Risk and Equity
Returns - Evidence From Germany
Richard L. Mertens, Thorsten Poddig and Christian Fieberg
March 27, 2017
We assess the empirical relation between default risk and equity re-
turns in the German stock market in order to provide out-of-sample
evidence for the growing strand of literature which investigates whether
distress risk a) explains stock returns and b) offers explanations for size,
value or momentum effects in equity returns. At the core of this lit-
erature, which has come to unsettling and inconclusive results, is a
fundamental discussion about the nature of risk factors in multifac-
tor models like the Fama & French 3-Factor Model: are there really
straightforward economic explanations (such as distress risk) for these
factors? The empirical results for the German stock market lend sup-
port to the notion that distress risk itself is an idiosyncratic risk in the
equity market. Even though characteristics like size, book-to-market-
equity and momentum are intimately related to distress risk, the latter
offers no explanation at all for the significant value and momentum
effects in the German stock market.
1. Introduction
Researchers have identified way too many patterns in average stock returns. Since
Fama & French (1992, 1993, 1996), the list of firm characteristics that supposedly
explain returns has become endless. The ever growing literature on the cross-
section of stocks and firm characteristics surveyed by Harvey et al. (2015) leaves
71
us in an uncomfortable place: which characteristics-related effects are real, which
are artifacts due to data-mining? How should we deal with the multidimensional-
ity, how many independent characteristics are there (Cochrane 2011)? And finally:
how can we make sense of it all? Are there really straightforward economic ex-
planations for common characteristics-related effects? This article is devoted to
shed further light on the last two aspects. We assess the empirical relation be-
tween stock returns and distress risk in order to investigate whether firm distress
risk, a popular explanation (Fama & French 1995, 1996), is behind size, value and
momentum effects in the German stock market.
Assessing the ability of distress risk to explain equity returns touches one of the
most intensely debated issues in finance. Now the most commonly used empirical
asset pricing models are multifactor models like the Fama & French (1993)-3-
factor-model (FFM) and the Carhart (1997)-Four-Factor-Model (CFM). These
models are widespread in empirical research and practice, notwithstanding that
it remains largely unclear what kind of risk their factors actually represent. Ad-
vocates of rational pricing theories claim that these factors are systematic risk
and have suggested that distress risk is the fundamental explanation behind the
factors (Fama & French 1995, 1996). However, a growing strand of the empiri-
cal literature finds it extremely difficult to establish a clear-cut relation between
distress risk and equity returns.1 This paper is motivated by the contradictory
results of this literature that call for out-of-sample evidence. The German stock
market, which differs from the US market, for instance due to Germany being
characterized as a bank-based economy, is interesting in this regard for two rea-
sons. First, the German stock market has not been researched as intensively as
the US market. Second, there is evidence for significant value and momentum
effects but not much support for risk factor models like the FFM or CFM. Several
authors find that these models fail to explain returns in the cross-section of Ger-
man stocks (Artmann, Finter, Kempf, Koch & Theissen 2012, Artmann, Finter
& Kempf 2012, Brueckner 2013, Fieberg et al. 2016). While these articles show
that there are indeed value and momentum effects in the German stock market,
they find that risk factors based on these effects provide no good explanations for
returns. The empirical analysis sheds light on whether firm distress risk explains
pattern in returns in the cross-section of German stocks.
The empirical analysis provides ex-post and ex-ante perspectives on distress risk.
1Several papers find that distress risk increases equity returns (Anginer & Yildizhan 2014,
Vassalou & Xing 2004, Friewald et al. 2014). However, a growing body of literature reports
evidence in favor of a distress risk puzzle, i.e. a negative relation between distress risk and
equity returns (Campbell et al. 2008, Dichev 1998, Griffin & Lemmon 2002, Ding et al. 2012,
Ferreira Filipe et al. 2014).
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We add to the literature by conducting an ex post control firm analysis. Compar-
ing the long-run Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns (BHAR) of defaulters against
firms with similar characteristics that stay alive shows significant underperfor-
mance of the former up to one year before the default event. Prior to that, future
defaulters seem to outperform survivors but the return differences are statistically
insignificant. Furthermore, we use the default risk models that have been tested
in the German stock market by Mertens et al. (2016) for portfolio sorts and Fama
& MacBeth (1973) regressions. The F-Score model proposed by Campbell et al.
(2008) and recalibrated for the German market by Mertens et al. (2016) serves as
base model in the article. We choose this model because it is known to outperform
other models in forecasting corporate defaults. Hence, using this model, reduces
measurement error and, in general, the arbitrariness of other common character-
istics associated with distress risk. Only a small fraction of firms is affected by
distress risk, which is by nature an extreme risk. Overall, we find that this risk
can be characterized as idiosyncratic in the stock market. Though average returns
on F-Score sorted portfolios exhibit a pattern that is similar to the findings of
the US-literature (Campbell et al. 2008, Dichev 1998, Griffin & Lemmon 2002),
this finding does not pass standard asset pricing tests in the German stock mar-
ket. Moreover, while distress risk has straightforward relations to characteristics
like size, book-to-market-equity (BTM) and momentum, we do not find that it
offers convincing explanations for the significant value and momentum effects in
the German market.
We perform several robustness checks, most notably by excluding small firms and
defaulters. Dropping small firms and defaulters from the sample reduces distress
risk substantially but yields stronger evidence for a negative relationship between
firm distress risk and stock returns. However, in such settings, models forecast-
ing defaults mainly reflect correlation with momentum and value and not actual
distress risk. Overall, the cross-section of German stocks contains relatively more
distressed firms than the cross-section of US stocks studies by Campbell et al.
(2008). Perhaps the negative relation between distress risk and returns detected
by Campbell et al. and others is driven by the low levels of risk and reflects such
correlation rather than causality.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. We explain the appeal of distress
risk as an explanatory variable in empirical asset pricing models and summarize the
related literature in section 2. Section 3 describes the methodology, in particular
the ex post control firm analysis, portfolio sorts and Fama & MacBeth (1973)
regressions. The sample is introduced in section 4. Results are presented in section
5. Section 6 discusses the robustness of our results to the variation of various
parameters and section 7 concludes.
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2. Theory and Hypothesis Development
A stunning data mining has been going in research on the cross-section of stocks.
Harvey et al. (2015) survey hundreds of articles in search for variables that have
been found to be significantly related to returns. In total, they find 316 different
variables. It appears that associating firm i’s characteristics C with the excess
returns on its stock re is one of the most popular sports in economics:
rei,t+1 = αi + b
′ × Ci,t. (1)
Overall, applying frameworks like (1) has tended to make matters in asset pricing
much less clear. Most importantly, the extensive research is calling the way factor
models translate (risk) factors into returns into question.
Empirical asset pricing models are themselves commonly based on firm character-
istics. The most popular examples are the FFM and the CFM. Fama & French
(1992, 1993) have proposed the former in the light of an overwhelming evidence
on the failure of the single-factor Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) to explain
patterns in returns with regard to firm size (Banz 1981) and BTM (Rosenberg et al.
1985). The FFM was built on the premise that return differences between small
and big firms, the Small-Minus-Big (SMB) factor, as well as growth and value
firms, the High-Minus-Low (HML) factor, are systematic risk (Fama & French
1995, 1996). Furthermore, Jegadeesh & Titman (1993) show that firm momen-
tum is associated with patterns in returns that are unexplained by the CAPM
and the FFM. Consequently, Carhart (1997) proposed to amend the FFM by a a
momentum factor constructed from return differences between past winners and
loser, the Winner-Minus-Loser (WML) factor. The model including this factor
is called the CFM. More recently, Fama & French (2015) suggest to construct
additional factors based on investment expenditure and profitability, yet two more
firm characteristics.
The papers briefly summarized above certainly play in their own league. Though
dealing with four or five characteristics might be complicated enough, this is
nowhere near where the empirical literature summarized by Harvey et al. (2015)
and Richardson et al. (2010), who provide another review, currently stands. Ap-
parently, there is an ever growing evidence on failures of empirical asset pricing
models and new significant characteristics. The cross-section is in a mess. There is
an urgent need for cleanup efforts. Cochrane (2011) demands that future research
must reduce the “zoo” of anomalies. Which characteristics do explain returns and
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which are subsumed by others?
In this article, we investigate whether firm distress risk imposes structure on com-
mon characteristics in the German stock market. Below we discuss why distress
risk has been brought forward in the related literature as a superimposed risk be-
hind several characteristics. Risk factor models like the FFM do not pass standard
tests in the full cross-section of German stocks, but there is strong evidence for
significant characteristics-effects, in particular value and momentum effects (Art-
mann, Finter, Kempf, Koch & Theissen 2012, Artmann, Finter & Kempf 2012,
Brueckner 2013, Fieberg et al. 2016). In this regard, the situation seems to be
similar to the US. On the other hand, the German data set has not yet been so
extensively mined for explanatory variables. This enables us to present interesting
out-of-sample evidence on the relation between distress risk and equity returns.
2.1. The Case for Distress Risk
The problem with common characteristics is twofold. First, in many cases there
is little theory behind them. The size effect is a good example. There are poten-
tially many reasons why small firms earn, on average, larger returns than big firms
(liquidity, bankruptcy risk, opaqueness, to name a few), but Banz (1981) bluntly
acknowledges that his discovery of the size effect itself has no theoretical foun-
dations at all. Second, common characteristics are highly ambiguous and if they
are a measure for some kind of risk, they are probably subject to measurement
errors. Penman et al. (2007) interpret leverage as a proxy for financial risk and
find a seemingly puzzling negative relation between leverage and stock returns.
However, by intuition this finding must by no means be a puzzle. Sorting firms
by leverage will typically show that relatively safe firms apply more leverage and
risky firms are constrained in the debt market (George & Hwang 2010). Thinking
carefully about what one should do with characteristics and making sure that the
characteristics are really an adequate measure for the subject at hand is essential
to prevent further chaos in the cross-section.
There are several theoretical arguments for the ability of distress risk to explain
patterns in stock returns. Corporate balance sheets mirror business cycle dynamics
(Bernanke et al. 1996) and default rates fluctuate pro-cyclically. Following in this
vein, Fama & French (1995, 1996) argue that investors, who have outside labor
income, should dislike firms with high distress risk. Following basic Intertemporal
Capital Asset Pricing Model (ICAPM) (Merton 1973) logic, these firms must,
on average, earn larger returns. Consequently, distress risk has been associated
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with many different characteristics. Fama & French regard distress risk as an
explanation for the value effect. There are also strong arguments for relations of
size and momentum with distress risk. Small firms and past losers have much
higher default risk (Agarwal & Taffler 2008a, Campbell et al. 2008, Mertens et al.
2016). Hence, distress risk is probably mechanically related to size and momentum.
Therefore, it seems plausible that size and momentum effects could be explained
by a distress effect. Avramov et al. (2007), who use credit ratings as proxy for
distress, find that momentum effects are driven by past losers with low credit
ratings. Similar results are presented by Agarwal & Taffler (2008b).
The theoretical case for distress risk is compelling. An important question remains
how the concept of distress risk outlined above should be defined in order to be
an accurate measure of risk that is useful in empirical research. Firm distress can
be defined as a temporary state in which a firm cannot honor its commitments
(Asquith et al. 1994, Andrade & Kaplan 1998, Whitaker 1999). This state may
lead to default, which is terminal. Though distress and default are not the same
(Wruck 1990), the related empirical literature summarized below is centered on the
default event. This article follows this literature in treating distress and default
risk as if they were one and the same thing.2 From now on, we use the terms
distress risk and default risk interchangeably. We discuss the consequences of this
assumption as we present the results. Forecasting corporate defaults (measuring
default risk) has a long tradition in finance. Substantial progress has been made in
this area since the early work of Altman (1968). Modern default risk models can be
regarded as very powerful. Mertens et al. (2016) test several of them in the German
stock market and confirm the good performance of the failure score proposed by
Campbell et al. (2008). We adapt this model, which is in detail introduced in
section 3, as a characteristic for default risk in this article. In doing so, we can
substantially reduce the measurement problem. Moreover, we can use this measure
in generic frameworks like (1) and make our research directly comparable to the
related literature.
A strand of the empirical literature has looked at the relation between equity
returns and firm distress risk in the US. This literature has applied different default
risk models to measure distress risk at the firm level and then used this information
to form distress risk portfolios. The results are summarized in table 1.
2Distress risk and default risk are probably similar to each other. Pindado et al. (2008) propose
empirical models to forecast distress (not default) and find that the variables that are used
to forecast distress are the same as variables that are commonly used to forecast defaults.
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Authors Default Risk
Model
Relationship with Default Risk
Return Beta Size BTM
Dichev (1998) Z-Score, O-Score - - +
Griffin & Lemmon (2002) Z-Score, O-Score - - -
Vassalou & Xing (2004) DD + - +
Agarwal & Taffler (2008b) Z-Score -
Campbell et al. (2008) F-Score - + - -
Avramov et al. (2009) Ratings - + - +
Breig & Elsas (2009) DD - + - +/-
Garlappi & Yan (2011) DD +/- +/- +/-
Ding et al. (2012) F-Score - + - +
Friewald et al. (2014) CDS + +/- - +/-
Anginer & Yildizhan (2014) Bond Spreads + +
Ferreira Filipe et al. (2014) DD - + - +
This tables summarizes the related literature. Column two indicates the models applied
to measure distress risk. Columns three to six indicate the relationship with returns, beta,
size and BTM. A + (-) indicates a positive (negative) relationship. +/- indicates an am-
biguous relationship. Fields are left blank when the relationship does not become clear in
a paper.
Table 1: Literature Summary
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The articles apply a battery of models, including the Altman (1968) Z-Score,
Ohlson (1980) O-Score, Merton (1974) Distance-to-Default (DD), credit spreads
or ratings, as models to measure default risk. Only few articles evaluate how
well these approaches actually forecast defaults (Campbell et al. 2008, Vassalou &
Xing 2004). As such, the strand of the literature is a good example for the body
of research on the cross-section of stocks. The results are inconclusive. Several
studies document a negative relation between firm specific distress risk and equity
returns (Dichev 1998, Griffin & Lemmon 2002, Campbell et al. 2008, Avramov
et al. 2009, Ding et al. 2012, Ferreira Filipe et al. 2014).3 These authors conclude
that this finding contradicts our intuition about the relationship between risk and
return in general and have called it the distress risk puzzle. They conclude that
anything beyond behavioral explanations for these findings is hard to conceive.
However, some authors also report a positive relation between distress risk and
equity returns (Anginer & Yildizhan 2014, Friewald et al. 2014, Vassalou & Xing
2004). Moreover, the related literature shows strong relations of distress risk with
size and BTM (columns five and six of table 1). Distressed firms tend to be small
value firms. These findings are completely in line with the intuition proposed by
Fama & French (1993).
By and large, the empirical results remain inconclusive: is there a distress effect
in the equity market? If so, can this effect reduce the multidimensionality in the
cross-section and explain size value as well as momentum effects? There is need
for out-of-sample evidence.
2.2. Research Hypotheses
We present such evidence by repeating the analyses that have been conducted
in the U.S. literature in the German capital market. The goal is to assess the
basic relation between firm distress risk and equity returns. We use a realistic
forecasting model developed by Mertens et al. (2016) to model the market expec-
tations for distress risk and use this information for portfolio sorts and Fama &
MacBeth (1973) regressions. Our first hypothesis states that equity investors are
compensated for bearing distress risk.
3Breig & Elsas (2009) present some results on the relationship between distress risk and equity
returns in the German stock market. This working paper differs from this article as its
empirical analysis is based on several test assets and not the entire cross-section of German
equities. Their work is based on the premise that distress risk is systematic, so they begin
with the construction of risk factors. We take a more agnostic stance on the matter and
assess whether there is a distress effect in the cross-section.
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H1 Returns on high distress risk firms are larger than returns on low distress
risk firms.
Support for H1 would be given by outperformance of the high distress risk portfolio
versus the low distress risk portfolio as well as significance of distress risk in Fama
& MacBeth (1973) regressions. If H1 is rejected, there can be no superimposed
distress risk factor. Nevertheless, distress risk might still be a part of the expla-
nation for size, value and momentum effects. After all, they are catch-all effects
that might still partly be related to distress risk. This is what our second set of
research hypotheses postulates:
H2 Distress risk explains the size effect: When we control for distress risk, size
effects disappear.
H3 Distress risk explains the value effect: When we control for distress risk,
value effects disappear.
H4 Distress risk explains the momentum effect: When we control for distress
risk, momentum effects disappear.
The hypothesis H2-H4 refer to a common problem in statistics: does an additional
control variable (distress risk) affect the significance of the other explanatory vari-
ables (size, BTM, momentum)? A careful regression analysis is in order. The
methodology is explained in the following.
3. Methodology
We look at the empirical relationship between distress risk and equity returns from
two perspectives. An ex post analysis is supposed to shed light on the long run
BHAR of investments in bankrupt firms. We expect them to underperform in
the years preceding their failure as market participants anticipate their default.
To find preliminary evidence for H1, we need to detect positive outperformance
of bankrupt firms in the years before their decline. We make use of a control
firm analysis to measure long run BHAR of bankrupt firms. The ex ante analysis
follows the methodology of the literature listed in table 1 and performs portfolio
sorts based on a distress risk model, which has been developed and tested using
the same dataset as we will use in this paper. The ex ante portfolio sort approach
allows us to derive a realistic relationship between distress risk and expected equity
returns. Moreover, Fama & MacBeth (1973) regressions deliver further insight
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with regard to the interrelations between firm specific distress risk, size, value and
momentum effects (H2-H4).
3.1. Ex Post Control Firm Analysis
Barber & Lyon (1997) recommend the control firm analysis to detect long run
abnormal performance. In simulation studies they find that test statistics suffer
from new listing, rebalancing and skewness bias, when comparing the firms of
interest with proxies for a market portfolio. Their results demonstrate that these
problems do not arise when the firms of interest are matched with similar firms.
They detect similarity based on size and book-to-market equity. Following this
recommendation, we match each bankrupt firm in our sample at the beginning of
its records with a similar firm. We deem a firm to be a qualified control firm if it
has never entered insolvency proceedings and was neither acquired or delisted from
the market for any other reason. Moreover, we require the control firm to be in the
same industry. Finally, we apply two criteria to numerically determine similarity:
Control firms must have a similar size and a similar BTM. To operationalize
this, we z-transform the size and BTM of all eligible firms at the instant of the
defaulter first entering the sample. In other words, we z-transform size and BTM
in the cross-section consisting of the defaulter and eligible control firms on the first
trading day of the defaulter. Then, we compute the Euclidean distance between
each qualified control firm and the respective study firm. We select the firm with
the minimum distance as the control firm. Following this procedure we can find
appropriate control firms in our sample without problems. We do allow a control
firm to serve as a control for multiple bankrupt firms. This is necessary in order
to find suitable control firms in small industry groups. However, we do not obtain
control firms that serve as a control for many different bankrupt firms.4
Given an appropriate control firm j, we compute the yearly BHAR for every
bankrupt firm i according to (2):
BHARi,τ =
t=τ∑
t=τ−250
ri,t −
t=τ∑
t=τ−250
rj,t, (2)
where we apply (2) to the log returns r for values of τ equal to the date of the
bankruptcy event and 1-7 years before the bankruptcy event. Hence, we compute
4Restricting firms to act as controls for several bankrupt firms does not affect the results.
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yearly BHAR for up to eight years before the event given that the history of a
bankrupt firm is long enough. This procedure yields a 8×nD matrix with BHAR,
where nD denotes the number of defaulters in the sample. Based on this data, we
formally test whether bankrupt firms out- or underperform control firms at any
point in time. As is expected and evident in the data, BHAR are non normally
distributed in the cross-section, they are highly skewed, especially for small values
of τ . Thus, we conduct a nonparametric hypothesis test. Specifically, we use
the Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test to determine whether the cross-sectional BHAR
differ significantly from zero. It is expected that bankrupt firms will underperform
the year prior to bankruptcy (τ = 0). To find preliminary evidence for H1, we
should detect significantly positive BHAR in the time span long before bankruptcy
(τ > 2). This ex post view on default risk is very helpful as it yields results that are
intuitively interpretable. Such an analysis has not been conducted in the related
literature. Moreover, the ex post analysis does not require a model to estimate
distress risk and is therefore to a lesser degree affected by model risk and the joint
hypothesis problem (Lo & MacKinlay 1999).
3.2. Ex Ante Analysis
However, the parsimonious ex post analysis has three shortcomings and can thus
only provide preliminary evidence. First, by considering only defaulters and sur-
vivors, this procedure reduces firm specific distress risk to a dichotomy. The anal-
ysis provides no insight about the full spectrum of default risk and its relationship
with returns. Second, as it relies on the knowledge of future information, it is
not a feasible investment strategy and fails to account for the expectations of in-
vestors. This aspect seems to be especially important with regard to distress risk.
The credit risk literature has developed models that are relatively successful in
forecasting defaults, especially if the forecasting horizon does not exceed one year
(Bharath & Shumway 2008, Bauer & Agarwal 2014, Mertens et al. 2016, Tian
et al. 2015). Not accounting for the predictability of defaults will distort the re-
sults. Third, the control firm analysis restricts us from forming portfolios, whereas
this is necessary to gauge systematic effects.5
To address these issues, we follow the literature listed in table 1 and perform
portfolio sorts based on a distress risk model. Specifically, we use a re-calibrated
variant of Campbell’s (2008) failure score (F-Score). The F-Score model contains
5Given a sufficient number of firm that default simultaneously, we would be able to conduct an
ex-post analysis based on portfolios. The number of defaulters in our sample is too small for
such an analysis.
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the following exogenous variables for the prediction of defaults:
• NIMTA: net income / market value of total assets
• TLMTA: total assets / market value of total assets
• CASHMTA: cash / market value of total assets
• SIGMA: standard deviation of stock returns
• EXRETAVG: excess stock return over CDAX
• PRC: log price truncated above log(15) EUR
• RSIZE: relative market capitalization
• MB: market equity / book equity
The exogenous variables listed above include proxies for size (RSIZE), value (MB)
and momentum (EXRETAVG). Hence, the F-Score may be regarded as a super-
characteristic that has been calibrated to forecast defaults. Mertens et al. (2016)
have tested the F-Score model in the German stock market and provide further
computational details (see their section 3.1). They show that this model dominates
other known distress risk models in terms of forecasting accuracy in the German
market. We use the same data as Mertens et al. (2016) in this article. Hence, it is
appropriate to choose this model as our base model for distress risk. We check the
robustness of our results with regard to alternative distress risk models in section
6.
Mertens et al. (2016) re-estimate the F-Score at the beginning of every calen-
dar year using a rolling out-of-sample (“walk-forward”) re-estimation procedure
(Sobehart et al. 2000).6 In principle, a more frequent re-estimation is desirable in
this paper because this would enable us to consider market expectations timely.
However, the balance sheet indicators listed above are only available in annual
frequency. Frequent re-estimations might reduce the default risk forecast to a
selection of negative momentum firms. To strike a balance between a timely con-
6Again, we acknowledge that the F-Score might be restrictive as it focuses on the default event
and not on the state of distress. While Mertens et al. (2016) show that the model is a
reliable predictor of defaults, we cannot test to what extent firms with elevated F-Scores are
distressed. However, it is well known that defaults rarely happen out of the blue. The strong
performance of forecasters like the F-Score illustrate that firms probably undergo a period
of distress before they default. Therefore, we believe that using the F-Score as a proxy for
distress and default risk is reasonable.
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sideration of expectations and measuring fundamental default risk, we re-estimate
the F-Score model in January and July based on semi-annual data and form ten
portfolios based on the obtained default risk scores.7 A higher score implies a
higher probability of default. Portfolio one contains the firms with the lowest
distress risk, portfolio ten contains the firms with the highest distress risk. For
each portfolio, we compute value-weighted and equal-weighted returns as well as
the average portfolio characteristics. Moreover, we also compute the returns on
the 10-1 portfolio, which shorts low distress risk stocks and assumes a long po-
sition in high distress risk stocks. To control for the established risk factors, we
compute standard asset pricing models for each portfolio. We apply the CAPM,
the Fama & French (1993)-3-factor-model (FFM) and the Carhart (1997)-Four-
Factor-Model (CFM).
The ultimate test for the relation between firm specific distress risk and equity
returns is based on the 10-1 portfolios. Significantly positive 10-1 returns and
alpha coefficients point to a positive distress effect as implied by H1. Insignificant
10-1 returns and alpha coefficients suggest that firm specific distress risk is an
idiosyncratic risk in the German equity market. Apart from the standard t-tests,
we also perform the Gibbons-Ross-Shanken (GRS) test proposed by Gibbons et al.
(1989) as well as the monotonicity test proposed by Patton & Timmermann (2010).
The former tests the null that the alpha coefficients in the asset pricing models
are jointly equal to zero. The latter tests the null that the mean expected returns
of the ten distress risk portfolios exhibit a non-monotonic pattern.
The remaining research hypotheses (H2-H4) are devoted to assessing whether dis-
tress risk can explain size, value and momentum effects. As argued in section 2,
there might be a complex nexus between these effects. This setup calls for a very
careful regression analysis. We perform Fama & MacBeth (1973) regressions as
specified in (3)
ri,t+1 = λ
0
t+1 + SIZEi,t × λSt+1 + BTMi,t × λVt+1 + MOMi,t × λMt+1+
F-SCOREi,t × λDt+1 + i,t+1,
(3)
where r denotes the excess return of firm i at time t. To maintain consistency, we
7Mertens et al. (2016) present results on the forecasting performance of the F-Score based on
yearly re-estimations, but they conduct robustness checks using semi-annual re-estimations.
The F-Score outperforms all other models in this case too. The risk scores used in this article
can be translated into six-months-ahead probability of default (PD)s. We sort portfolios
based on scores because sometimes the distribution of probabilities is highly skewed and this
can be a problem for sorting algorithms.
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estimate (3) at the beginning of every January and July and aggregate the returns
to semi-annual returns. The different time subscripts for returns and character-
istics indicate that the re-estimation at the beginning of January is a regression
of the characteristics size, BTM, momentum (MOM) and F-Score observed at the
beginning of January on the returns observed at the end of June. We estimate
several variants of (3). Based on the results that have been presented in the re-
lated literature (Artmann, Finter & Kempf 2012, Fieberg et al. 2016, Schrimpf
et al. 2007), we expect that a version without F-Score as a control for distress risk
shows significant value and momentum effects (λV , λM > 0). With F-Score as a
control for distress risk, a significant coefficient λD would be evidence for a distress
effect (H1). We can judge to what extent distress risk explains the other effects by
comparing how significances and magnitudes of the other coefficients change once
we control for distress risk (H2-H4).8
A new methodological debate about statistical inference in asset pricing and cor-
porate finance is quickly gaining importance the research community. The debate
centers on how standard errors should be computed (Cameron et al. 2006, Gow
et al. 2010, Petersen 2008) and how we should deal with the data-snooping bias
inherent in modern empirical research (Harvey et al. 2015).
The Fama & MacBeth (1973) procedure uses the time-series of coefficients to
estimate standard errors.9 Two issues inherent in (3) might cause problems with
regard to statistical inference. First, the residuals might be correlated across
different firms, Cov[i,t, j,t] 6= 0 where i 6= j, which is called a firm effect. A
firm effect is present, when a certain firm is individually affected by some factor
that is not explicitly modeled. Second, the residuals might be correlated across
time period, Cov[i,t, i,t−s] 6= 0 where s 6= 0, which is called a time effect. A
time effect is given when forces that are not modeled as a control variable affect
returns at the same time. In general, it is very hard to preclude both effects
in finance. This is why Cameron et al. (2006) have proposed clustered standard
errors. Standard errors can be clustered on time, firm or both to account for the
correlation structures discussed above. Petersen (2008) and Gow et al. (2010) show
that unclustered standard errors can lead to grossly wrong conclusions when the
correlation structured describe above are in fact present. However, clustering is no
universal remedy. In settings without correlated errors the conventional variance
estimator is, of course, the right choice. Moreover, clustered errors can be wrong
8In section 4 we show that the empirical correlations between the right-hand-side variables of
(3) do not point to serious multicollinearity issues. We find that orthogonalization does not
affect the results.
9When factor loadings instead of characteristics are the regressors, the errors should be adjusted
for the errors-in-variables problem as suggested by Shanken (1992).
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when the number of clusters (number of firms or time periods) is low. We choose
to be very careful and report a variety of standard errors for the coefficients.
First, we compute the conventional Fama & MacBeth (1973) t-value based on the
distribution of the estimated coefficients. Moreover, t-values with standard errors
clustered on firm and time are reported. Lastly, we also compute a t-value based on
two-way clustered errors.10 Clustering has been implemented using the functions
provided by Cameron et al. (2006) and Gow et al. (2010). In accordance with
these authors, we use critical values from the t-distribution with G − 1 degrees
of freedom, G being the smallest number of clusters (firms or time periods) along
either dimension.
In addition to that, Harvey et al. (2015) conclude that after the extensive data
mining that has taken place in the literature, even if standard errors are in fact
correct, the hurdle rate for a conventional t-value should be larger than 2.0. To
account for the looming data-snooping bias, every new paper makes things worse
in this regard, they use a multiple testing framework to evaluate the results of
previous research and derive new, more reliable cut-off values for future research.11
Harvey et al. (2015) argue that a newly discovered variable should have a t-value
above 3.0. This hurdle rate should increase in the future with the number of
additional research papers mining the data. One might argue that the hurdle rate
should be lower when the sample is not the most actively researched US cross-
section of stocks. Albeit, even though it might be less popular, research on, say,
the cross-section of German equities, is still the same sport and the data-snooping
concern does not completely go away. Hence, careful research should at least
express some doubts when the t-values of new factors do not exceed 3.0.
We are convinced that, in spite of these complications, a panel regression like (3)
is the right methodology to isolate distress risk from other effects in equity returns
because it enables us to address the multidimensionality of the problem (Cochrane
2011). Moreover, in this case statistical inference has very well-researched prop-
erties. Nevertheless, we acknowledge that there are alternative methodologies.
First, there is the technique of double sorts that can be helpful to assess the joint
effect of two different variables on returns. In general, sorts are a nonparametric
10The conventional ordinary least squares (OLS) variance estimator is V = s2 × (X ′X)−1,
where s2 = 1N−K ×
∑N
i=1 ei and N,K denote the numbers of observations and parameters,
respectively. With one-way clustering the variance estimator is Vclustered = (X
′X)−1 ×∑Nc
j=1 u
′
j × uj × (X ′X)−1, where Nc denotes the number of clusters (e.g. firms/years) and u
is
∑
ei × xi in each cluster. See Cameron et al. (2006) for further details and the variance
estimator in the case of two-way clustering.
11Multiple testing is an area in statistics that is devoted to addressing data-mining biases. In
general, the techniques in this area adjust the p-values using the number of hypothesis that
have been tested before.
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method. When a relation is non-linear, sorts can help to gain a better visual eval-
uation. Since a characteristic feature of default risk is that risk indicators exhibit
highly skewed distributions, many firms are virtually not at risk, whereas few firms
have a high risk of defaulting (Bohn 2011, Mertens et al. 2016), such a method
might have its merits, too. Therefore, we consider double sorts in appendix A.
In general, sorts are limited in jointly considering several control variables. The
cross-section of German equities is rather small, anything beyond double sorts is
not appropriate. Daniel & Titman (1997), Daniel et al. (1997) propose an alter-
native sort technique based on characteristics-adjusted returns, which might fare
better in detecting a relationship between distress risk and equity returns net of
characteristics-effects. Such an analysis is presented in appendix B.
4. Data and Descriptive Statistics
We obtain all non-financial firms that have equity listed in Frankfurt, the main
stock exchange in Germany, from the Thomson Reuters Datastream database.
Specifically, we select all non-financial active and dead firms available between
1990 to 2015. We include only securities that Datastream labels as “primary list-
ings”. Equity prices and total return indices are provided with daily frequency.
Worldscope balance sheet and profitability data, which are also provided by Datas-
tream, is only available with an annual frequency. These data items are lagged by
six months to account for the publication lag. Moreover, individual stock returns
and balance sheet items are winsorized at the 1% level.12 We define the CDAX
index as a proxy for the market portfolio and use the yield to maturity on 1-year
German Bunds as proxy for the risk-free rate. Datastream data is known to con-
tain some flaws. We follow the recommendations made by Ince & Porter (2006)
and Brueckner (2013) to clean the data. SMB, HML and WML factors have been
obtained from Prof. Stehle’s Website.13
For our analysis it is crucial to know when and for which reasons a firm has left the
stock market. Most importantly, we need information about defaults to estimate
the F-Score model. Unfortunately, this information is not available on Datastream.
We use the data on defaults in the German market collected by Mertens et al.
12Mertens et al. (2016) find that winsorization at alternative levels or refraining from winsoriza-
tion does not affect the performance of default risk models. Similarly, we do not find that
our empirical results are affected by this choice.
13The link to the website is https://www.wiwi.hu-berlin.de/de/professuren/bwl/bb/data.
We find that using self-constructed risk factors or the factors provided by Artmann, Finter,
Kempf, Koch & Theissen (2012) does not affect our results.
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(2016) to determine the exact exit date of all defaulters. Consequently, we set a
firm to missing on the day after it has filed for default with a German court. We
set other inactive firms that have not defaulted to missing whenever prices have
been stale for a year. Moreover, we exclude firms that have been penny stocks for
95% of their lifetime. In particular this should address the most extreme cases of
investor fraud that have happened in the German stock market over the course
of the years. Besides that, we do not exclude penny stock observations per se.
In this regard, our dataset differs from the data used in other empirical work on
the German market. Brueckner et al. (2012) remove firms as soon as their share
price is below 1 EUR. Artmann, Finter, Kempf, Koch & Theissen (2012) do not
really describe how they deal with small prices. Obviously, there are arguments
for a strict immediate exclusion of penny stocks (Brueckner et al. 2012). However,
small prices and a small market capitalization are natural attendant circumstances
of distress and failure. Erasing firms as soon as their share price drops below a
certain threshold would imply erasing a lot of high distress risk firms and therefore
bias our results.14 We conduct several robustness checks to see if very small firms
are driving our results.
An introduction to the past and the present of the German stock market is pro-
vided by Stehle & Schmidt (2015). This market has a few features that make it
interesting for research on the pricing of distress risk. First, the German stock
market experienced a massive increase of listed firms in the years before the dot-
com bubble burst. This is visible in column two of table 2, which presents the
numbers of active and defaulted firms in our sample.15 In the late 1990s, the
boom of tech-stocks was fueled by Deutsche Boerse AG, the German exchange,
with the introduction of a new segment for internet start-ups, the so called “New
Market” (Neuer Markt). The idea was to create a market segment similar to NAS-
DAQ with laxer listing standards. After the stock market crash of 2001, a large
number of these firms experienced distress and many failed spectacularly. This is
illustrated in columns three and four of table 2. This episode has severely damaged
the reputation of the German stock market as well as the German equity culture.
Before this first default wave, defaults were quasi unheard of in the German stock
market. The low number of defaults prior to 2001 restricts us from estimating the
F-Score before January 2001. Unfortunately, this leads to a loss of information,
in particular on the rise of the New Market. There are two further spikes in the
annual default rate in 2009 and in 2013, which are due to the financial crisis and
14Moreover, Brueckner et al. (2012) limit their analysis to firms listed in the top market segment
of the Frankfurt stock exchange. This is not possible in a study on failure, as defaults in this
segment are extremely rare.
15This table is identical to table 1 in Mertens et al. (2016), who use the same sample to test the
performance of default risk models.
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a large number of defaults in the German solar cells industry, respectively. Hence,
the dynamics of default in our dataset are to some degree similar and to some
degree different from the existing research on the pricing of distress risk in the
U.S. market. Moreover, Germany is also the textbook example of a bank-based
economy. These aspects illustrate that the German stock market can provide in-
teresting out-of-sample evidence on the empirical relation between distress risk
and equity returns.
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Year Active Firms Defaulted Firms Default Rate
1991 313 0 0
1992 324 0 0
1993 328 1 0.3
1994 333 0 0
1995 343 0 0
1996 362 2 0.55
1997 368 2 0.54
1998 383 0 0
1999 441 1 0.23
2000 577 3 0.52
2001 702 17 2.42
2002 691 28 4.05
2003 623 7 1.12
2004 585 8 1.37
2005 568 7 1.23
2006 566 8 1.41
2007 628 4 0.64
2008 658 9 1.37
2009 645 22 3.41
2010 607 11 1.81
2011 597 7 1.17
2012 596 10 1.68
2013 562 20 3.56
2014 533 7 1.31
2015 512 7 1.37
Full sample 1023 181 17.69
Yearly average 505 6.96 1
This table presents the total number of active firms in every year as well as the
number of defaulters per year. The default rate is the %-share of defaulters in all
active firms per year. The full sample default rate is the %-share of defaulters in
all firms. Yearly averages are obtained by averaging all yearly observations in the
table.
Table 2: Sample Statistics: Total number of firms and number of defaulted
firms
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We obtain out-of-sample F-Score distress risk score based on this data. Summary
statistics for these scores and the other firm characteristics of interest are presented
in panel A of table 3.
Panel A: Summary Statistics
Beta Size BTM Momentum F-Score
Mean 0.48 11.27 0.82 -5.21 -7.11
StdErr 0.6 44.16 0.71 52.96 1.87
P25 0.07 0.18 0.38 -27.53 -8.32
Median 0.43 0.6 0.63 1.39 -7.45
P75 0.84 2.76 1 24.14 -6.11
Panel B: Correlations
Beta Size BTM Momentum F-Score
Beta 1
Size 0.06 1
BTM -0.06 -0.1 1
Momentum 0.04 0.05 -0.27 1
F-Score 0.1 -0.14 0.12 -0.38 1
This table presents summary statistics (panel A) and correlation co-
efficients (panel B) for several firm characteristics. P25 and P75 de-
note the 25- and 75-percentile values, respectively. Size is reported
in terms of 100 mn. Euros and momentum is reported in terms of
percentage points. The stock returns and balance sheet items have
been winsorized at the 1% level.
Table 3: Summary statistics and correlations
Compared with the related literature, the average firm in our sample is slightly
smaller, has a higher BTM and much lower momentum. These differences can be
explained by our somewhat different sampling procedure and the shortened sample
period. As we cannot estimate the F-Score before 2001, we loose the bull phase
of the early nineties. Hence, we begin the analysis just before the collapse of the
so-called New Economy and do not delete many of the small firms entering the
market during this period. In this respect, it is also notable that the distribution of
firm size is heavily skewed towards small firms.16 As expected, the average F-Score
implies a probability of default of roughly zero and the distribution appears to the
skewed to the right.17 Correlation coefficients are shown in panel B of table 3. In
16This observation is similar to the descriptive statistics presented by Fieberg et al. (2016). An
equal-weighted index of all active firms in the sample yields a negative total return over the
entire sample period. Stehle & Schmidt (2015) provide further information on the effects
of the rise and fall of the “Neuer Markt” segment on the total market capitalization of the
German stock market (see their figure 1) .
17The probability of default can be obtained by applying the logit transformation to the scores.
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general, correlations appear to be low. The correlations of size, book-to-market
equity and momentum with the F-Score are all intuitive and marginally significant.
Alternative default risk models (see section 6) show very similar correlations.
5. Empirical Results
Table 4 shows the results of the control firm analysis. At the instance of the default
event (τ = 0,0-250 days before bankruptcy) and one year prior to the default event
(τ = 1,251-500 days before bankruptcy), we observe large negative BHAR. Based
on the Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test, these results are highly significant. They do
not come as a surprise. Markets anticipate the default event, the death of the
firm in its current form, as firms go through a period of distress. BHAR that are
observed for the more distant past of the firm are all positive, statistically they
are either insignificant or just marginally significant. One might wonder whether
these results are still economically significant. After all, the control firm analysis
does not yield fully conclusive results. The signs for the periods 2-7 are all in
accordance with H1, but the total number of defaults in the sample is perhaps still
too low to draw conclusions out of this.
τ 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
BHAR (%) -44.6 -29.75 19.19 17.56 5.68 8.32 6.62 8.51
P-Val 0 0 0.0767 0.547 0.2262 0.1114 0.2382 0.2216
This table presents the mean yearly BHAR that have been computed based on a control
firm analysis. The returns have been winsorized at the 0.01 and 0.99 percentile. Yearly
BHAR have been computed at the instances of the default event (τ = 0),...,seven years
before the default event (τ = 7).
Table 4: Control Firm Analysis: BHAR
The evidence of strong underperformance of future defaulters up to two years
before default implies that markets process existing information about the bad
condition of these firms relatively early. This is consistent with the evidence that
default risk models based on market and accounting information are relatively
successful in forecasting defaults up to one year in advance (Bauer & Agarwal
2014, Hilscher & Wilson 2016, Mertens et al. 2016).
As a next step, we perform semi-annual out-of-sample re-estimations of the F-Score
in January and July and sort portfolios on the obtained scores. The results for the
ten distress risk portfolios are shown in table 5.
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Value-weighted excess returns in panel A of table 5 begin to decay after portfolio
1, become negative after portfolio 4 and increase after portfolio 9. Perhaps this v-
shaped pattern reflects the different states of firms: firms in portfolio 1-4 are safe,
firms in portfolios 5-9 are in decline and firms in portfolios 10 are already in severe
distress or in recovery. At first glance, this pattern seems to confirm the distress
risk puzzle that has been documented in the US-literature (see table 1). However,
Campbell et al. (2008) and Dichev (1998) find that returns decline monotonically
in distress risk. Moreover, in the German stock market, the sort on distress risk
does not yield significant alpha coefficients - only some are statistically significant
and all of them are far from being economically significant. The 10-1 portfolio,
which is long high distress risk and short low distress risk stocks, yields a semi
annual excess return that is statistically not different from zero. In neither of the
applied asset pricing models does this strategy deliver an alpha coefficient that
we would regard as economically and statistically significant. Unsurprisingly, the
GRS and monotonicity tests both fail to reject the null.
Panel B of table 5 shows the coefficients of the CFM. In general, higher distress
risk implies higher market factors, but betas drop after portfolio 9. The same
pattern has been presented by Garlappi & Yan (2011), who argue that highly
distressed firms are to a lesser extent exposed to systematic risk as the value of
equity converges to a recovery value. The high betas and low returns on portfolios
5-9 mark a failure of the CAPM. However, only portfolio nine shows significant
alphas. The firms in this portfolio appear to be deeply distressed, yet continue to
be in decline. Loadings on the remaining factors are hard to interpret and do not
give rise to straightforward conclusions. As it is rather unclear what factor models
like the CFM really achieve in the German capital market, we refrain from further
interpretations.
Does table 5 tell us anything? From a statistical point of view, the results remain
inconclusive. Based on the 10-1 excess returns, we should conclude that the data
tell us nothing. One might nevertheless argue that the decline in excess returns
from portfolios 1 to 9 is evidence for a distress risk puzzle. We are skeptical for two
reasons: First, the results point towards strong interfering value and momentum
effects. The portfolio characteristics in panel C of table 5 show suggestive trends
with respect to BTM, momentum and other characteristics. Low distress risk firms
are growth and past winner firms, high distress risk firms are value and past loser
firms. The pattern of excess returns is likely to be explained by these effects. The
results of the Fama & MacBeth (1973) regressions below shed further light on this.
Second, distress risk naturally is an extreme risk. It is to a much stronger degree a
binary risk than other kinds of risk in financial markets. The -8.07 mean F-Score
of portfolio 4 translates into a holding period PD of roughly 3 basis points and
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the portfolio 5 mean F-Score of -7.72 implies a PD of 4 basis points. Are such PD
levels a concern to investors? In fact, the only portfolio with a significant mean
PD appears to be portfolio 10. Its -3.4 mean F-Score implies a holding period PD
of 3.2%. By way of comparison, the 5.2 mean F-Score of portfolio 9 translates into
a PD of only 50 basis points.18 After all, these aspects illustrate that explaining
excess returns on portfolios 1-9 with distress risk is probably not sensible because
distress risk in these portfolios should be irrelevant to investors. Therefore, we
believe that the analysis should focus on the extreme portfolios.19
Additional results reveal that returns on all portfolios are left skewed, indicat-
ing that several extreme values in the left tail of the distributions influence the
results. For the high F-Score portfolios this does not come as a surprise. We ex-
pect distressed stocks to show highly negative returns. However, the left-skew in
the distribution is also existing in low F-Score portfolios, so the “Neuer Market”
downturn appears to affect our results in general to a larger extent than the related
literature.20 We discuss the robustness of our findings, in particular the distress
risk effect, to a more rigorous exclusion of small firms in section 6. Furthermore,
we find that standard deviations are increasing from portfolio 1 to 10. Portfolio
10 exhibits the highest annualized volatility, roughly 53% - more than twice as
high as the volatility of portfolio 1.21 In sum, the returns on highly distressed
firms fluctuate strongly. Due to the high volatility, we cannot detect that they
differ from zero. The results presented in table 5 point to strong relations between
distress risk with size, value and momentum effects, however. To investigate the
potential nexus between distress risk, size, BTM and momentum (H2-H4), we run
Fama & MacBeth (1973) regressions. The results are presented in table 6.
18Campbell et al. (2008) report similar probabilities. To put this into perspective, Moody’s
credit rating transition matrices show that annual default rates above 2% characterize the
speculative grade segment (Moody‘s 2008).
19The results presented by Mertens et al. (2016) support this view as they show that the ex ante
expected number of defaults in the highest F-Score decile (Portfolio 10) is very close to the
ex post realized number of defaults. Defaults in low risk portfolios are rare. See their table
4.
20Apart from distress and default, the IPO effect (Ritter 1991) may have caused underperfor-
mance of “Neuer Markt” stocks.
21These results are available upon request.
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Panel A: size, BTM and momentum
λ0 λS λV λM R2 RMSE
Coefficients -4.89 0.01 4.57 8.24 0.05 29.96
T-Stat. -1.65 0.92 2.86 4.67
T-Stat. firm-clustered -13.08 2.34 10.22 17.27
T-Stat. time-clustered -2.52 1.65 6.61 2.74
T-Stat. two-way-clustered -2.5 1.64 6 2.75
Panel B: size, BTM, momentum and distress risk
λ0 λS λV λM λD R2 RMSE
Coefficients -18.06 0 4.96 5.8 -1.67 0.07 29.66
T-Stat. -2.21 0.36 4.31 3.98 -2.06
T-Stat. firm-clustered -7.37 1.75 10.29 15.46 -2.98
T-Stat. time-clustered -2.44 1.12 6.71 2.43 -1.22
T-Stat. two-way-clustered -2.43 1.12 6.09 2.43 -1.21
This table presents the results of Fama-MacBeth regressions (3). The dependent
variables are the cross-sections of semi-annual excess stock returns between 2001-
2015. In panel A the independent variables are firm size, BTM and momentum.
In panel B the independent variables are firm size, BTM, momentum and F-Score.
The presented coefficients are the time-series means of the values that have been es-
timated in the repeated cross-sections. We report conventional T-Statistics and sev-
eral T-Statistics based on clustered standard errors. The reported coefficients of de-
termination are the time series averages of the adjusted R2 from the cross-sectional
regressions. The RMSE are computed as the square root of the mean squared resid-
uals. We compute a RMSE for each cross-sectional regression and report the average
for all regressions in the table.
Table 6: Fama-MacBeth Regression Results
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Panel A shows estimation results for a reduced model without distress risk. The
independent variables are firm size, BTM and momentum. In accordance with
Artmann, Finter, Kempf, Koch & Theissen (2012), Artmann, Finter & Kempf
(2012), Glaser & Weber (2003) and Fieberg et al. (2016), we find evidence for
priced value and momentum effects but no evidence for a priced size effect in the
cross-section of German equities. Value and momentum effects are statistically
significant regardless of the way standard errors are computed. Clustering tends
to decrease standard errors. Clustered errors have asymptotic properties, a small
number of clusters is usually a problem. Firm-level clustering is innocuous in
this regard because the number of clusters is well above 900. Time-clustering is a
borderline case, since we have only 29 semi-annual observations at hand. Moreover,
lower clustered errors result from negative intracluster correlation (Cameron et al.
2006), possibly hinting towards a misspecified model. The results in table 6 show
that firm-level clustering has the largest effect on standard errors in this regard.
Therefore, negative intra-firm correlation is responsible for the decrease in standard
errors.
Panel B shows the estimation results for the model including F-Score. Distress
risk enters with a negative sign. Note that an increasing F-Score indicates higher
default risk, so the negative coefficient mirrors the patterns of excess returns on F-
Score-sorted portfolios in table 5. The Fama & MacBeth (1973) t-value are slightly
above the conventional critical value but, according to Harvey et al. (2015), in the
area where we should be skeptical. Standard errors clustered on firm point towards
a statistically significant coefficient. However, due to the issues explained above, we
should neither be fully convinced by them. Time and two-way clustering renders
the relationship insignificant. All in all, we certainly do not find any evidence for
a positive relationship between distress risk and equity returns (H1). The point
estimate do rather point towards a distress risk puzzle but are still in the area
of doubt with regard to their statistical significance. Moreover, controlling for
distress risk has no effects on the economic and statistical significance of size and
value effects. The momentum coefficient decreases after controlling for distress
risk and the corresponding standard errors increase slightly, but distress does not
wipe out the momentum effect. Hence, the results do neither support H2, H3 and
H4.
The coefficients of determination presented in table 6 are typical for an analysis
based on an entire cross-section of firms. Because adjusted R2 values alone are
not very helpful to judge the performance of alternative models, we also compute
a root mean squared error (RMSE) as an indicator for how far off the models are
with their predictions. Following the Fama & MacBeth (1973) idea, the values
presented in the tables are the time series averages of the cross-sectional RMSE.
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Both models in table 6 show similarly large RMSE, indicating that they provide
rather poor explanations for excess returns.
So far, the empirical evidence does not support any of the four research hypotheses.
However, there might be more convincing evidence when looking at different time
lags. For instance, even though momentum is obviously not explainable through
the contemporaneous estimate of distress risk, it might be that markets look in the
past and continue reactions to past levels of distress. Alternatively, markets might
look further into the future and preclude future distress that cannot be estimated
with the F-Score model. Note that the former, a reaction to past distress, is
inconsistent with the conventional understanding of rational and forward-looking
financial markets, whereas the latter implies that investors can forecast distress
with higher accuracy than the model developed by Mertens et al. (2016). To
investigate these issues, we adapt a technique proposed by Fama & French (1995).
At the beginning of every year, we sort firms into 10 portfolios according to size,
book-to-market equity and momentum. For each portfolio we record the average
F-Score for the time period starting five years before the sort and ending five years
after the sort. Thus, we obtain the evolution of distress risk over an eleven-year
period for each sort. Averages of these series over all sorts are presented in figure
1. The vertical axes show the probabilities of default implied by the F-Score model
to foster interpretation.22
22Neither repeating the sorts at the beginning of every January and July nor changing the
window around the sort affects the results.
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Figure 1: Distress risk history of portfolio sorted on size, book-to-market equity
and momentum
At the beginning of every year in the sample we sort firms in 10 portfolios on size (the upper panel
of the figure), BTM (the middle panel) or momentum (the bottom panel). The instant of this sort
is labeled as 0 on the horizontal axes. We track the evolution of distress risk for each firm starting
five years before and ending five years after the sort. We record the cross-sectional averages for
these 11 values each year. Hence, we obtain t×11 matrices with cross-sectional averages for each
year t. The plots illustrate the time-series averages of these matrices. Specifically, they show the
top and bottom portfolios for each characteristic. The distress risk patterns illustrate whether a
certain characteristic indicates high levels of distress in the past or future.
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The distress risk history for big and small firms is depicted in the the upper panel
of figure 1. Smalls firms are associated with higher risk across the entire eleven-
year window considered. Small firms are most likely to default when they are
sorted into the small firm portfolio (point zero on the horizontal axis) and big
firms are always associated with low levels of distress risk. These results do not
suggest that size effects are due to past or future distress. The middle panel of
figure 1 shows the evolution of distress risk for portfolios sorted on BTM. We find
that distress risk in both the extreme value and extreme growth portfolios is very
low and shows no specific pattern. Figure 1 underlines that value stock are not
distressed per se. The lower panel of figure 1 shows the distress risk history of
past winner and loser firms. The spike (drop) in distress risk for losers (winners)
at the instant of the sort mirrors the mechanical relation between distress risk and
momentum. Otherwise there is no evidence for patterns in distress risk associated
with positive or negative momentum.
6. Robustness Checks
Research on the cross-section of equities allows the researcher many degrees of
freedom. The most important choices we have made are the sample construction,
in particular the handling of very small firms, and the choice of distress risk model.
We consider the results for alternative choices in this section.
First, we repeat the single sort on F-Scores excluding all firms whose market
capitalization is over their entire life below 500 Mio. EUR. A firm with such a
market capitalization can be regarded as an average small cap in Germany. In this
manner, we exclude most of the firms which have been listed in the “Neuer Markt”
(Stehle & Schmidt 2015). Strictly speaking, restricting the cross-section in this
fashion would require us to abandon the F-Score model proposed by Mertens et al.
(2016). To be exactly accurate, we would need to re-estimate the risk models based
on the smaller cross-section.23 However, then we would loose several defaults and
would have to shorten the sample period even further. Therefore, we decide to
stick with the old F-Score model and assume that investors derive their information
about distress risk from the large cross-section but invest only in a smaller cross-
section. Restricting the cross-section in this fashion increases the correlation of
the F-Score with BTM and momentum. Therefore, the independent information
provided by the F-Score is likely to be lower in this setting. The results are
presented in table 7.
23Moreover, this procedure induces a survivorship bias.
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In the cross-section of large firms we find a negative distress effect, similar to the
literature summarized in table 1. Excess returns in table 7 exhibit the same pattern
as in the full cross-section. Most notably, average returns on portfolio 10 are larger
than returns on portfolio 9. The 10-1 returns are statistically and economically
significant. However, the 10-1 CAPM, FFM and CFM alphas remain tiny and
economically insignificant. Apparently, the single factor CAPM suffices to explain
the lion’s share of the return difference between portfolios 10 and 1. Furthermore,
the GRS and monotonicity tests still fail to reject their null hypotheses. A look at
the portfolio characteristics confirms that default risk has dropped in the highest
distress risk portfolios. In portfolio 10, the average F-Score of -3.69 translates into
a holding period default risk of 2.4%, which is substantially lower than the value of
3.2% observed in table 5. Hence, firms in portfolio 10 in table 7 are not as acutely
distressed as firms in table 5. Repeating the Fama & MacBeth (1973) regressions
in the cross-section of large firms yields the results presented in table 8.
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Panel A: size, BTM and momentum
λ0 λS λV λM R2 RMSE
Coefficients -4.32 0 5.59 10.18 0.08 28.37
T-Stat. -1.37 -0.01 3.87 3.41
T-Stat. firm-clustered -7.78 0.81 6.92 12.92
T-Stat. time-clustered -2.12 0.61 4.9 2.67
T-Stat. two-way-clustered -2.09 0.6 4.37 2.67
Panel B: size, BTM, momentum and distress risk
λ0 λS λV λM λD R2 RMSE
Coefficients -21.96 -0.01 5.05 7.11 -2.32 0.11 27.82
T-Stat. -2.44 -1.12 4.11 3.46 -2.54
T-Stat. firm-clustered -6.41 -0.42 6.72 10.48 -4.58
T-Stat. time-clustered -3.28 -0.29 5 2.16 -2.93
T-Stat. two-way-clustered -3.18 -0.29 4.38 2.17 -2.82
This table presents the results of Fama-MacBeth regressions (3). The dependent
variables are the cross-sections of semi-annual excess stock returns between 2001-
2015. Firms whose market capitalization never exceeds 500 mn. EUR are excluded.
In panel A the independent variables are firm size, BTM and momentum. In panel
B the independent variables are firm size, BTM, momentum and F-Score. The pre-
sented coefficients are the time-series means of the values which have been estimated
in the repeated cross-sections. We report conventional T-Statistics and several T-
Statistics based on clustered standard errors. The reported coefficients of determi-
nation are the time series averages of the adjusted R2 from the cross-sectional re-
gressions. The RMSE are computed as the square root of the mean squared residu-
als. We compute a RMSE for each cross-sectional regression and report the average
for all regressions in the table.
Table 8: Fama-MacBeth Regression Results excluding very small firms
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Excluding small firms does not alter the results presented in panel A of table
6. In table 8 we continue to find significant value and momentum effects and
no size effects. In analogy to the single sort in table 7, we find evidence for a
negative distress effect in panel B of table 8. Hence, the significance of the F-Score
coefficient λD rests on big firms, which are much less likely to be distressed, than
small firms. Taken together, these results may confirm the “distress risk puzzle”
presented by Campbell et al. (2008), Dichev (1998) and Griffin & Lemmon (2002).
Nevertheless, doubts are warranted with regard to the lower levels of distress in
the cross-section of large firms. Is the F-Score really an indicator for distress risk
or is it something else? The statistical and economical significance of value and
momentum effects remains unaffected when we control for distress risk. Hence,
there continues to be no evidence for H2 and H3. We find that controlling for
distress risk has slightly stronger effects on the coefficients and standard errors for
momentum. As mentioned above, the correlation between F-Score and momentum
in the cross-section of large firms is higher than the full-sample value shown in table
3. This probably mirrors the fact that large firms are much less likely to default and
F-Score values of these firms are to a stronger extent driven by pure momentum
instead of fundamentally decreasing credit quality. Therefore, we do not interpret
the interplay between λM and λD as strong evidence for H4. Even though there
is certainly correlation between momentum and distress risk, there is no evidence
that distress risk can explain the momentum effect. We should question whether
there is any distress risk in this case.24
The regression model (3) appears to perform slightly better when small firms are
excluded. The RMSE lower in this setting. Still, they are large and point towards
model misspecification. Therefore, we conduct another experiment and drop all
defaulters from the sample. That is, we assume defaulters had never existed and
repeat all analyses based on the cross-section of survivors and firms which left
the market for other reasons. This procedure may shed additional light on the
differences between distress and default. Maybe default is too extreme as an event
and completely predictable for investors so that the results are purely mechanical
(because investors know that firms will default). Sorting all non-defaulting firms
on F-Score will eliminate this concern as the sample default risk will be artificially
restricted to zero in this setting. The results are presented in table 9.
24Appendix A confirms view by presenting the results from double-sorts.
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Excluding defaulters leads to more frequent sign changes of excess returns on high
distress risk portfolios. Excluding the risk of default gives rise to a completely
idiosyncratic relation between distress risk and default. All other results remain
unchanged. Controlling for defaulters with a dummy variable is equivalent to
repeating the Fama & MacBeth (1973) regressions in the cross-sections of non-
defaulting firms. The results are presented in table 10.
λ0 λS λV λM λD Def. R2 RMSE
Coefficients -14.63 0 4.94 5.62 -1.32 -10.37 0.08 29.48
T-Stat. -1.85 0.06 4.31 3.87 -1.66 -6.09
T-Stat. firm-clustered -5.51 1.09 10.33 15.08 -1.6 -10.05
T-Stat. time-clustered -1.85 0.72 6.77 2.42 -0.67 -4.88
T-Stat. two-way-clustered -1.85 0.72 6.14 2.42 -0.66 -4.96
This table presents the results of Fama-MacBeth regressions (3). The dependent variables
are the cross-sections of semi-annual excess stock returns between 2001-2015. The indepen-
dent variables are firm size, BTM, momentum, F-Score and a dummy for firms that end up
defaulting. The presented coefficients are the time-series means of the values which have been
estimated in the repeated cross-sections. We report conventional T-Statistics and several T-
Statistics based on clustered standard errors. The reported coefficients of determination are
the time series averages of the adjusted R2 from the cross-sectional regressions. The RMSE
are computed as the square root of the mean squared residuals. We compute a RMSE for
each cross-sectional regression and report the average for all regressions in the table.
Table 10: Fama-MacBeth Regression Results excluding Defaulters
As expected, the dummy enters as highly significant with a large negative sign.
The distress risk coefficient λD remains negative but turns out to be statistically
insignificant. All other coefficients are not affected. These additional results il-
lustrate that neither defaults nor default risk explains the value and momentum
effects in the German stock market.
Lastly, we consider alternative distress risk models for the portfolio sorts. Specif-
ically, we repeat the sorts using all models tested by Mertens et al. (2016). The
additional models are variants of the Altman (1968) Z-Score and the Merton (1974)
DD. We consider both models in their original versions and one version of each
model which has been calibrated to our data as shown by Mertens et al. (2016).
In general, these models are informative about defaults but considerably worse
forecasters than the F-Score. Therefore, we do not attach great importance to
these results, which we summarize below without presenting additional tables.
Sorts on the Merton (1974) DD and the recalibrated version computed by Mertens
et al. (2016) yield statistically significant negative 10-1 portfolio returns. In both
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cases, we also find statistically significant alpha coefficients, but they are tiny (≈
30 basis points per annum) and economically insignificant. The results for the
two versions of the Z-Score computed by Mertens et al. (2016), including both the
original Altman (1968) model and a new version with re-estimated coefficients,
neither point towards a clear relationship between distress risk and equity returns.
Sorts based on Altman’s model show a positive but statistically insignificant 10-1
portfolio return and sorts based on the model with re-estimated coefficients show
a negative but economically insignificant relationship. Using the original versions
of the Merton (1974) DD and the Altman (1968) Z-Score does allow us to extend
the sample period and start the analysis in the year 1991. However, the results do
not change at all in the extended sample period.
Lastly, we also repeat the Fama & MacBeth (1973) regressions with the alternative
distress risk models. As in single-sorts, both versions of DD are negatively related
to excess returns but only weakly significant when considering conventional stan-
dard errors. However, controlling for DD does not affect the significant value and
momentum effects. Altman’s Z-Score remains insignificant and the version with
re-estimated coefficients is marginally significant with a negative sign. Control-
ling for these models does neither affect the other effects. All in all, we find that
changing the distress risk model changes the numbers and has very slight effects
on statistical significance, but the economic impact is null. There continues to be
no convincing evidence for the research hypotheses.
7. Conclusion and Discussion
Sorting firms on F-Scores points to a non-linear relationship between distress risk
and equity returns. Average excess returns decay and become highly negative with
increasing risk, but returns in the highest risk portfolio are extremely volatile and
indistinguishable from zero. We argue that inference should focus on the extreme
portfolios because most firms are not affected by distress risk at all. Arbitrage
strategies of long positions in distressed firms and short positions in safe firms do
not deliver significant returns. F-Score enters with a negative sign when we fit
a linear model by means of Fama & MacBeth (1973) regressions. The regression
coefficient reflects the non-linear relationship uncovered by the sorts, but the F-
Score coefficient is only borderline significant. Several robustness checks, especially
excluding small firms and defaulters, cast further doubt on the significance. After
all, we interpret our results as consistent with the view that distress risk is an
idiosyncratic risk in the German equity market.
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Moreover, in line with the related literature, we find significant priced value and
momentum effects in the cross-section of German equities but no evidence for a
size effect (Artmann, Finter, Kempf, Koch & Theissen 2012, Artmann, Finter &
Kempf 2012, Glaser & Weber 2003, Fieberg et al. 2016). It is often speculated that
distress risk could explain these phenomena. Our results show that this is not the
case. Value and momentum effects continue to exist when we control for distress
risk and the size effect continues to be absent. Even though there are certainly
mechanical relations between the characteristics size, BTM and momentum on the
one hand and distress risk on the other hand, there is no evidence for a distress
risk explanation behind size, value and momentum effects.
At first glance, our results confirm the US-literature that has, for the most part,
discovered a negative relation between distress risk and equity returns (Dichev
1998, Griffin & Lemmon 2002, Campbell et al. 2008, Avramov et al. 2009, Ding
et al. 2012, Ferreira Filipe et al. 2014). However, in the German stock market
this finding does not pass standard asset pricing tests. We refrain from calling
the negative relation between F-Score and stock returns a distress risk puzzle for
two reasons. First, as noted above, statistical significance is not there. Long-short
distress risk strategies yield insignificant alphas and the coefficients in Fama &
MacBeth (1973) regressions are no more than borderline significant. Second, the
pattern of excess returns with regard to F-Score is driven by firms with very low
distress/default risk. Except for the extreme F-Score portfolio, average portfolio
PDs are below 1% per annum. Hence, the vast majority of firms should probably
not be associated with distress risk at all. The results presented by Campbell et al.
(2008) and other US-authors show this tendency as well. The F-Score (and other
default risk models) are powerful forecasters of corporate defaults, but most firms
are simply not at risk. Do markets perceive a slightly elevated risk score as a sign
for increased distress risk, even though implied default risk is virtually zero? We
find it more convincing that other omitted variables explain the alleged negative
relationship between firm distress risk and stock returns.
The results presented in this article may be affected by several limitations. The
most grave limitation should be the short sample-period. Due to a low number of
corporate defaults prior to 2001 we cannot start our analysis before this year. In
effect, this leaves us with only two business cycles and this might be not enough
to assess long-run systematic effects on returns. Moreover, the quality of the data
that is available for the German stock market is significantly lower than the US
data (Brueckner 2013, Ince & Porter 2006). This problem might be aggravated in
our particular study because firms in distress should be especially likely to “cook
the books” or delay disclosure of important information. In addition to that,
we find that a common characteristics-based model does not provide convincing
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explanations for the entire cross-section of German stocks. The differences between
ex-ante expected returns and ex-post realized returns are staggeringly large and
the standard errors of regression coefficients clustered on firm exhibit behavior
that is associated with model misspecification. Even though there are patterns
with regard to size and momentum in German stock returns, these patterns do
not suffice to build powerful empirical pricing models. Hence, our study may lack
adequate control variables. Obviously, developing more powerful empirical asset
pricing models for the cross-section of German equities warrants further research.
Finally, we think that two very general findings, which call for further research,
emerge from the empirical literature on distress risk and equity returns, including
this article:
First, we believe that looking at the relation between distress risk and stock returns
using a firm characteristic as a proxy for risk is inappropriate. Like the related
literature, this article has used a default risk characteristic to measure distress risk.
Effectively, such measures are supercharacteristics. They combine many other
variables that are known to be related to patterns in returns and are calibrated to
be very reliable forecasters of defaults. Consequently, they should be meaningful
to investors whenever they indicate a significant PD. However, in most cases
(roughly 90% of observations in this paper), they indicate that PDs are close to
zero. In other words, distress risk is a binary risk. It is mostly completely absent
and only in few cases relevant. Default risk is a highly specific characteristic that
is very useful in (credit) risk management but not in asset pricing. Characteristics
like BTM and momentum are highly general “catch-all” characteristics. There
continues to be an urgent need of risk-based explanations for effects related to
size, value and momentum. However, singling out anything like firm default risk
is probably not going to lead us anywhere.
Second, we suggest that future research on risk factors in the stock market should
adapt a different definition of distress instead. Even though our data show that
corporate defaults occur in waves, we are convinced that this definition does not
capture systematic effects but risk that equity investors can easily diversify away.
Even several joint defaults of firms in a diversified portfolio will not evoke unusually
large returns. Hence, firm distress risk is probably not systematic in the equity
market. A definition of distress risk as a firm’s exposure to the macroeconomic
credit cycle instead of firm-specific default risk should be much better suited to
capture the undiversifiable risk of tightening credit markets. We assume that such
a definition of distress, which is not a conventional firm characteristic, is more
promising in future asset pricing research (Hahn & Lee 2006, Petkova 2006).
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Appendices
A. Double sorts
We double-sort stocks, first on F-Score and then on size, BTM or momentum. Due
to the relatively small number of stocks in the German capital market, we sort firms
into five portfolios along the first dimension and then sort them into three distress
risk portfolios. Hence, each double sort yields 5× 3 portfolios.25 We compute 5-1
distress risk as well as 3-1 size, value and momentum portfolios for each double-
sort. If size, value or momentum effects are due to distress risk, they should not
be very pronounced if distress risk is very low. Mertens et al. (2016) report that
distress risk scores are highly skewed, indicating that many firms are not at risk. If
25Sorting firms into 5 × 5 portfolios does alter the results, but we fear that hypothesis tests
become less powerful.
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distress risk is behind size, value or momentum effects, we should not observe these
effects when distress risk is irrelevant. Hence, insignificant (significant) size, value
and momentum effects in the low (high) distress risk portfolio support H2-H4.
Some words of caution are due before we present the results: Double sorts are much
less effective in dealing with the multidimensionality of empirical asset pricing.
Based on the previous results, we know that we should at least control for BTM
and momentum when double-sorting firms on distress risk and, for instance, size.
Double-sorting is equivalent to controlling for two variables only. Furthermore,
unfortunately, we cannot control for liquidity in this full-sample analysis. Double-
sorting may produce several extreme portfolios. For example, the small firm with
high F-Score is likely to consist of thinly traded stocks. Whether these issues are
tradeable or whether prices on Datastream are reliable at all is debatable. Single-
sorted portfolios contain a large number of stocks (≈ 55 per portfolio). Double
sorts consist of slightly less stocks (≈ 39 per portfolio) and the procedure tends to
group more extreme firms in the same portfolio. These caveats should be kept in
mind when interpreting the excess returns on double-sorted portfolios presented
in table 11.
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Panel A: Double Sort with Size
Distress Portfolios
Low High
Size Portfolios 1 2 3 4 5 5-1 (T-Stat)
Small 1 7.86 6 6.41 6.68 19.58 13.25 (3.99)
2 7.18 5.12 0.09 1.05 6.48 0.04 (0.01)
Big 3 5.12 1.5 -4.13 -4.31 -24.72 -29.26 (-3.52)
3-1 -2.64 -4.46 -10.31 -10.43 -34.85
(T-Stat) (-1.51) (-2.45) (-2.63) (-2.4) (-5.35)
Panel B: Double Sort with BTM
Distress Portfolios
Low High
BTM Portfolios 1 2 3 4 5 5-1 (T-Stat)
Growth 1 3.19 3.05 -2.3 -3.12 -17.63 -20.73 (-3.08)
2 6.35 0.66 -3.55 -7.56 -9.12 -15.42 (-2.89)
Value 3 6.63 3.44 -0.5 6.56 6.48 0.04 (0.01)
3-1 3.37 0.33 2.18 9.65 23.97
(T-Stat) (2.01) (0.15) (0.86) (1.64) (2.51)
Panel C: Double Sort with Momentum
Distress Portfolios
Low High
Momentum Portfolios 1 2 3 4 5 5-1 (T-Stat)
Loser 1 4.07 0.92 -5.04 -6.72 -18.38 -21.67 (-3.68)
2 3.54 1.09 -1.74 -2.55 -8.85 -11.66 (-1.74)
Winner 3 8.68 4.09 0.67 1.41 -3.92 -12.83 (-2.18)
3-1 4.66 3.25 5.27 7.03 12.88
(T-Stat) (1.91) (2.03) (1.99) (1.62) (1.46)
This table shows the results of conditional double sorts. At first, all assets are
sorted into five distress risk portfolios. Then, each of these portfolios is sorted into
three size (panel A), BTM (panel B) and momentum (panel C) portfolios. The ta-
ble presents the obtained value-weighted excess returns corresponding to a holding
period of six months. The 5-1 portfolios are long high distress risk and short low
distress risk stocks. The 3-1 portfolios are long big, value or past winner stocks and
they are short small, growth or past loser stocks. T-values are stated in parentheses.
Table 11: Returns on Size, BTM and Momentum Portfolios across Distress Risk
Portfolios
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Returns on distress risk and size double-sorted portfolios presented in panel A of
table 11 suggest that returns decrease monotonously in size. Nevertheless, there is
no size effect in the full sample. Thus, the significance of the size effects in the five
distress risk portfolios must reflect correlation of distress with other characteristics.
Distressed firms outperform low distress risk firms in the size portfolios 1 but
underperform in the size portfolios 3.
Results of the double sort with BTM are presented in panel B of table 11. Value
stocks outperform growth stocks in all distress risk portfolios. The the value
premium tends to increase with distress risk but is also significant in the low
risk portfolio. Moreover, the value premium in the high distress risk portfolio
seems very large. This is probably a sample-specific relict of the Dot-Com bubble.
Most of the internet start-ups that entered the market between 1999-2002 (see
table 2) were growth stocks and underperformed dramatically after their IPOs.
Furthermore, the liquidity caveat needs to be taken into account with regard to
the extreme growth and distress risk portfolios, as well. Distress risk can, at best,
explain a part of the value effect. There is no convincing evidence for H3.
Lastly, panel C of table 11 shows the results for the double sort with momentum.
Contrary to the hypothesis H4 and the results presented by the related literature
(Avramov et al. 2007, Garlappi & Yan 2011), the momentum effect appears to
be driven by low and not high distress risk firms. These findings underline that
distress risk cannot explain momentum in the German stock market.
Double sorts are helpful to visualize patterns in data. They do not contradict
our previous results, but, for the reasons discussed above, we remain skeptical
with regard to their ability to detect significant relationships. We believe that the
regression analysis in the paper is better suited to deal with the multidimension-
ality.
B. Characteristics-adjusted Returns
Following Daniel & Titman (1997) and Daniel et al. (1997) we implement an
alternative way to control for size, value and momentum effects when assessing the
relation between distress risk and equity returns. Previously, we have controlled
for the Fama & French (1993) and Carhart (1997) risk factors as we have sorted
firms on distress risk (see table 5). The relevance of these risk factors is, however,
intensely debated in the German equity market (Artmann, Finter, Kempf, Koch
& Theissen 2012, Artmann, Finter & Kempf 2012). Fieberg et al. (2016) are
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able to replicate results presented by Daniel & Titman (1997), who show that
characteristics and not risk factors determine expected returns in US data, in the
German stock market. This is why we have chosen to control for characteristics
and not factors in the Fama & MacBeth (1973) regressions. In single sorts we
have not controlled for characteristics at all and in the double sorts we have only
controlled for one single characteristic at a time.
To adjust stock returns for characteristics we proceed as follows. At the begin-
ning of every January and July, when we sort portfolios on F-Score, all firms are
independently sorted on size, value and momentum as characteristics. We choose
three portfolios for each characteristic. These sorts yield 27 portfolios for each
size/value/momentum combination. Daniel & Titman (1997) and Daniel et al.
(1997) suggest to treat these portfolios as benchmark portfolios. Hence, one of
these 27 portfolios can be assigned to each stock as a benchmark portfolio. Given
the relatively small cross-section of firms, 541 firms are active on average between
2001-2015, 27 should be about the maximum number of portfolios that can be
formed ensuring that diversification effects unfold. We set a benchmark portfolio
return to missing whenever the number of stocks in it is lower than three. This does
not happen often. Nevertheless, we loose some observations due to this constraint.
The characteristics-adjusted return of every single stock is its return minus the its
benchmark portfolio return. We repeat the single sort on F-Score, see table 5 for
the previous results, with characteristics-adjusted returns. The results, which are
presented in table 12, show whether returns net of characteristics-effects show any
relation to distress risk.
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In short, the results presented in panel A of table 12 do not lead to different
conclusions. The relation between distress risk and characteristics-adjusted equity
returns remains roughly inverse-tent-shaped and 10-1 alphas are insignificant. The
cross-section considered in the sort is identical to the previous single sort in section
5, yet the characteristics in panel C of table 12 differ slightly from the correspond-
ing values in table 5. These differences result from the loss of observations due
to the benchmark portfolio formation procedure outlined above. Unfortunately,
information on several high distress risk firms is lost. The high risk decile portfolio
F-Score is only -4.07 (PD ≈ 1.7%), whereas the value is -3.4 (PD ≈ 3.2%) in table
5. Even the exclusion of several small firms has not caused a similar loss of informa-
tion (see table 7). Distressed firms appear to be in extreme size/value/momentum
portfolios, not many other firms share these attributes.
We can reduce this loss of information by forming benchmark portfolios based
on two instead of three characteristics. We summarize these additional results
without presenting the tables. Adjusting for size and BTM only (not adjusting
for momentum) as well as adjusting for BTM and momentum (not adjusting for
size) delivers qualitatively similar results. Adjusting for size and momentum (not
adjusting for BTM) is the only way to lift the distress risk scores up to the previous,
unadjusted levels. Hence, distressed firms appear to be members of extreme value
portfolios. Still, the size and momentum adjusted returns show no significant
pattern with regard to distress risk.
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B.4. Paper IV: The Reaction of Equity and Credit Markets to
Unconventional Monetary Policy - Are the Markets
Buying it?
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The Reactions of Equity and Credit
Markets to Unconventional
Monetary Policy - Are the Markets
Buying it?
Richard L. Mertens∗
March 24, 2017
The reaction of asset markets to the announcement of monetary pol-
icy measures is regarded as crucial for the transmission mechanism of
monetary policy. I test whether the cross-sections of European equities
and CDS show responses to monetary shocks which are in accordance
with the goals behind the ECB policies. In particular, I assess whether
credit constrained firms show stronger reactions than firms which are
unlikely to be credit constrained. The balance sheet channel of mon-
etary policy states that unconventional monetary policy lifts credit
constraints. I obtain some unsettling results: Market reactions to con-
ventional short rate changes are completely at odds with economic
theory, but reactions to unconventional measures are in line with the-
ory. Moreover, the reactions in the cross-section contradict the story
of the balance sheet channel.
1. Introduction
Asset markets can be a bottleneck for the transmission mechanism of monetary
policy. As emphasized by modern monetary theory (Woodford 2003), the desired
∗University of Bremen, Chair of Finance, Hochschulring 4, D-28359 Bremen
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economic effects are unlikely to ensue if financial markets are not fully convinced of
the central bank’s goals. If monetary policy is credible, investors will take actions
as they learn about monetary news and thereby initiate the transmission mech-
anism. Otherwise, if markets do not react accordingly, the long-run economic
effects of monetary policy are likely to be withheld. The reactions of financial
markets to monetary news are especially important for the effectiveness of un-
conventional monetary policy (UMP) (outright asset purchase programs). In this
article, I assess whether equity and Credit Default Swaps (CDS) markets show re-
actions which are consistent with the intentions behind the UMP of the European
Central Bank (ECB). Specifically, I apply an event study approach based on the
full cross-section of German, French, Italian and Spanish equities as well as CDS.
This large database enables me to assess whether the market reactions are consis-
tent with the balance sheet channel of monetary policy. This theory asserts that
monetary policy can lift credit constraints and is regarded as the most important
transmission channel of monetary policy (Bernanke & Gertler 1995).
A relatively large body of literature assesses asset market responses to monetary
policy actions. Diverse methodologies have been used. The macroeconomic litera-
ture predominantly uses vector autoregression models to isolate shocks and assess
how these shocks affect asset prices and other macroeconomic time series (Boivin
et al. 2010, Chatziantoniou et al. 2013, Ehrmann 2000, Kontonikas & Kostakis
2013). In contrast to this article, which focuses on the immediate response of
equity and CDS markets, this methodology is primarily useful to assess the per-
sistence of monetary policy shocks. A larger strand of the finance literature uses
time series regressions to estimate the short-run response of asset prices to mon-
etary policy actions. This methodology is also called the event study approach.
The first contributions in this area were attempts to identify news which could
explain the variance of stock market index returns (Cook & Hahn 1989, Cutler
et al. 1988, McQueen & Roley 1993, Pearce & Roley 1983). Following the seminal
contribution of Kuttner (2001), more recent work has focused on the estimation
of asset price responses to unexpected monetary policy shocks. Continuing in the
same vein, my paper is closely related to the work of Bernanke & Kuttner (2005),
Bredin et al. (2009), Ehrmann & Fratzscher (2004), Basistha & Kurov (2008) and
Gregoriou et al. (2009), who explain the heterogeneous reactions of equity market
sectors to unexpected monetary shocks using both time series and cross-sectional
regressions. This strand of the literature is growing as central banks worldwide
have adapted a broader range of instruments (UMP). More recently, Rogers et al.
(2014) and Fratzscher et al. (2014) assess asset market index reactions to UMP
annoucements of several central banks. Haitsma et al. (2015) assess the reaction
of the EuroStoxx 50 index stocks to the announcement of UMP measures. My
analysis differs from the existing studies as this is, to my best knowledge, the first
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article assessing the reaction of a large cross-section of European equities and CDS
to UMP actions.1
For a number of reasons this approach is superior to the use of benchmark indices.
First, it is questionable whether a certain index is a reliable benchmark for the
entire market. Second, the use of an entire cross-section enables the researcher
to link the reaction of stocks and CDS to the announcement of UMP back to
individual firm characteristics. The panel data structure enables me to estimate
whether the reactions of credit constrained firms are larger than the reactions of
firms without binding credit constraints. Basistha & Kurov (2008) and Haitsma
et al. (2015), who use the event study apporach to test the existence of such a
credit channel, use indices and only a few, very large firms. It is difficult to draw
inference from such a sample as credit constraints are typically much more severe
among very small firms, which are present in my sample.
The evidence shows the transmission mechanism of CMP is probably damaged in
the European Monetary Union (EMU). Conventional interest rate changes appear
to evoke equity market reactions with the same sign. However, UMP does indeed
evoke increasing equity returns and decreasing CDS spreads. These results confirm
the evidence presented by Haitsma et al. (2015) and Rogers et al. (2014). Moreover,
I find that stocks and CDS of banks react significantly stronger than firms in
other industries. Lastly, I show that large firms, which are unlikely to be credit
constrained, show the strongest positive equity returns after the annoucement
of UMP. This finding stands in contrast to the balance sheet channel and the
results presented by Haitsma et al. (2015). In the CDS market, firms which are
more likely to be credit constrained show stronger contractions of credit spreads.
However, this result is driven by large firms, too. The market capitalization of
firms with available CDS is, on average, roughly ten times larger than the market
capitalization of firms in the cross-section of equities. Very large firms are not
likely to be severely credit-constrained. Moreover, using portfolio sorts, I present
some further evidence for a long-run trend in outperformance of low-default risk
firms, which are highly unlikely to be credit constrained, versus high default risk
firms in the EMU. In spite of the efforts of the ECB, the balance sheet channel
does not appear to be operative.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the history of the ECB’s UMP
1Yet another strand of the literature has moved on to analyze the effects of Conventional
Monetary Policy (CMP) on the cross-section of equity returns using the long-run event study
methodology (Jensen & Mercer 2002, Maio 2013, Thorbecke 1997). These articles are primar-
ily attempts to gauge relations between the well known risk factors Small-Minus-Big (SMB)
and High-Minus-Low (HML) with monetary conditions in the cross-section of US equities.
125
measures and summarizes the related literature. I deduct my research hypotheses
from the officially communicated goals of the programs and the literature’s stance
on the transmission mechanism of UMP. The methodology is explained in section
3. I present the sample with several descriptive statistics in section 4. Empirical
results follow in section 5 and the robustness of results is discussed in section 6.
The article closes with a summary and discussion in section 7.
2. Unconventional Monetary Policy
Interest rates i are decomposed of a risk-free short rate r and several risk premia
θ, for instance premia for maturity, illiquidity and default risk:
i = r + θ. (1)
When central banks aim to ease funding conditions, they must try to either de-
crease r, θ or perhaps even both parameters simultaneously. Conventional Mon-
etary Policy (CMP) is about setting the short run interest r rate at which com-
mercial banks can borrow funds from and deposit funds at the central bank. For
decades, monetary policy has been based on rules, like for instance the famous
Taylor rules, which provide guidelines regarding the level of short-run benchmark
rates (Taylor 1993). From its foundation until the end of the 2000s, the ECB has
also followed such an understanding of monetary policy. Alas, CMP measures are
no longer sensible when interest rates are at the zero lower bound (r ≈ 0). The
zero lower bound, which characterizes the interest rate environment of the years
following the financial crisis of the years 2008/2009, describes the idea that interest
rates cannot be lower than 0% because agents in the economy could always hold
zero interest cash. Hence, as soon as interest rates are close to zero, conventional
interest rate targeting is not any longer an option (Eggertsson & Woodford 2003,
Hamilton & Wu 2012). Because the economic crisis following the financial crisis
after the year 2008 turned out to be one of the severest crises in economic history,
many central banks, including the Bank of England (BoE), Bank of Japan (BoJ)
and the Federal Reserve System (FED) were eager to provide further stimulus to
their economies. Thus, they had to turn to UMP measures, which aim to decrease
the risk premia θ in (1).
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2.1. The Monetary Policy of the ECB since 2008
Even though the ECB has approached the zero-lower-bound later than the FED,
which had effectively arrived at levels close to zero in 2008, it had, like other
major central banks, begun to adopt UMP already after the first signs of the
global financial crisis in 2007/2008. Apart from conventional rate cuts, the ECB
had adapted a first set of UMP measures, which was officially called “Enhanced
Credit Support”. This package included measures directed at coping with the
growing tensions in interbank money markets. A detailed overview is provided by
Giannone et al. (2011). As means to provide long-term funding to troubled banks,
these measures can be regarded as attempts to reduce term, liquidity and default
risk premia in money markets. Furthermore, they were rather short-term actions
directed at preventing further panic and wholesale bank-runs. However, in spite
of these efforts, the economic crisis in the EMU deepened further and the recovery
after the recession has been unusually weak. The severity of this crisis has led
the ECB to extend its UMP toolkit to several outright asset purchase programs,
which are chronologically listed in table 1.
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These eight programs, which stand out as the main areas of the ECB’s UMP,
are directed at different markets. As visible in table 1, they have become more
aggressive with regard to volumes and restrictions in time. Most importantly,
they all share one overriding goal: easing funding conditions for financial and
non-financial corporations.2
2.2. The Transmission Mechanism of UMP
How can UMP contribute to this goal? According to Mishkin (1996), the trans-
mission mechanism of monetary policy consists of three different types of channels.
First, the textbook interest rate channel assumes that expansionary monetary pol-
icy reduces real interest rates and thereby increases aggregate investment goods
demand. The literature is rather skeptical about the viability of the demand-effect,
as empirical research has found it difficult to establish a link between short run
real interest rates and the cost of capital (Bernanke & Gertler 1995). The second
channel is called the asset price channel. An increasing money base might boost
the demand for equities. Through Tobin’s q (Tobin 1969), firms would find it
attractive to issue new equity to buy more investment goods.
The third type of channels are credit channels.3 The two most important credit
channels, the balance sheet and bank lending channels, are illustrated in figure 1.
The lower branch of figure 1 depicts the bank lending channel. Through provi-
sions of extended funding or outright asset purchases, UMP can increase liquidity
in the banking sector in order to bolster bank lending. The beginning of UMP in
the EMU, the “Enhanced Credit Support” package, was obviously targeting the
bank lending channel. Moreover, several of the purchase programs listed in table
1 are directed at assets which are to a large extent concentrated in the banking
sector. Several papers have investigated how monetary shocks propagate through
the banks. By and large, empirical results regarding the significance of the lend-
ing channel have been mixed. While several studies confirm that monetary policy
affects the ability of banks to provide loans, the effects do not appear to be large
enough to explain a substantial share of the variation of aggregate lending (An-
geloni et al. 2003, Ashcraft 2006). More recently, Gambacorta & Marques-Ibanez
(2011) show that the bank lending channel gained importance during the financial
crisis. The other credit channel is the balance sheet channel, which is depicted
in the upper branch of figure 1. UMP, especially the purchase programs listed in
2This conclusion is carved out in greater detail and with references to the official ECB commu-
nication in appendix A.
3A formal discussion of the credit channels is offered by Tirole (2006, Chp. 13).
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table 1, increases asset prices and decreases risk premia. The rise in asset prices
improves the balance sheets of firms and thereby increases the net worth of firms
(for instance through increasing collateral value). This should, in turn, lessen ad-
verse selection and moral hazard problems. These issues are commonly regarded
as the main impediments to lending during economic crises (Bernanke & Gertler
1995, Bernanke et al. 1996, 1999). Ciccarelli et al. (2015) find that the balance
sheet channel is an important part of the transmission channel of monetary policy
in Europe and the U.S..
Unconventional 
Monetary Policy
Aggregate 
Lending ↑
Asset Prices ↑
Risk Premia ↓
Net Worth 
of Firms ↑
Adverse Selection
 & Moral Hazard ↓
Liquid Assets in 
Banking Sector ↑ Bank Lending ↑
Bank lending channel
Balance sheet channel
Figure 1: The credit channel
In general, the literature on the transmission channels suggest that UMP must
propagate through assets markets to achieve the desired macroeconomic effects.
Thus, the market reaction to the announcements of UMP is likely to be crucial
for its overall success.4 A new strand of the literature highlighting the importance
of expectations for the transmission mechanism of monetary policy lends further
support to this view. According to Woodford’s influential handbook, “not only do
4A similar conclusion is drawn by Joyce et al. (2012), who summarize the transmission mecha-
nism of Gilt-purchases by the BoE.
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expectations about policy matter but, at least under current conditions, very little
else matters” (Woodford 2003, p.15). The importance of setting credible goals for
monetary policy, adapting a systematic decision framework and communicating
decisions in a convincing manner is now commonly acknowledged. In recent years,
“expectation management” or “forward guidance” appears to be of special concern
to the ECB and other central banks (Braun 2015).
2.3. Research Hypotheses
My research hypotheses address the importance of such expectations. Successful
monetary policy requires the market’s faith. When asset markets find the goals
of the central bank not credible, the transmission mechanism of UMP cannot
operate as desired. The first obvious question to ask in this regard is whether
the announcement of UMP, starting after the financial crisis and including the
programs listed in table 1, has evoked any specific market reaction at all. These
are my first research hypotheses H1a and H1b:
H1a Announcements of UMP measures of the ECB gave rise to positive equity
market reactions.
H1b Announcements of UMP measures of the ECB gave rise to contracting CDS
spreads.
Details on the measurement of UMP news are provided in the following section.
Evidence in favor of H1a and H1b would support the view that the market assumes
the ECB’s programs are going to have positive effects. As argued above, this can
be seen as a prerequisite for the functionality of transmission mechanisms.
Moreover, using cross-sectional firm level data enables me to test more detailed
hypotheses with regard to the specific goals of the programs. EMU member states
are regarded as bank-based economies and monetary policy directly affects banks.
However, UMP announcements might be perceived as good or bad news for the
banking sector by investors. First, all purchase programs listed in table 1, except
for the Corporate Sector Purchase Programme (CSPP), are directed at assets
which are concentrated in the banking sector. As far as UMP enables banks to get
rid of unwanted assets at favorable prices - this is the story of the bank lending
channel -, these measures should be regarded as positive news for banks. On the
other hand, Borio et al. (2015) show long periods of low interest rates and flat
yield curves depress bank profitability. Thus, UMP announcements could also be
regarded as negative for the banking industry in the long-run. In either way, banks
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should be the first firms to be affected. Therefore, I follow Ricci (2015) as well as
Yin et al. (2010) and test the reactions of bank equities as H2a. Moreover, I add
to the literature and test the reactions of bank CDS as H2b.
H2a Stocks of banks show larger positive return reactions than stocks of non-
financial firms around the announcement of UMP measures.
H2b CDS of banks show larger contractions than CDS of non-financial firms
around the announcement of UMP measures.
Lastly, the ECB vigorously claims its UMP measures, especially the outright asset
purchase programs, are conducted to ease the funding conditions of non-financial
firms.5 The balance sheet channel implies that non-financial firms facing high costs
of debt benefit from these programs as credit constraints become less binding. If
markets are convinced of this strategy, high default risk firms should show stronger
equity return reactions and starker contractions of CDS spreads than low default
risk firms. This idea is summarized in the third set of research hypotheses H3a
and H3b:
H3a Stocks of non-financial firms with high default risk show stronger positive
reactions than stocks of non-financial firms with low default risk around the
announcement of UMP measures.
H3b CDS of non-financial firms with high default risk show stronger contractions
than CDS of non-financial firms with low default risk around the announce-
ment of UMP measures.
Several papers (Ehrmann & Fratzscher 2004, Basistha & Kurov 2008, Haitsma
et al. 2015) have investigated the reaction of firms which are supposedly credit
constrained to monetary policy shocks, but these contributions have two major
shortcomings. First, they are based on a cross-section of very large firms (S&P
500 or EuroStoxx50 index members) which are unlikely to be severely credit con-
strained. Second, they measure credit constraints using industry membership or
simple balance sheet indicators. In this article, I test the balance sheet channel
using the full cross-section of German, French, Italian and Spanish firms and iden-
tify credit constraints with a model which has a proven track record to forecast
corporate defaults. Hence, this article is based on a more informative sample and
is to a lesser degree affected by measurement errors. The set of control variables
5A large macroeconomic literature suggests that the credit quality of firms is an important
determinant of economic activity. See Bernanke & Gertler (1989) and Bernanke et al. (1996)
for two seminal contributions.
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used to identify high default risk firms is explained in the following sections. Taken
together, H1a−H3b are tests of the market’s immediate perception of the UMP
measures.6
3. Methodology
The analysis proceeds in three steps to test these hypotheses. At first, I discuss how
monetary policy shocks (both conventional and unconventional) can be identified.
As a next step, I use these shocks to estimate equity and CDS market responses
with time series regressions. Finally, I turn to the cross-section of equities and
CDS and apply panel regressions. These methods are frequently used to assess the
short-run responses of asset prices to monetary policy.
3.1. Monetary Policy Shocks
Monetary policy decisions are made by the ECB Governing Council, which used to
conduct monthly meetings from 2002-2014 and switched to a less frequent meeting
schedule in 2015. I construct my sample as a combination of several data items,
which are introduced in detail in the next section, recorded at the day of every
Governing Council meeting t. Exception were the Governing Council decisions to
decrease rates in October 2008 (jointly with other central banks) and the decision
to implement SMP in September 2010 at the height of the European debt crisis
(see table 1). I include these off-schedule dates into the analysis as Governing
Council meeting days.7
The Governing Council decisions on UMP are of special interest in this article.
According to the efficient market hypothesis (Fama 1970), markets should react
to news, whereas monetary policy actions are often -at least partly- anticipated.
Therefore, it is necessary to develop reasonable proxies for unexpected monetary
policy shocks. This applies to both CMP and UMP. While in this article the focus
lies on the latter, I choose to include CMP actions into the analysis for two reasons.
6Obviously, it is still too early to judge the long-run economic effects of the ECB’s UMP.
7It is debatable whether the famous “whatever-it-takes” speech by ECB president Mario Draghi
in 2012 should likewise be included as a date in the analysis. I choose not to because the
speech was held at a industry meeting and did certainly not formally announce monetary
policy measures. While, in general, speeches of ECB staff might be informative for financial
markets, it is difficult to distinguish interesting public appearances from statements which
are not that important for the markets on that respective day.
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First, it is possible that both CMP and UMP actions are taken simultaneosuly.
An example could be a small shock to short-term interest rates through forward-
guidance and rumors about asset purchases when the economy is already at the
zero-lower-bound. Hence, CMP shocks are an important control variable when
assessing the asset market response to UMP announcements. Second, the empirical
methodology for CMP reaction studies can be regarded as established, whereas
UMP reaction studies are just beginning to emerge. The existing CMP studies
provide a reasonable starting point for a new UMP analysis with the additional
possibility to re-assess prior findings regarding CMP reactions. Below I begin
with the identification of CMP shocks and then turn to the identification of UMP
shocks.
Cook & Hahn (1989) proposed to identify CMP shocks as the difference of the
central bank’s main policy rate ∆it = it − it−1. In this context, we are dealing
with the ECB’s main refinancing rate. Obviously, this approach fails to account
for market expectations. A rate cut of 25 basis points (bps) could be good news
for equity markets, when investors were actually expecting a rate increase or no
change at all. Conversely, it might be bad news for equity markets, when investors
were in fact expecting an even larger increase.
Kuttner (2001) decomposes interest rate changes into expected and unexpected
shocks and presents evidence which is consistent with the theory of efficient mar-
kets. I apply the Kuttner (2001) decomposition, which has become standard in the
related literature, with a slight modification proposed by Gregoriou et al. (2009),
who assess the UK stock market reaction to monetary policy announcements by
the BoE.8 Interest rate futures are used to extract the surprise component of
CMP actions. In particular, I use the 3-month EURIBOR future contract. The
EURIBOR is a highly liquid EMU benchmark rate and conceptionally equivalent
to the 3-month LIBOR contract used by Gregoriou et al. (2009). Bernoth & Hagen
(2004) show that the 3-month EURIBOR is a reliable predictor of the ECB policy
rates. Thus, the EURIBOR future is a good proxy for the market’s expectations
about future interest rates.9 Hence, I define the unexpected CMP interest rate
shock ∆iut on every Governing Council meeting t as
8The Kuttner (2001) decomposition makes use of futures contracts for the federal funds rate,
the main conventional policy target rate of the FED. Such futures contracts do not exist in
the UK and the EMU, which is why the modification by Gregoriou et al. (2009) is necessary.
The same approach is adapted by Haitsma et al. (2015).
9Though the use of futures as forecasters of future spot rates is standard in the literature, one
might in general question that futures contain market expectations. I consider alternative
shocks, which are independent from futures markets, in appendix B. The results presented in
the following are not affected.
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∆iut = ft − ft−1, (2)
where ft is the implied future rate (100 minus the future price) observed at the
end of the meeting day and ft−1 is the rate observed at the end of the day before
the meeting. Given the unexpected CMP shock, the expected short rate shock is
stated in (3):
∆iet = ∆it −∆iut , (3)
whereas ∆it denotes the total change of the EURIBOR short rate from the end of
the day before the meeting until the end of the meeting day. The shocks captured
by (2) and (3) are defined by changes of the short rate, they are primarily induced
by CMP. As argued in section 2, UMP comes into play, when such measures are,
due to the zero-lower-bound, no longer applicable. Like CMP actions, UMP actions
are likely to be at least partly expected by investors. To identify the surprise
element of UMP announcements, one needs to identify financial instruments which
are immediately affected by such decisions. Rogers et al. (2014) and Haitsma et al.
(2015) argue that the changes in spreads between long-term Italian and German
government bonds are a reliable proxy for unexpected UMP shocks τu. Formally,
these are defined as
τu =
{
0 , for 01/01/2002 - 12/31/2007
(i10,ITt − i10,GERt )− (i10,ITt−1 − i10,GERt−1 ) , otherwise,
(4)
where i10,ITt are yields on 10-year Italian Government bonds recorded at the end of
the trading day for every Governing Council meeting day t. As argued in section
2, long-term bonds are in the focus of the ECB’s UMP. (4) captures changes in
different risk premia (term premia, default premia, liquidity premia), which are
at the core of the programs listed in table 1. Consequently, increases (decreases)
in (4) are associated with restrictive (accommodative) UMP shocks. Following
Haitsma et al. (2015), I set τ = 0 before the outbreak of the financial crisis.
Hence, I assume ECB actions did not affect the spread (4) before 2008. I discuss
this assumption in several robustness checks.
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3.2. Time Series Regressions
The unexpected monetary policy shocks discussed above are used in several time
series regressions to test the hypotheses H1a and H1b. In the beginning, I estimate
the Cook & Hahn (1989) model using all ECB Governing Council meeting days t:
rt = α
EQT + βEQT ×∆it + ρEQT × τut + t (5)
st = α
CDS + βCDS ×∆it + ρCDS × τut + t, (6)
where ∆it is the change of the ECB main rate and τ
u
t is the UMP shock as defined
in (4). Without this variable (5) is identical to equation one in Cook & Hahn
(1989), who apply it to bond rates. I estimate this specification for daily log
equity market returns rt and CDS market spread changes st using Ordinary Least
Squares (OLS). The st are changes of a CDS index constructed as the time series
of cross-sectional mean CDS spreads in the sample.10 Economic theory implies a
negative response to conventional interest rate changes for equities (βEQT < 0)
and a positive response for CDS spread changes (βCDS > 0). Moreover, the first
research hypotheses H1a and H1b suggest increasing (decreasing) equity prices
(CDS spreads) as a response to accommodative UMP shocks. Thus, support for
the hypotheses requires ρEQT < 0 and ρCDS > 0.
To consider market expectations, I turn to regressions in the style of Kuttner
(2001), Bernanke & Kuttner (2005) and Haitsma et al. (2015). The market re-
sponses as a function of expected and unexpected CMP shocks as well as UMP
shocks are shown in specifications (7) and (8):
rt = α
EQT + ψEQT ×∆iut + γEQT ×∆iet + ρEQT × τut + t (7)
st = α
CDS + ψCDS ×∆iut + γCDS ×∆iet + ρCDS × τut + t. (8)
When markets are informationally efficient, we should observe no reactions to
expected interest rate shocks (γEQT = γCDS = 0). Reactions to unexpected in-
terest rate shocks should be negative for equities (ψEQT < 0) and positive for
10There is no established full CDS market index. The Markit iTraxx Index is highly liquid but
contains only investment grade issuers. Even though speculative grade reference entities are
rare in the CDS market, they might be present in my sample. It is a standard procedure in
the literature to use self-constructed equal-weighted CDS indices (Hull et al. 2004, Norden &
Weber 2004)
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CDS (ψCDS > 0). As above, the coefficients of interest are the UMP response
coefficients ρ with an implied negative (positive) equity (CDS) market reaction.
The residuals t in (5)-(8) capture factors other than monetary policy events affect-
ing equity returns and CDS spreads at Governing Council meeting days. Whenever
one uses OLS to estimate these equations, one assumes these factors are orthogonal
to changes in the main rate and UMP actions. This assumption might be prob-
lematic for two reasons. First, the causality might run into the other direction,
whereas equity and/or CDS market developments cause monetary policy actions.
However, this problem is not acute in this article, as I use daily equity returns and
CDS spread changes. In this case endogeneity of ∆it or τ
u
t due to reverse causal-
ity would require central bank action caused by intraday equity and CDS market
developments. Bernanke & Kuttner (2005) argue this is highly unlikely. Another
look at the transcripts of press conferences after ECB Governing Council meet-
ings assures that not a single decision has been justified with recent developments
in capital markets. Neither are there any immediate actions after major events
such as the Dot-Com Crisis in 2002 or the Lehman Brothers default in 2008. The
reverse causality problem becomes more acute whenever one tries to explain the
development of asset prices with monetary policy actions over a longer horizon.
The second problem might be an omitted variables bias. Asset prices on the one
hand and monetary policy on the other hand might respond to some unobserved
variable, for instance macroeconomic news. Again, this problem is alleviated
through the use of daily equity returns and CDS spread changes because same
day responses of monetary policy to news are highly unlikely. Rigobon & Sack
(2004) have developed a Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) approach to
estimate asset price responses to monetary policy actions, which relies on a much
weaker set of assumptions than conventional OLS. They show consistency of OLS
requires - in the limit - that the variances of monetary policy shocks are infinitely
large relative to other shocks on the days of ECB Governing Council meetings.
Put differently, it is required that the news about monetary policy dominate all
other news when announced. Rigobon & Sack (2004) themselves fail to formally
reject the consistency of OLS using daily equity market data. Thus, I choose to
follow the mainstream literature which sticks with this strict but not unreasonable
assumption and use OLS to estimate (5)-(8).11
11See among others Cochrane & Piazzesi (2002), Cook & Hahn (1989), Bernanke & Kuttner
(2005), Haitsma et al. (2015), Thorbecke (1997), Rogers et al. (2014).
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3.3. Cross-Sectional Analysis
As a next step in the analysis, I apply the time series regressions discussed above
in the cross-section of equities and CDS by re-estimating the regressions (5)-(8) for
every firm in the sample. The second set of research hypotheses H2a−H2b states
that the reactions to UMP should be larger for banks than for non-financial cor-
porations because banks are immediately affected in the transmission mechanism
of monetary policy. To test this conjecture, I apply the Wilcoxon rank-sum test to
the ρ coefficients in the subsample of banks versus the subsample of non-financial
corporations (excluding insurers and other financial services firms). If banks have
statistically lower ρEQT and larger ρCDS coefficients, we can conclude H2a and
H2b are valid.
The last set of research hypotheses (H3a and H3b) is about credit-constrained
non-financial firms and the balance sheet channel. A firm’s default risk provides
information about binding credit constraints, agency costs of lending and costs
of debt capital. Moreover, there are reliable models for the estimation of default
risk. Therefore, I use firm specific default risk to test H3a and H3b. Frameworks
for the measurement of default risk for financial firms differ substantially from the
measurement of default risk for non-financial firms. Hence, I drop financial firms
from the sample at this point. Alongside other variables, I use the Merton (1974)
Distance-to-Default (DD), which is stated in (9), as a control variable for default
risk.
DDt =
ln(
VA,t
Dt
) + (µ− 0.5× σ2A)
σA ×
√
T
(9)
The DD is a leverage ratio scaled by asset volatility σA. Due to the residual claim
character of equity, it can be regarded as a call option on the market value of the
firm’s assets VA, with a strike price equal to the book value of the firm’s debt D
due in T years. I set T = 1. Moreover, I follow the conventional assumptions in the
literature and compute D as the sum of total short term debt and one-half times
the sum of long term debt (Vassalou & Xing 2004). The physical version of the
DD uses µ, which is the growth rate of VA, as drift and σA is the corresponding
standard deviation. In general, the market value of assets VA is unobservable.
However, daily values for VA are required to estimate σA and µ with precision.
Vassalou & Xing (2004) have developed an iterative procedure to estimate daily
VA given low frequency book values of assets and daily equity data. I apply this
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procedure to compute the DD, which has become a standard in the literature.12
The estimation of the DD proceeds as follows and is repeated on every trading day
before a ECB Governing Council meeting. Daily equity prices and the number of
shares outstanding are used to compute one year of daily values for the firm’s
market capitalization VE. One year of implied daily asset values VA are backed
out using the Black & Scholes (1973) formula (10):
VE =VA ×N(d1)−D × exp(−r × T )×N(d2)
with d1 =
ln(VA
D
) + (r + 0.5× σ2A)× T
σA ×
√
T
d2 =d1 − σA ×
√
T .
(10)
Using the Black & Scholes (1973) framework is complicated by the fact that an
initial estimate of σA is required to solve (10). The iterative procedure overcomes
this problem by using scaled equity volatility σA = σE × VEVE+D as a first guess,
whereas I use a history of one year of equity returns to compute equity volatility
σE. This guess yields a first estimate of daily VA and an updated value for σA,
which is once more used to start a new iteration. The procedure is continued until
the σA values converge, whereas convergence requires a difference between the last
two estimates which is smaller than 10E−4. The daily VA of the last iteration are
used to determine the final estimates for σA and µ, the mean log growth rate of
assets. Merton (1974) assumes that firms default when their asset value intersects
with their debt value. DD states the distance to this default point in terms of
standard deviations. The lower a firm’s DD, the higher its default risk.
The empirical literature on default risk finds that the DD is informative about
default risk but not a sufficient statistic to forecast defaults (Bharath & Shumway
2008, Campbell et al. 2008, Hillegeist et al. 2004). In practical applications (credit
risk management), reduced form default risk models in the spirit of Altman (1968)
are more frequently used. Therefore, several balance sheet and profitability indi-
cators are employed as alternative proxies for default risk. Reduced from default
risk models commonly use information about profitability, leverage, liquidity and
valuation to forecast corporate defaults (Bauer & Agarwal 2014, Campbell et al.
2008, Tian et al. 2015). Following Campbell et al. (2008), who have developed the
current state of the art model, I compute the following indicators:
12See among others Pires et al. (2013), Valta (2016), Xu & Zhang (2008)
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• NIMTA: EBITDA divided by the market value of total assets
• TLMTA: total liabilities divided by the market value of total assets,
where the market value of total assets is approximated as the market value of
equity plus the book value of total debt. These variables account for the fact
that firms with low profitability and high leverage are more likely to default.13 To
exploit cross-sectional as well as time series heterogeneity, I estimate the asset price
reaction to monetary policy announcements using a panel data model. Specifically,
I estimate the following two specifications for equity excess returns and CDS spread
changes:
ri,t =a
EQT
i + b
EQT ×Xt + cEQT1 ×DDi,t + cEQT2 × (EASt ×DDi,t)+
dEQT × Vi,t + ei,t
(11)
si,t =a
CDS
i + b
CDS ×Xt + cCDS1 ×DDi,t + cCDS2 × (EASt ×DDi,t)+
dCDS × Vi,t + ei,t.
(12)
The specifications above include firm fixed effects in ai. I cluster standard errors
at the firm level to account for firm dependence (Cameron et al. 2006, Petersen
2008).14 Xt is a matrix containing the monetary policy shocks ∆i
u
t ,∆i
e
t and τ
u
t as
explained in section 3.1. DDi,t, the firm-specific DD, appears twice in (11)-(12).
The interaction between DD and the EAS dummy, which is set equal to one at
the dates of the announcement of the six purchase programs listed in table 1, is of
special interest with regard to the hypothesesH3a andH3b. When equity investors
expect these programs to ease funding conditions, we should observe larger equity
returns for firms with lower DD (higher default risk). Hence, we expect cEQT2 < 0
under H3a. Conversely, the interaction term is expected to be positive under H3b
in the CDS market (cCDS2 > 0). The matrix Vi,t contains additional firm specific
control variables. In addition to NIMTA and TLMTA, I also control for systematic
risk using the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) BETA. BETA is estimated
using daily excess stock returns observed in the time frame -250 to -1 day before
each Governing Council meeting. To account for other characteristics, which are
known to possess explanatory power for cross-sectional equity returns, I present
separate estimation results including controls for the firm’s market-to-book equity
ratio (MB) and momentum (MOM). The latter is constructed along the lines of
13Including other typical balance sheet indicators does not affect the results.
14I find that clustering standard errors both at the firm and time level (two-way clustering) using
the algorithm provided by Cameron et al. (2006) does not affect the results.
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Jegadeesh & Titman (1993) by using the cumulative return over the last twelve
months before every Governing Council meeting day, whereas the last month in
this window is skipped to avoid the short-term reversal effect. Moreover, I also
add a control for a firm’s market capitalization relative to the full sample market
capitalization at each point in time (RSIZE). Lastly, I control for country risk and
other macroeconomic risk by adding the yield on the 10 year government bond of
each firm’s market (GOV).
4. Data and Descriptive Statistics
The sample consists of firms listed in Frankfurt, Paris, Milan and Madrid (Mer-
cado Continuado). Equity prices, total return indices and Worldscope balance
sheet and profitability data have been downloaded from Thomson Reuters Data-
stream. All active and dead firms available between 01/01/2002 and 06/30/2016
on Datastream are included in the sample, whereas firms without Worldscope bal-
ance sheet data have been dropped. Datastream data contain some well known
errors. I have carefully followed the procedures proposed by Ince & Porter (2006)
and Brueckner (2013) to clean the Datastream files. In particular, firms are la-
beled as inactive and deleted them from the sample after their prices have been
stale for three months. Moreover, nano caps with market capitalizations below 20
million Euros have been deleted. I select the MSCI EMU Index as a proxy for the
market portfolio and use the EURIBOR as a proxy for the risk-free rate. All of
these data items have been obtained from Datastream, as well.
Datastream also provides CDS spreads. However, matching the Datastream CDS
sample with the equity of the underlyings is not straightforward. As the European
CDS market is rather small, I have conducted a manual matching procedure using
the “related securities” field of Datastream. In detail, I follow Berndt & Obreja
(2010) and select the 5-year contracts with modified-modified restructuring clause
for senior unsecured Euro denominated debt. Discussions with credit derivatives
traders confirm that this type of contract is the most liquid CDS contract in the
European market. As proposed by Norden & Weber (2004), I choose the daily mid
spread as indicator for the costs of protection. The same filters which are used to
clean equity data are also applied to the CDS spreads. Lastly, yields on 10-year
government bonds from Datastream have been added to the sample. In particular,
I have selected German Bunds, French Obligations Assimilables du Tre´sor (OAT)
as well as Italian and Spanish government bonds.
Figure 2 displays the evolution of excess returns on the MSCI EMU (solid line,
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largest with regard to market capitalization and more firms are listed in Paris
than in Frankfurt. In total, there are 76 banks in the sample. This number is
sufficient to conduct hypothesis tests for H2a. Table 2 also lists other financial
firms, which might be more directly affected by unconventional monetary policy.
For example, insurers are likely to be negatively affected by these policies because
their ability to generate interest income is severely impaired when interest rates
are very low. For this reason I exclude these firms as I test H2. The largest group
of firms are non-financial companies. This group is divided into several further
sectors, which are not listed in table 2 to save space.
Banks Insurers Other Financial
Services
Non-Financial
Companies
Total
Panel A: Listed Firms
Germany 12 13 85 685 795
France 19 8 80 748 855
Italy 27 12 31 264 334
Spain 18 2 7 145 172
Total 76 35 203 1842 2156
Panel B: Firms with available CDS
Germany 2 3 0 26 31
France 4 2 3 37 46
Italy 7 1 1 10 19
Spain 6 0 0 7 13
Total 19 6 4 80 109
The upper panel shows the number of firms in the equity market across different
sectors. The corresponding numbers for firms with available CDS spreads are listed
in the lower panel.
Table 2: Sample Statistics
Panel B of table 2 lists firms with available CDS spreads. In total, there are only
109 firms. Berndt & Obreja (2010) study the entire cross-section of European CDS
(17 countries including the UK). Their sample of 150 firms for the time period
2004-2008 is only slightly larger. Once more, my discussions with credit derivative
traders confirm that the sample size is realistic for the European market. As there
are 19 banks and 80 non-financial corporations with available CDS spreads, I can
also conduct reasonable hypothesis tests for H2b and H3b.
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5. Empirical Results
I begin the empirical analysis with a look at equity and CDS market movements on
ECB Governing Council meeting days. Table 3 shows the mean excess return on
the MSCI EMU index and the mean change of the CDS index with the correspond-
ing standard deviations. Market movements are generally larger when actions have
been taken and the six UMP asset purchase program announcements discussed in
section 2, (column 4 of table 3) evoke especially strong reactions. When no actions
have been taken, equity returns and CDS spread changes are close to zero.
Conventional Action No Action Purchase Program
MSCI -0.827 -0.0191 2.085
(3.068) (1.476) (3.603)
CDS 0.718 -0.0623 -10.11
(3.869) (3.847) (10.96)
This table presents the time series means of excess returns (in %) on the MSCI
Europe and CDS spread changes (in bps) on days of ECB Governing Council
meetings. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Conventional actions
correspond to days when the ECB main rate has been changed. The third col-
umn reports means for days of meetings without any policy changes. The last
column reports means for days with announcements of UMP measures. In par-
ticular, these are the six purchase program announcements listed in table 1.
Three purchase programs (CBPP1,CBPP3/ABSPP,M-EAPP) were announced
simultaneously with conventional rate cuts. These three days are counted as
purchase program announcement days in this table.
Table 3: Summary Statistics: Market Reactions and Monetary Policy
It is noteworthy that markets have, on average, responded to conventional actions
with negative excess equity returns and increasing CDS spreads. In appendix C
I show that this picture does not change when event windows instead of daily
reactions are considered. In total, the ECB has increased rates at 11 meetings,
decreased rates at 18 meetings and left rates unchanged after 137 meetings. Even
though rate decreases outnumber rate increases in column two of table 3, markets
did not respond as expected on average. The most likely explanation for this find-
ing is the sample period, which contains the severe and ongoing crisis since 2008.
UMP actions did however evoke the expected market reactions. A closer look at
every single one of the six UMP announcement days reveals equity markets have re-
sponded to the announcement of SMP with the strongest excess returns (+8.60%),
whereas the equity market closed at -1.43% in excess of the risk free rate after the
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announcement of the Modified Expanded Asset Purchase Programme (EAPP).
CDS market reactions have been negative after the announcement of every single
UMP measure. As a next step, I assess the average market reactions to monetary
policy shocks in the more elaborated time series regression frameworks. Estima-
tion results for the Cook & Hahn (1989) specifications (5)-(6) and the regressions
proposed by Kuttner (2001) (7)-(8) are presented in table 4.
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MSCI CDS
(5) (7) (7) (6) (8)
∆i 0.024 -0.010
(0.01463) (0.02264)
τu -0.092∗∗∗ -0.098∗∗∗ -0.096∗∗∗ 0.31∗∗∗ 0.31∗∗∗
(0.01916) (0.01905) (0.01842) (0.06623) (0.06258)
∆ie 0.25 0.30∗∗ -0.11
(0.1434) (0.09912) (0.2416)
∆iu 0.30∗ 0.44∗∗∗ -0.081
(0.1488) (0.09667) (0.2658)
CRIS×∆ie -0.090
(0.2479)
CRIS×∆iu -0.21
(0.2556)
Constant -0.045 -0.061 -0.080 -0.40 -0.39
(0.1055) (0.1120) (0.1108) (0.3238) (0.3386)
Observations 165 166 166 98 98
Adjusted R2 0.293 0.305 0.318 0.572 0.569
This table presents the estimation results for time series regressions. There
are three different specifications for excess returns on the MSCI Europe
and two different specifications for CDS spread changes. The first column
of each panel corresponds to the regression models (5)-(6). The remaining
columns report the results for the regressions (7)-(8). Robust standard er-
rors are reported in parentheses below the estimation results. ∆i denotes
the change of the ECB main refinancing rate. τu is the UMP shock. ∆ie
and ∆iu denote expected and unexpected CMP shocks, respectively. The
term CRIS × ... indicates an interaction with a crisis dummy, which is set
equal to one in the time period 2008-2016.
Table 4: Time Series Regression Results
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The first columns in the MSCI and CDS panels report estimation results for the
Cook & Hahn (1989) regressions, which I have augmented with the UMP shock.
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses below the coefficients. Con-
trary to the economic intuition, point estimates for the change of the ECB main
refinancing rate are positive for equity markets and negative for CDS markets, al-
beit not statistically significant. The more elaborated models (7) and (8) provide
even stronger support for this finding, as equity markets show significant positive
responses to both expected (∆ie) and unexpected (∆iu) monetary policy shocks.
The coefficients are positive but insignificant for the CDS market. This finding
warrants further discussion. Apparently, investors have regarded interest rate de-
creases as bad news for the equity market. Bredin et al. (2009) run a similar
regression on the returns of the DAX Index and several German industry indices
over the time period 1989-2004. In general, their coefficients also exhibit a positive
sign but are insignificant. They conclude equity markets are ambivalent to the ac-
tions of the ECB. My results are even stronger, the coefficients in table 4 are, at
least at the 10% level, significant for the equity markets. These results underline
that the transmission mechanism of CMP was not operating as expected during
the sample period.
Gregoriou et al. (2009) report similar evidence for the UK. I follow these authors
and investigate the time stability of the coefficients with an interaction term. It is
possible that the market reaction changes as the interest rates approach the zero
lower bound. The variable CRIS shown in column 4 of table 4 is a dummy set
equal to one at the first meeting in 2008 and keeps this value until the end of the
sample period. The interactions should show whether a specific crisis effect drives
the result. It turns out that this is not the case. Coefficients without the interaction
remain largely unchanged and the interacted coefficients are indistinguishable from
zero.16 Taken together, these results imply that financial markets did not perceive
accommodative CMP decisions in the sample period as positive news.
The coefficients on the UMP shock variable (τu) describe the market reactions to
the announcements of UMP. The coefficients are always negative and significant
for the equity market and positive at statistically significant levels for the CDS
market. Holding interest rate shocks constant, a 25 bps reduction of τu yields an
average equity excess return of 2.45% (−25×−0.098) and decreases CDS spreads
by 7.75 bps (−25 × 0.31) on average. Hence, these results are evidence for H1a
and H1b. In general, the models presented in table 4 explain a substantial share
of the variation of excess equity returns and CDS spreads on ECB Governing
Council meeting days. The adjusted R2 coefficients are around 30% for the equity
16Due to limited data availability, I cannot estimate the specification with interactions for the
CDS market.
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market models and even close to 50% for the CDS market models. When I adapt
a more narrow definition of UMP and set τu = 0 on all but the six purchase
program announcement days (see table 1) I obtain qualitatively similar results but
substantially lower coefficients of determination. These results reflect that UMP
is not limited to outright asset purchase programs. Other changes of the assumed
start date of UMP do neither alter the picture presented here. These results are
available upon request.17
As a next step, I turn to the entire cross-section of equities and CDS. To gather
preliminary information about heterogeneous reactions, I estimate the specifica-
tions (7) and (8) for every stock and CDS in the cross-section. The box plots
in figure 3 illustrate the cross-sectional distributions of the response coefficients.
Panel A of figure 3 shows the response of excess stock returns and CDS spread
changes to unexpected interest rate shocks ∆iu. While the reaction of equities is
close to zero for the vast majorities of firms, there are quite a lot of outliers visible
in the box plot. Likewise, the box plot shows a median response of CDS, which
is close to zero. Outliers are not prevalent in the case of CDS, but we have to
keep in mind that there are only 109 firms with available CDS spreads. Panel B of
figure 3 shows the response coefficients for UMP shocks τu. As conjectured in the
hypotheses H2a,H2b,H3a and H3b, I find that the reactions to these events are
quite heterogeneous in equity and credit markets. Consistent with the index re-
gression results presented in table 4, the box plots show average negative (positive)
responses of equity excess returns (CDS spread changes) to changes in τu.
17The regressions are re-estimated with market reactions measured in event windows in ap-
pendix C. The results are qualitatively similar, but the coefficients of determination drops
considerably with increasing window sizes. The bottom line of these additional results is that
monetary policy does not suffice to explain the movements of equity and credit markets over
several days surrounding Governing Council meetings.
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 Panel A: Conventional Monetary Policy Responses
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 Panel B: Unconventional Monetary Policy Responses
These box plots show the cross-sectional distributions of the response coefficients from the re-
gression models (7)-(8). The upper panel shows the response to unexpected CMP shocks ∆iu.
The lower panel shows the response to UMP shocks τu.
Figure 3: Cross-Sectional Distribution of Response Coefficient
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According to H2a and H2b, we expect the strongest market reactions in the bank-
ing sector. Average UMP response coefficients by markets and sectors are pre-
sented in table 5. As visible in the last rows of panels A and B, banks show the
strongest responses in both equity and credit markets. The Wilcoxon rank-sum
test rejects the null of equal coefficients for banks and non-financial corporations
at the 1% level. Hence, I find that stocks and CDS spreads of banks react stronger
to UMP announcements than securities of non-financial firms. Moreover, the nega-
tive (positive) reactions observed for bank stocks (CDS) underline markets perceive
UMP as beneficial for banks and do not focus on the averse effects of these policies
on bank profitability. This result is in line with the equity index evidence pre-
sented by Haitsma et al. (2015). In general, H2a is valid in the German, French
and Italian subsamples. In the Spanish subsample, I find that stocks of insurers
react even stronger to UMP shocks.18 Bank CDS react stronger than CDS of firms
in other industries across all subsamples. Thus, H2b is valid in all subsamples.
18As visible in panel A of table 5, markets perceive accommodative UMP shocks as bad news
for German insurers. This finding reflects the re-investment problem German insurers face
in particular within their life insurance business lines.
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Banks Insurers Other Financial
Services
Non-Financial
Companies
Total
Panel A: Listed Firms
Germany -0.06 0.04 -0.04 -0.02 -0.03
(0.1312) (0.211) (0.1686) (0.1024) (0.1144)
France -0.09 -0.06 -0.01 -0.04 -0.04
(0.0914) (0.0694) (0.0881) (0.1099) (0.1079)
Italy -0.13 -0.09 -0.09 -0.07 -0.08
(0.075) (0.0594) (0.1246) (0.1105) (0.1092)
Spain -0.12 -0.14 -0.02 -0.06 -0.06
(0.1289) (0.0099) (0.0532) (0.0953) (0.0993)
Total -0.11 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04
(0.1042) (0.1526) (0.134) (0.1072) (0.1113)
Panel B: Firms with available CDS
Germany 0.47 0.21 0.21 0.23
(0.0842) (0.0064) (0.1919) (0.1879)
France 0.44 0.29 0.36 0.2 0.23
(0.2119) (0.2082) (0.2721) (0.175) (0.1955)
Italy 0.58 0.35 0.45
(0.3442) (0.2797) (0.3126)
Spain 0.67 0.53 0.6
(0.2432) (0.1529) (0.2071)
Total 0.57 0.3 0.36 0.24 0.31
(0.2679) (0.1797) (0.2721) (0.2138) (0.2531)
This table presents the mean response coefficients to announcements of UMP mea-
sures. Panel A shows the cross-sectional means of ρEQT in (7). Panel B shows the
cross-sectional means of ρCDS in (8). Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Cells with less than 3 observations have been left blank.
Table 5: Response Coefficients in the Cross-Section
151
The remainder of this paper is devoted to explaining the cross-sectional hetero-
geneity of stock and CDS market reactions on Governing Council meeting days
further. The last set of research hypotheses H3a and H3b implies stronger mar-
ket reactions for high default risk firms. Results for the panel regression models
(11)-(12) are presented in table 6. Only equity returns and CDS spreads of non-
financial firms have been used in the estimation. The coefficients of the monetary
shocks and constants are omitted to save space. The left panel presents the results
for equities. The first specification includes a reduced set of control variables. On
average, stocks of firms with low default risk (high DD) have shown larger return
on days of ECB Governing Council meetings. Moreover, also the interaction of DD
with the dummy variable EAS, which is set equal to one on each announcement
day of the six purchase programs listed in table 1, is positive and highly signifi-
cant. Not stocks of high default risk firms, but stocks of low risk firms respond
with stronger positive returns to the announcements of purchase programs. This
stands in harsh contrast to the balance sheet channel and H3a.
Moreover, the results show that equities with high CAPM BETA yield lower re-
turns on Governing Council Meeting days. Jensen & Mercer (2002) find BETA
and returns are positively related in times of expansive monetary policy and neg-
atively related in times of restrictive monetary policy. Among others, Pettengill
et al. (1995) find a conditional relationship between BETA and expected returns,
which is positive in up and negative in down market phases. However, the sample
period used here is one of exceptionally expansive monetary policy and an overall
positive market performance. Above all, the negative relation between BETA and
equity returns on Governing Council Meeting days, which is very stable across
different subsamples, implies the equity market does not respond as suggested by
capital market theory. The within R2 of the first specification for equities is only
1.8% and increases considerably if controls for the market-to-book equity ratio
(MB) and momentum (MOM) are added. Haitsma et al. (2015) and Kontonikas
& Kostakis (2013) show that loser stocks react more strongly to monetary policy
actions. I cannot confirm this as both interactions of MOM with the monetary
policy shocks and interactions of winner/loser dummies with the shocks are in-
significant. Moreover, I run a separate panel regression of the lagged monetary
policy shocks on momentum returns to assess whether monetary policy shocks ex-
plain a substantial share of the variation of momentum. I find that this is not the
case.19 There are momentum effects in the sample, but they are not explained by
monetary policy.
Even though DD as a control for default risk is not significant once I control for
19These additional results are available upon request.
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momentum, it retains its positive sign. Hence, I cannot find any evidence for a
positive reaction of high default risk stocks to announcements of UMP (H3a).
Instead, I find weak evidence for a stronger reaction of low default risk firms. This
finding is new and contrasts the prior findings of Haitsma et al. (2015) who argue
that UMP in the Eurozone has - through a balance channel of monetary policy
- evoked strong positive equity returns of highly leveraged firms.20 Again, it is
important to bear in mind that the paper by Haitsma et al. (2015) is based on
a sample which consists of the Euro Stoxx 50 firms. In contrast to my sample,
their sample is limited to several large firms which are not very likely to be credit
constrained.
20Ehrmann & Fratzscher (2004) find stocks of U.S. firms with poor credit ratings are affected
significantly more by CMP. Similarly, Basistha & Kurov (2008) show that the response of
credit constrained firms to monetary policy shocks is larger than the response on firms, which
are not constrained.
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Equities CDS
(11) (11) (12) (12)
DD 0.000000017∗∗∗ 0.000000014∗∗∗ 0.00095∗∗∗ 0.00094∗∗∗
(2.4e-09) (2.8e-09) (0.00016) (0.00017)
EAS × DD 0.23∗∗∗ 0.078 0.70∗∗∗ 0.71∗∗∗
(0.050) (0.044) (0.13) (0.12)
EAS -1.88∗∗∗ 2.60∗∗∗ -6.36∗∗∗ -6.54∗∗∗
(0.52) (0.49) (1.14) (1.10)
CRISIS -3.70∗∗∗ 4.58∗∗∗ 0 0
(0.37) (0.36) (.) (.)
GOV 0.88∗∗∗ 1.27∗∗∗ 0.16 0.18
(0.16) (0.11) (0.10) (0.10)
BETA -4.15∗∗∗ -3.38∗∗∗ -1.05∗ -0.98∗
(0.61) (0.46) (0.49) (0.44)
RSIZE 0.48∗∗∗ 0.050 -0.086∗∗ -0.075∗∗
(0.044) (0.037) (0.026) (0.023)
NIMTA -0.0029 0.0022∗∗∗ -0.00046 0.0027
(0.0016) (0.00058) (0.019) (0.019)
TLMTA -0.016∗∗ -0.011∗∗∗ -0.0015 -0.0014
(0.0050) (0.0031) (0.0015) (0.0013)
MB 0.34∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗
(0.043) (0.054)
MOM 17.2∗∗∗ -0.62
(0.51) (0.33)
Firm Fixed Effets Yes Yes Yes Yes
Monetary Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 183069 172642 7378 7373
Adjusted R2 0.018 0.131 0.182 0.183
This table presents the panel regression results for models (11) and (12). The de-
pendent variables are equity excess returns (in %) and CDS spread changes (in
bps.) observed at the end of every Governing council meeting day. DD is the firm
specific distance-to-default. EAS is a dummy, which is equal to one on the six an-
nouncement events listed in table 1. The monetary shocks represented by (3) and
(4) have been included in the estimation but are not displayed to save space. The
same applies to firm fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level.
Two-way clustering at the firm and time level does not affect the results.
Table 6: Panel Regressions
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The right panel of table 6 shows the results for the cross-section of CDS spread
changes. In general, less control variables enter the CDS specifications at conven-
tional significance levels. As implied by H3b, I find a positive and highly significant
relation between DD interacted with the dummy for the purchase programs and
spread changes. Holding everything else constant, firms with larger DD (low de-
fault risk firms) show larger CDS increases. Conversely, high default risk firms
show larger CDS contractions. Hence, the reaction of the credit market is in line
with the balance sheet channel.
6. Robustness Checks
All in all, the results show that CDS of large firms react in accordance with the
intentions behind the UMP purchase programs, whereas the larger cross-section
of equities shows an opposite pattern suggesting stock investors are not convinced
that credit constrained firms will benefit. The average market capitalization of a
firm with available CDS spreads is close to 20 bn. EUR, whereas the full sample
average market capitalization is approximately 2 bn. EUR. Thus, small firms
might drive the results. When I restrict the cross-section of equities to firms with
available CDS spreads and re-estimate (11), I do indeed obtain a negative, yet
insignificant coefficient on the interaction EAS × DD. However, restricting the
cross-section to firms with available CDS leads to a loss of information on credit
constrained firms. When I re-estimate (11) once more using all firm observations
with a market capitalization above 1 bn. EUR, I obtain a weakly significant
positive coefficient on the EAS ×DD interaction and otherwise results similar to
the results presented in table 6.21 The bottom line of these additional regression
results, which are available upon request, is equity of very large firms responds
to the announcement of UMP with strong positive stock returns. Apparently,
markets believe these firms will profit from UMP, whereas markets do not believe
in an actual balance sheet channel.
To provide a different perspective on the reaction of high and low default risk firms
to UMP, I mimic an arbitrage trading strategy assuming a long position in high
DD and a short position in low DD firms. On the day before every ECB Governing
council meeting, I sort all firms into ten deciles according to their DD. I assume
investors can buy and sell the highest and lowest deciles at the closing price on
these days and then hold these portfolio until the day before the next Governing
Council meeting. The arbitrage portfolio returns are computed as the top decile
21A firm with market capitalization above 1 bn. EUR can be regarded as a large small cap stock.
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value-weighted portfolio return minus the bottom decile value-weighted portfolio
return. The cumulative “10-1” returns are plotted in figure 4. The arbitrage
strategy shows a dramatic outperformance against the MSCI EMU index since the
end of the financial crisis and the beginning of the adoption of UMP by the ECB.
Apparently, firms which are to a lesser degree affected by credit constraints have
quite persistently outperformed firms which are likely to be credit constrained. A
further inspection shows that the main driver of this outperformance is indeed the
underperformance of firms with low DD. Explaining the existence of this trend in
detail is beyond the scope of this paper.22 Nevertheless, these results provide a
context for the previous results. The performance of the arbitrage strategy mirrors
a market environment which is bullish for low risk and bearish for high risk firms.
Apparently, the asset purchase programs, which are highlighted in figure 4, have
not affected this trend. The ECB has not managed to alter the expectations of
market participants in this regard. Instead of a balance sheet channel, this results
points to a worsening environment for small, credit constrained firms.
22Among others Vassalou & Xing (2004) and Campbell et al. (2008) provide results on the
long-run relationship between default risk and equity returns.
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I conduct another robustness check by sorting the 80 non-financial firms with
available CDS into five portfolios before every Governing Council meeting and
compute returns of an arbitrage strategy which is long the equity of the bottom
quintile of CDS and short the equity of the top quintile of CDS. Conceptually, this
is equivalent to going long high DD and short low DD firms. The CDS arbitrage
strategy shows the same outperformance of low risk firms in the time period 2008-
2016. These results are available upon request.
7. Summary and Discussion
The results presented in this paper cast some doubt on the effectiveness of mone-
tary policy in the EMU. Between January 2002 and June 2016 conventional main
rate decreases have, on average, evoked negative equity returns. However, the
ECB unconventional monetary policy has, since 2008, lead to positive equity mar-
ket and negative CDS market reactions on the announcement days. Bank equities
and CDS show the strongest reactions. These findings are in accordance with the
literature (Fratzscher et al. 2014, Haitsma et al. 2015, Rogers et al. 2014).
In contrast with previous findings in the literature, I show that the announcement
of UMP measures, in particular asset purchase programs, did not evoke a stronger
stock market reaction among credit constrained firms, which is implied by the
balance sheet channel of monetary policy. In the CDS market, I do indeed find that
contracts written on firms, which are more likely to be credit constrained, contract
stronger than contracts written on firms with low likelihood of credit constraints.
However, the market capitalization of firms with active CDS is roughly ten times
as large as the average market capitalization in the entire cross-section of equities
and credit constraints are expected to be more severe among small firms. Using
the entire cross-section of equities, I find that large firms, which are not likely to
be constrained, show the strongest equity returns. Consequently, financial markets
regard asset purchase programs as beneficial for large, safe firms and not for small,
credit constrained firms.
These results must not necessarily mean that UMP will be completely fruitless
in the long run. The measures might slowly pass through a bank lending chan-
nel before aggregate lending to non-financial firms increases. However, the asset
market channels, in particular the balance sheet channel, seem to be the more
important part of the transmission mechanism of UMP (Joyce et al. 2012). This
part crucially depends on asset market reactions and the results presented here
suggest that the qualitative goals of the ECB’s actions, easing conditions for credit
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constrained firms, have not been reached.
Assessing asset price responses to monetary policy actions remains an interesting
topic in finance and macroeconomics. This article assesses how markets react to
the announcement of new unconventional measures, whereas shocks are measured
using spot and future rates. In light of the relentless efforts of central bankers
to achieve forward-guidance there might be a variety of additional, more subtle
measures central banks undertake to shape expectations, however. For instance, it
is likely that the impact of monetary policy on markets is to an even greater extent
determined by the wording of the ECB president when communicating the Gov-
erning Council decisions at the official press conferences. Loughran (2011) provide
a finance dictionary which can be used to classify the tone of financial reports. In
this vein, the methodology of textual analysis is likely to offer interesting ways to
alternatively measure monetary policy shocks. Even a complete evaluation of a
central bank’s communication including press releases and other public statements
seems now viable.
References
Altman, E. I. (1968), ‘Financial ratios, discriminant analysis and the prediction of
corporate bankruptcy’, The Journal of Finance 23(4), 589–609.
URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1968.tb00843.x
Altomonte, C. & Bussoli, P. (2014), Asset-backed securities: The key to unlocking
europe’s credit markets?, Bruegel policy contribution, Bruegel.
Angeloni, I., Kashyap, A. K., Mojon, B. & Terlizzese, D. (2003), Monetary trans-
mission in the euro area: Does the interest rate channel explain it all?, Working
Paper 9984, National Bureau of Economic Research.
URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w9984
Ashcraft, A. B. (2006), ‘New evidence on the lending channel’, Journal of Money,
Credit, and Banking 38(3), 751–775.
URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/mcb.2006.0037
Basistha, A. & Kurov, A. (2008), ‘Macroeconomic cycles and the stock market’s
reaction to monetary policy’, Journal of Banking & Finance 32(12), 2606–2616.
URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2008.05.012
Bauer, J. & Agarwal, V. (2014), ‘Are hazard models superior to traditional
bankruptcy prediction approaches? a comprehensive test’, Journal of Bank-
159
ing & Finance 40, 432–442.
URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2013.12.013
Beirne, J., Dalitz, L., Ejsing, J., Grothe, M., Manganelli, S., Monar, F., Sahel, B.,
Susec, M., Tapking, J. & Vong, T. (2011), The impact of the eurosystems covered
bond purchase programme on the primary and secondary markets, Occasional
Paper Series 122, European Central Bank.
Bernanke, B. & Gertler, M. (1989), ‘Agency costs, net worth, and business fluctu-
ations’, The American Economic Review 79(1), 14–31.
URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1804770
Bernanke, B., Gertler, M. & Gilchrist, S. (1996), ‘The financial accelerator and
the flight to quality’, The Review of Economics and Statistics 78(1), 1–15.
URL: http://ideas.repec.org/a/tpr/restat/v78y1996i1p1-15.html
Bernanke, B. S. & Gertler, M. (1995), Inside the black box: The credit channel
of monetary policy transmission, Working Paper 5146, National Bureau of Eco-
nomic Research.
URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w5146
Bernanke, B. S., Gertler, M. & Gilchrist, S. (1999), Chapter 21 the financial ac-
celerator in a quantitative business cycle framework, Vol. 1, Part C of Handbook
of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, pp. 1341 – 1393.
URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S157400489910034X
Bernanke, B. S. & Kuttner, K. (2005), ‘What explains the stock market’s reaction
to federal reserve policy?’, The Journal of Finance 60(3), 1221–1257.
URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.00760.x
Berndt, A. & Obreja, I. (2010), ‘Decomposing European CDs returns’, Review of
Finance 14(2), 189–233.
URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/rof/rfq004
Bernoth, K. & Hagen, J. v. (2004), ‘The euribor futures market: Efficiency and
the impact of ecb policy announcements’, International Finance 7(1), 1–24.
URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1367-0271.2004.00127.x
Bharath, S. T. & Shumway, T. (2008), ‘Forecasting default with the Merton dis-
tance to default model’, Review of Financial Studies 21(3), 1339–1369.
URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhn044
Black, F. & Scholes, M. (1973), ‘The pricing of options and corporate liabilities’,
Journal of Political Economy 81(3), pp. 637–654.
URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1831029
160
BLS (2012), Euro area bank lending survey january 2012, Technical report, Euro-
pean Central Bank.
Boivin, J., Kiley, M. T. & Mishkin, F. S. (2010), How has the monetary transmis-
sion mechanism evolved over time?, Working Paper 15879, National Bureau of
Economic Research.
URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w15879
Borio, C., Gambacorta, L. & Hofmann, B. (2015), The influence of monetary policy
on bank profitability, Bis working paper, BIS.
Braun, B. (2015), ‘Governing the future: the european central bank expectation
management during the great moderation’, Economy and Society 44(3), 367–
391.
URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03085147.2015.1049447
Bredin, D., Hyde, S., Nitzsche, D. & O’Reilly, G. (2009), ‘European monetary pol-
icy surprises: the aggregate and sectoral stock market response’, International
Journal of Finance & Economics 14(2), 156–171.
URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/ijfe.341
Brueckner, R. (2013), Three Essays on the German Capital Market, PhD thesis,
Humboldt University.
Cameron, A. C., Gelbach, J. & Miller, D. (2006), ‘Robust inference with multi-way
clustering’.
URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/t0327
Campbell, J. Y., Hilscher, J. & Szilagyi, J. (2008), ‘In Search of Distress Risk’,
Journal of Finance 63(6), 2899–2939.
URL: http://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/jfinan/v63y2008i6p2899-2939.html
Chatziantoniou, I., Duffy, D. & Filis, G. (2013), ‘Stock market response to mon-
etary and fiscal policy shocks: Multi-country evidence’, Economic Modelling
30, 754–769.
URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econmod.2012.10.005
Ciccarelli, M., Maddaloni, A. & Peydro, J.-L. (2015), ‘Trusting the bankers: A new
look at the credit channel of monetary policy’, Review of Economic Dynamics
18(4), 979–1002.
URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.red.2014.11.002
Cochrane, J. H. & Piazzesi, M. (2002), ‘The fed and interest ratess - a high-
frequency identification’, American Economic Review 92(2), 90–95.
URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/000282802320189069
161
Cole, C. S., Impson, M. & Reichenstein, W. (1991), ‘Do treasury bill futures rates
satisfy rational expectation properties?’, Journal of Futures Markets 11(5), 591–
601.
URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/fut.3990110507
Cook, T. & Hahn, T. (1989), ‘The effect of changes in the federal funds rate
target on market interest rates in the 1970s’, Journal of Monetary Economics
24(3), 331–351.
URL: https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/moneco/v24y1989i3p331-351.html
Cutler, D. M., Poterba, J. M. & Summers, L. H. (1988), What moves stock prices?,
Working Paper 2538, National Bureau of Economic Research.
URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w2538
ECB (2009), Decision of the european central bank of 2 july 2009 on the im-
plementation of the covered bond purchase programme, Offical Journal of the
European Union L 175/18, European Central Bank.
ECB (2010), Decision of the european central bank of 14 may 2010 establishing a
securities markets programme, Technical report, European Central Bank.
ECB (2011), Decision of the european central bank of 3 november 2011 on the im-
plementation of the second covered bond purchase programme, Official Journal
of the European Union L 297/70, European Central Bank.
ECB (2014a), Decision of the european central bank of 15 october 2014 on the
implementation of the third covered bond purchase programme, Official Journal
of the European Union L 335/22, European Central Bank.
ECB (2014b), Decision of the european central bank of 19 november 2014 on
the implementation of the asset-backed securities purchase programme, Official
Journal of the European Union L 1/4, European Central Bank.
ECB (2015), Decision (eu) 2015/774 of the european central bank of 4 march 2015
on a secondary markets public sector asset purchase programme (ecb/2015/10),
Official Journal of the European Union L 121/20, European Central Bank.
ECB (2016a), Decision (eu) 2016/948 of the european central bank of 1 june 2016
on the implementation of the corporate sector purchase programme, Official
Journal of the European Union L 157/28, European Central Bank.
ECB (2016b), Decision of the european central bank of 18 april 2016 amending
decision (eu) 2015/774 on a secondary markets public sector asset purchase
programme, Official Journal of the European Union L 121/24, European Central
Bank.
162
Eggertsson, G. & Woodford, M. (2003), ‘The Zero Bound on Interest Rates and
Optimal Monetary Policy’, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 34(1), 139–
235.
URL: https://ideas.repec.org/a/bin/bpeajo/v34y2003i2003-1p139-235.html
Ehrmann, M. (2000), Firm size and monetary policy transmission: evidence from
German business survey data, Working Paper Series 0021, European Central
Bank.
URL: https://ideas.repec.org/p/ecb/ecbwps/20000021.html
Ehrmann, M. & Fratzscher, M. (2004), ‘Taking stock: Monetary policy transmis-
sion to equity markets’, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 36(4), 719–737.
URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3839039
Fama, E. F. (1970), ‘Efficient capital markets: A review of theory and empirical
work’, The Journal of Finance 25(2), 383–417.
URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2325486
Fisher, I. (1930), The theory of interest: As determined by impatience to spend
income and opportunity to invest it, Macmillan.
Fratzscher, M., Lo Duca, M. & Straub, R. (2014), Ecb unconventional monetary
policy actions: Market impact, international spillovers and transmission chan-
nels, in ‘15th Jacques Polak Annual Research Conference’.
Gambacorta, L. & Marques-Ibanez, D. (2011), The bank lending channel: Lessons
from the crisis, Technical report, BIS.
Giannone, D., Lenza, M., Pill, H. & Reichlin, L. (2011), Non-standard monetary
policy measures and monetary developments, Working Paper Series 1290, Eu-
ropean Central Bank.
Gregoriou, A., Kontonikas, A., MacDonald, R. & Montagnoli, A. (2009), ‘Mone-
tary policy shocks and stock returns: evidence from the british market’, Finan-
cial Markets and Portfolio Management 23(4), 401–410.
URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11408-009-0113-2
Hafer, R. W., Hein, S. E. & MacDonald, S. S. (1992), ‘Market and survey forecasts
of the three-month treasury-bill rate’, The Journal of Business 65(1), 123.
URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/296560
Haitsma, R., Unalmis, D. & de Haan, J. (2015), The impact of the ECB’s conven-
tional and unconventional monetary policies on stock markets, DNB Working
Papers 483, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department.
URL: https://ideas.repec.org/p/dnb/dnbwpp/483.html
163
Hamilton, J. D. & Wu, J. C. (2012), ‘The effectiveness of alternative monetary
policy tools in a zero lower bound environment’, Journal of Money, Credit and
Banking 44, 3–46.
URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1538-4616.2011.00477.x
Hicks, J. (1946), Value and capital, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Hillegeist, S. A., Keating, E. K., Cram, D. P. & Lundstedt, K. G. (2004), ‘Assessing
the probability of bankruptcy’, Review of Accounting Studies 9(1), 5–34.
Hull, J., Predescu, M. & White, A. (2004), ‘The relationship between credit de-
fault swap spreads, bond yields, and credit rating announcements’, Journal of
Banking & Finance 28(11), 2789–2811.
URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2004.06.010
Ince, O. S. & Porter, R. B. (2006), ‘Individual equity return data from Thomson
Datastream: Handle with care!’, Journal of Financial Research 29(4), 463–479.
URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-6803.2006.00189.x
Jegadeesh, N. & Titman, S. (1993), ‘Returns to buying winners and selling losers:
Implications for stock market efficiency’, The Journal of Finance 48(1), 65–91.
URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1993.tb04702.x
Jensen, G. R. & Mercer, J. M. (2002), ‘Monetary policy and the cross-section of
expected stock returns’, Journal of Financial Research 25(1), 125–139.
URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1475-6803.00008
Joyce, M., Miles, D., Scott, A. & Vayanos, D. (2012), ‘Quantitative Easing and
Unconventional Monetary Policy - An Introduction’, The Economic Journal
122(564), pp. F271–F288.
URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/23324224
Kontonikas, A. & Kostakis, A. (2013), ‘On monetary policy and stock market
anomalies’, Journal of Business Finance & Accounting 40(7-8), 1009–1042.
URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jbfa.12028
Krueger, J. T. & Kuttner, K. N. (1996), ‘The fed funds futures rate as a predictor
of federal reserve policy’, Journal of Futures Markets 16(8), 865–879.
URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/(SICI)1096-9934(199612)16:8¡865::AID-
FUT2¿3.0.CO;2-K
Kuttner, K. N. (2001), ‘Monetary policy surprises and interest rates: Evidence
from the fed funds futures market’, Journal of Monetary Economics 47(3), 523–
544.
URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0304-3932(01)00055-1
164
Loughran, T, a. M. B. (2011), ‘When is a liability not a liability? textual analysis,
dictionaries, and 10-Ks’, The Journal of Finance 66(1), 35–65.
URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2010.01625.x
Maio, P. (2013), ‘Another look at the stock return response to monetary policy
actions’, Review of Finance 18(1), 321–371.
URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/rof/rfs050
McQueen, G. & Roley, V. V. (1993), ‘Stock prices, news, and business conditions’,
Review of Financial Studies (3520).
URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w3520
Merton, R. C. (1974), ‘On the pricing of corporate debt: The risk structure of
interest rates’, The Journal of Finance 29(2), 449–470.
URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1974.tb03058.x
Mishkin, F. (1996), ‘The channels of monetary transmission: Lessons for monetary
policy’.
URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w5464
Norden, L. & Weber, M. (2004), ‘Informational efficiency of credit default swap
and stock markets: The impact of credit rating announcements’, Journal of
Banking & Finance 28(11), 2813–2843.
URL: http://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/jbfina/v28y2004i11p2813-2843.html
Patel, J. & Zeckhauser, R. (1987), Treasury bill futures as hedges against inflation
risk, Working paper no. 2322, NBER.
URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w2322
Pearce, D. K. & Roley, V. V. (1983), ‘The reaction of stock prices to unanticipated
changes in money: A note’, The Journal of Finance 38(4), 1323–1333.
URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1983.tb02303.x
Petersen, M. A. (2008), ‘Estimating standard errors in finance panel data sets:
Comparing approaches’, Review of Financial Studies 22(1), 435–480.
URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhn053
Pettengill, G. N., Sundaram, S. & Mathur, I. (1995), ‘The conditional relation
between beta and returns’, The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
30(1), 101.
URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2331255
Pires, P., Pereira, J. P. & Martins, L. F. (2013), ‘The empirical determinants
of credit default swap spreads: a quantile regression approach’, Eur Financial
165
Management 21(3), 556–589.
URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-036X.2013.12029.x
Ricci, O. (2015), ‘The impact of monetary policy announcements on the stock
price of large european banks during the financial crisis’, Journal of Banking &
Finance 52, 245–255.
URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0378426614002465
Rigobon, R. & Sack, B. (2004), ‘The impact of monetary policy on asset prices’,
Journal of Monetary Economics 51(8), 1553–1575.
URL: https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/moneco/v51y2004i8p1553-1575.html
Rogers, J. H., Scotti, C. & Wright, J. H. (2014), Evaluating Asset-Market Effects of
Unconventional Monetary Policy: A Cross-Country Comparison, International
Finance Discussion Papers 1101, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System (U.S.).
URL: https://ideas.repec.org/p/fip/fedgif/1101.html
Taylor, J. (1993), ‘Discretion versus policy rules in practice’, Carnegie-Rochester
Conference Series on Public Policy 39(1), 195–214.
URL: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:crcspp:v:39:y:1993:i::p:195-214
Thorbecke, W. (1997), ‘On stock market returns and monetary policy’, The Jour-
nal of Finance 52(2), 635–654.
URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb04816.x
Tian, S., Yu, Y. & Guo, H. (2015), ‘Variable selection and corporate bankruptcy
forecasts’, Journal of Banking & Finance 52(0), 89–100.
URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0378426614003823
Tirole, J. (2006), The Theory of Corporate Finance, Princeton University Press.
URL: http://press.princeton.edu/titles/8123.html
Tobin, J. (1969), ‘A general equilibrium approach to monetary theory’, Journal of
Money, Credit and Banking 1(1), 15–29.
URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1991374
Valta, P. (2016), ‘Strategic default, debt structure, and stock returns’, Journal of
Financial and Quantitative Analysis 51(01), 197–229.
URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S002210901600003X
Vassalou, M. & Xing, Y. (2004), ‘Default risk in equity returns’, The Journal of
Finance 59(2), 831–868.
URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2004.00650.x
166
Woodford, M. (2003), Interest and Prices, Princeton University Press.
Xu, M. & Zhang, C. (2008), ‘Bankruptcy prediction: the case of Japanese listed
companies’, Review of Accounting Studies 14(4), 534–558.
URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11142-008-9080-5
Yin, H., Yang, J. & Handorf, W. C. (2010), ‘State dependency of bank stock
reaction to federal funds rate target changes’, Journal of Financial Research
33(3), 289–315.
URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-6803.2010.01272.x
Appendices
A. The ECB’s Asset Purchase Programs
This appendix contains a summary of the ECB’s asset purchase programs. I outline
the background of these programs and carve out their most important goals with
references to the official ECB communication.
Joyce et al. (2012) propose to distinguish between two different types of UMP mea-
sures. On the one hand, qualitative easing programs are asset purchases which are
supposed to ease funding conditions for commercial banks and non-financial cor-
porations but lead to relatively small or even no increase of the central bank’s
balance sheet. Below, I argue that the ECB’s attempts to revive the European
covered bond and Asset Backed Securities (ABS) markets can be regarded as qual-
itative easing. These programs are attempts to reduce default risk and liquidity
premia. Another example for such a policy in the USA would be the so-called
“Operation Twist”, a balance sheet neutral portfolio turnover, which involves sell-
ing short-term and buying long-term government bonds. Clearly, this program
was an attempt to reduce maturity premia. On the other hand, quantitative eas-
ing programs are purchase programs conducted in large and highly liquid market
segments. Normally, such programs involve - but are not limited to - outright pur-
chases of government bonds.23 Moreover, these programs lead to large increases of
the central bank’s balance sheet. While qualitative measures aim to precisely re-
duce selected risk premia, quantitative measures are to be regarded as a universal
weapon.
23The FED QE1 also included mortgage backed securities.
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When central banks opt for outright purchases of securities in the capital market,
they set five parameters to define their programs. First, they have to decide on the
asset classes to be bought. This is the most significant decision because the choice
of asset class will inevitably restrict the choices regarding the other parameters.
Second, they can choose the volume of securities to be bought. Relative to the
chosen asset class market size, this parameter should define the impact of their
program. With the choice of the remaining three parameters, the central bank can
fine-tune the program to reduce specific premia. The program can be designed
to buy specific maturities, specific rating grades and impose restrictions regarding
liquidity, for instance by setting a minimum issuance size for eligible securities.
The ECB has varied all these parameters in their purchase programs, which are
summarized in chronological order in table 1.
The ECB embarked on outright asset purchases with the announcement of its
first Covered Bond Purchase Programme (CBPP) in May 2009. At that time, the
covered bond market, which is important for the funding of European banks, was
disrupted due to the ongoing crisis of trust following the financial crisis. Con-
sequently, CBPP1 was announced as a program designed to “(a) promoting the
ongoing decline in money market term rates and (b) easing funding conditions for
credit institutions and enterprises.” (ECB 2009, p. 1). The evolution of the ECB’s
balance sheet compared with the FED’s balance sheet is shown in the upper panel
of figure 5. CBPP1 had a rather modest volume of 40 bn. EUR (relative to an
ECB balance sheet volume of approximately 1.9 trillion EUR at that time) and
was terminated by the end of June 2010. Some evidence regarding the effectiveness
of CBPP1 has been presented by ECB staff. Beirne et al. (2011) claim that the
program has, on average, dampened covered bond yields by approximately 12 bps,
but they present only very weak evidence on positive spillovers to corporate bonds
issued by non-financial firms.
A first purchase programme for government bonds, the Securities Markets Pro-
gramme (SMP), was installed at the height of the European Debt crisis in 2012.
Similar to the early “Enhanced Credit Support” package, SMP was meant to ad-
dress a “malfunctioning” of financial markets (ECB 2010) and decrease credit
spreads in the EMU. As such, this interventionist program differs from the other
measures listed in table 1, which are more directed towards long-term strategic
goals, especially easing funding conditions for non-financial corporations. Even
though purchases under SMP were unrestricted with regard to ratings, maturities
and volume, the total amount of purchased securities was rather low compared to
purchases of government bond by other central banks.24 Moreover, the purchases
24At its peak, the volume totaled 210 billion Euros (see the website https://www.bundesbank.
de/Redaktion/EN/Glossareintraege/S/security_markets_programme.html).
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were sterilized to prevent effects on the money supply.
A second covered bond programme, CBPP2, was implemented to achieve the same
goals as the first programme in 2011 (ECB 2011). As visible in table 1, CBPP2
was more aggressive with regard to credit risk and liquidity but came with a lower
target volume (40 bn. EUR). While the disruption in the covered bond market had
been resolved after the turmoil in 2009, the CBPP programs apparently had not
very sustainable effects on funding conditions for non-financial enterprises. The
January 2012 bank lending survey, a survey conducted on a quarterly basis by the
ECB, reported tightening instead of loosening credit conditions in the EMU (BLS
2012). The lower panel of figure 5 illustrates that credit to non-financial firms was
in aggregate contracting at that time.
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The upper panel shows the evolution of the ECB and FED balance sheets in EUR and USD,
respectively. All values have been rebased to unity as of January 2002. The lower panel shows the
evolution of log credit to non-financial corporations in million EUR as reported by commercial
banks in the EMU. The data items have been downloaded from the ECB and FED websites.
Figure 5: Central bank balance sheets and aggregate credit to non-financial cor-
porations in the EMU
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A third CBPP was announced in September 2014. CBPP3 marks a further esca-
lation in the ECB’s UMP because it involves purchases of covered bonds with un-
limited volume and without restrictions on maturities and liquidity (ECB 2014a).
Still, as shown in the upper panel of figure 5, the increases of the ECB’s bal-
ance sheet due to this program were negligible. Hence, CBPP3 belongs still to
the category of qualitative easing. To move the scope of policy measures more
towards lending to the real economy, an ABS Purchase Programme (ABSPP) was
announced jointly with CBPP3 in September 2014. The ECBs intentions behind
this program were, according to the official communication, to revive the ABS
market which had dried up after the financial crisis (ECB 2014b). The size of the
European ABS market is small and very few non-financial corporations do actively
use ABS as a means of internal finance (Altomonte & Bussoli 2014). However, ABS
can enable banks, which are, due to capital requirements, not able to lend, to free
up space in their balance sheets in order to provide new loans. The ECB accounts
for the limitations of purchases in this market with a maximum of freedom re-
garding the program’s parameters. Table 1 shows there are no limits regarding
volume, maturities or issuance size. ABS may be purchased in the primary as well
as the secondary markets and tranches may include senior and guaranteed mez-
zanine tranches but no equity tranches (ECB 2014b). Until this point, the ECB
had avoided balance sheet increases and focused on qualitative easing. According
to the upper panel of figure 5, the balance sheet even decreased between 2012 and
2015. Moreover, the lower panel of figure 5 underlines that, ex post, the programs
did not have effects on aggregate lending.
Against this backdrop, the ECB moved on to quantitative easing measures in
January 2015, when the Expanded Asset Purchase Programme (EAPP) was an-
nounced. The objectives behind EAPP are very similar to the goals behind
the qualitative easing measures described above: depressed yields on government
bonds should ease funding conditions for non-financial corporations and households
to foster aggregate investment (ECB 2015). EAPP is supposed to achieve this with
monthly purchases of EMU government bonds across a broad range of maturities
(2-30 years) in the secondary market. Initially, the program was announced to last
for 12 months, but during the announcement the ECB Governing Council under-
lined that they would be willing to prolong the program if considered necessary.
Apart from government bonds, also bonds issued from government agencies and
debt securities issued by supranational European Union (EU) institutions may be
purchased under EAPP.25 This program is certainly a milestone in the history
of monetary policy in the EMU. However, in an international context, it is no
25A list of eligible institutions is available on the website https://www.ecb.europa.eu/mopo/
implement/omt/html/pspp.en.html
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novelty, as other major central banks have conducted very similar programs years
before the announcement of EAPP.26 The ECB introduced two slight modifica-
tions to EAPP in November 2015. These changes are not listed as a separate row
in table 1 because the main parameters of EAPP remained unchanged. First, the
modifications included purchases of bonds issued by regional governments, such as
for example German Bundesla¨nder. Second, the maturity of the entire program
was extended to at least March 2017. This did not come as a surprise, since the
Governing Council had been very explicit about their willingness to prolong the
program during the first official announcement of EAPP in January 2015 and in
the official wording of the program (ECB 2015). Consequently, I do not consider
these changes as a separate purchase program event in the following empirical
analysis. A larger overhaul of the program was announced in March 2016, when
the ECB increased the volume of the asset purchases (ECB 2016b). Moreover,
this overhaul introduced an additional layer with the introduction of a dedicated
corporate bond program called CSPP, which is explicitly limited to non-financial
firms (ECB 2016a). The modified EAPP and CSPP are in combination limited to
80 bn. EUR per month.
In effect, the ECB’s history with UMP marks a clear escalation from highly tar-
geted programs aimed at specific risk premia (qualitative easing) to actions with
a focus on volume in highly liquid markets. The upper panel of figure 5 illustrates
the trend-breaking effect of the EAPP announcement on the ECB balance sheet
in January 2015.
B. Alternative Construction of Interest Rate Shocks
As suggested by Kuttner (2001), I construct monetary policy shocks using interest
rate futures in section 3 (see (2) and (3)). This procedure assumes futures markets
contain expectations of market participants (Fisher 1930, Hicks 1946). Admittedly,
one can argue that this story is simply untrue. Indeed, the mechanics of cash-and-
carry arbitrage suggest that nothing beyond storage and financing costs determine
the relationship between spot and futures markets. In spite of this compelling
argumentation, the empirical forecasting literature has clearly found that futures
prices as predictors for future spot prices are hard to beat.27 If one were to reject
the informativeness of futures rates for current spot rates, there would be two
26See Rogers et al. (2014) for a summary of the UMP measures of the BoE, BoJ and FED.
27Krueger & Kuttner (1996) as well as Bernoth & Hagen (2004) show that future rates forecast
changes in monetary policy rates. In general, there is ample evidence that futures rates
forecast spot rates (Cole et al. 1991, Hafer et al. 1992, Patel & Zeckhauser 1987).
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alternative ways to gauge the market’s expectations regarding future spot rates.
First, one might assume traders make naive forecasts and use the last observed
spot rate as a forecast. This possibility has been explicitly considered in the article
through modeling the monetary policy shock as ∆i, along the lines of Cook & Hahn
(1989).
Alternatively, traders might forecast futures rates using an AR(p) model with
lag length p. We assume that traders fit an ARIMA(1, 0, 0) model to the entire
available history before every Governing Council meeting in order to forecast the
short rate. Subtracting this forecast from the actually observed spot rate at the
end of the meeting day yields an alternative unexpected interest rate shock, which
we call ∆iu,ARt . As in (3), the expected interest rate shock is then given as ∆i
e,AR
t =
∆it−∆iu,ARt . Re-estimating (7) and (8) with these shocks yields the results shown
in table 7.
MSCI CDS
∆e,AR -0.60 28.6
(1.6885) (26.989)
∆u,AR 0.25 -0.13
(0.1543) (0.2127)
τu -0.095∗∗∗ 0.31∗∗∗
(0.01828) (0.06553)
Constant -0.098 -0.0085
(0.1493) (0.4408)
Observations 164 98
Adjusted R2 0.290 0.573
This table presents the estimation re-
sults for time series regressions (7)-
(8) with alternative AR(1) interest rate
shocks.
Table 7: Time Series Regression Results - AR(1) shocks
These results do not lead to different conclusions. We find that the AR(1) shocks
are insignificant in equity and CDS markets. The conventional unexpected shocks
computed using futures markets enters the equity market specification (7) with a
positive sign as weakly significant in table 4. It is of similar magnitude and in-
significant in this case. The unconventional shocks continue to be highly significant
and assume the expected signs.
172
C. Event Windows
So far, I have assumed that monetary policy actions hit equity and CDS markets on
the days of Governing Council meetings. Though I have accounted for expectations
in the computation of monetary shocks, it might still be that market reactions
change when we consider event windows instead of instantaneous, daily market
reactions. In this appendix, I test market reactions using four event windows
around the Governing Council meeting days denoted as 10 days before to 10 days
after a meeting (-10:10), 5 days before to 5 days after a meeting (-5:5), 1 day
before to 1 day after a meeting (-1:1) and the meeting day to one day after the
meeting (0:1). Note that large reactions in the aftermath of a meeting contradict
our understanding of informationally efficient markets. Table 8 replicates table 3
using these windows. For the sake of completeness, I have also listed the daily
reactions (denoted as window 0:0), which are identical to the numbers presented
in table 3 in section 5.
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Event Window Conventional Action No Action Purchase Program
Panel A: Equities
-10:10 0.37 -0.21 4.63
(7.9) (5.74) (8.13)
-5:5 -1.52 0.13 2.59
(5.49) (4.14) (4.8)
-1:1 -0.85 0.13 3.87
(3.22) (2.45) (1.99)
0:1 -0.96 0.05 3.25
(2.81) (2.13) (2.51)
0:0 -0.71 -0.02 2.09
(2.46) (1.37) (3.6)
Panel B: CDS
-10:10 5.39 1.22 -8.04
(35.42) (21.4) (30.18)
-5:5 3.97 -0.06 -7.32
(17.75) (16.57) (16.37)
-1:1 2.99 -0.04 -13.03
(9.58) (8.84) (7.34)
0:1 2.44 0.04 -12.94
(8.2) (7.1) (9.49)
0:0 0.72 -0.06 -10.11
(3.87) (3.85) (10.96)
This tables presents cumulative excess returns on the MSCI EMU (in %) over several
event windows in panel A. For instance, window -10:10 denotes the window starting
10 days before and ending 10 days after a Governing council meeting. Spread changes
on the CDS market (in bps.) over the same windows are presented in panel B. Stan-
dard errors are presented in parentheses. The last rows in panels A and B present
the market reactions on the days of Governing council meetings. These numbers are
identical to the numbers presented in table 3.
Table 8: Market Reactions in Event Windows
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First of all, we find that windows spanning more days are associated with larger
standard errors. Many different factors, not only monetary policy, affect equity
returns (panel A of table 8) and CDS spreads (panel B) when we increase the
time span over which reactions are measured. Otherwise, there are no suggestive
changes in signs regarding market reactions to CMP or UMP actions. To assess
whether the time series regression models (7)-(8) are able to capture the variation
of equity excess returns and CDS spread changes measured over the event windows,
I re-estimate the specifications below. Table 9 shows the results for (7) when the
dependent variable, the excess returns on the MSCI EMU, is the cumulative sum
of returns over the windows explained above.
MSCI (Event Windows)
-10:10 -5:5 -1:1 0:1 0:0
∆ie -0.52 -0.20 0.50∗∗∗ 0.34∗∗ 0.25
(0.5345) (0.4386) (0.1243) (0.1253) (0.1434)
∆iu -0.42 -0.041 0.55∗∗∗ 0.39∗∗ 0.30∗
(0.5425) (0.4242) (0.1420) (0.1357) (0.1488)
τu -0.070 -0.091 -0.12∗∗∗ -0.099∗∗∗ -0.098∗∗∗
(0.07454) (0.05629) (0.02950) (0.02682) (0.01905)
Constant -0.23 -0.23 0.11 0.000070 -0.061
(0.5129) (0.3589) (0.1859) (0.1676) (0.1120)
Observations 165 165 166 166 166
Adjusted R2 0.012 0.048 0.214 0.179 0.305
This table presents the estimation results for the time series model (7),
whereas the dependent variable, which is the excess return on the MSCI
EMU index, is measured over several event windows. For instance, window
-10:10 denotes the window starting 10 days before and ending 10 days after
a Governing council meeting. The last column repeats the results which
have been presented in table 4 in section 5, where the dependent variable is
just the daily excess return recorded on a Governing Council meeting day.
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Table 9: Time Series Regression Results for Equities - Event Windows
The last column of the table repeats the estimation results presented in table
4. Again, I do not find any suggestive sign changes. The coefficients assume
the same signs as in table 4 when I measure returns over the two or three-days
windows. The event windows looking into the more distant past and future deliver
regression coefficients which are insignificant altogether. A look at the adjusted R2
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coefficients underlines that the regression models are not suited to explain equity
excess returns over long horizons, the specification with daily reactions, which has
been presented in section 5, is by far the most convincing one in terms of R2. I
take these additional results as support for the procedure undertaken in the article.
There is not much information in equity returns measured over a period of days
surrounding Governing Council meeting days, which we can explain with monetary
policy actions. The results which arise when I measure CDS market reactions over
the event windows do neither give rise to different conclusions. They are presented
in table 10 below.
CDS (Event Windows)
-10:10 -5:5 -1:1 0:1 0:0
∆ie 0.41 0.79 -0.55 -0.13 -0.11
(3.0855) (2.0056) (0.8049) (0.6669) (0.2416)
∆iu -0.28 0.49 -0.64 -0.17 -0.081
(3.1874) (2.0863) (0.8319) (0.6965) (0.2658)
τu 0.30 0.25 0.42∗∗∗ 0.41∗∗∗ 0.31∗∗∗
(0.3078) (0.2264) (0.1077) (0.08535) (0.06258)
Constant 1.69 0.50 -0.21 -0.14 -0.39
(2.4353) (1.7798) (0.8360) (0.6579) (0.3386)
Observations 98 98 98 98 98
Adjusted R2 0.013 0.015 0.287 0.382 0.569
This table presents the estimation results for the time series model (8),
whereas the dependent variable, which is the change of the CDS index,
is measured over several event windows. For instance, window -10:10
denotes the window starting 10 days before and ending 10 days after a
Governing council meeting. The last column repeats the results which
have been presented in table 4 in section 5, where the dependent vari-
able is just the daily excess return recorded on a Governing Council
meeting day. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Table 10: Time Series Regression Results for CDS - Event Windows
In analogy to the equity market results, I find that there are no sign changes and
the results which arise when CDS spread reactions are measured over a longer
time span are completely insignificant. Moreover, the results exhibit the same
downward trend in R2: the ability to explain market reactions with monetary
policy becomes very limited as the event window increases. Taken together, these
results support the way monetary policy shocks have been measured in the related
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literature (Rogers et al. 2014, Haitsma et al. 2015) and this article.
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